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Abstract
The need for the concrete analysis of Trespass is dictated by current
struggles over the conditions of land possession in the conjuncture.
Whilst only a Marxist approach is capable of accounting for the
complexity of the totality of Trespass and related law, the principal
general theories of law and the State are prevented from doing justice
to this task by their common rationalist conception of the
abstract/concrete relation and their consequent inability to
satisfactorily ground concrete socio-legal analysis. The proper
understanding of Marx's method of investigation in Capital, however,
can provide the basis for such analysis, through the specification of
a concrete-abstract- concrete methodological trajectory which respects
the specificity of the particular object of study. The point of
departure for the analysis of Trespass is its simplest and most
irreducible expression in concrete social practice: The equal right
to exclude the world from interference with the possession of land.
The concrete particular is analyzed through scientific Abstraction,
which further accompanies the movement from simple to ever more
complex aspects of the object until the concrete totality of law
securing relations of ownership, possession and separation is
explained in its complex form and function. Finally the broadest
Concrete Totality of Trespass and related law is revealed in the full
context of its political and socio-economic determinations in the
conjuncture: The fundamental pre-condition of the transformation of
Trespass in the 1970's is the crisis of capital accumulation, as
mediated through domestic and industrial crises and the phenomena of
squatting and factory occupations which have threatened existing
relations of possession and the institutions of exclusive property
right. Law is ultimately revealed as a terrain of struggle that has
enabled the greater possessors to resolve the legal and socio-economic
crisis to thei r'own advantage at the expense of lesser possessory
interests.
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1Introduction
The immediate impetus for this study was the debate over the
criminalisation of trespass that occurred in the wake of the
squatting boom in the early and mid 1970's, and the urgent need to
explain both it and the changes that were ultimately effected in Part
II of the Criminal Law Act 1977 : What was the nature of this
transformation ; by what means was it accomplished ; how far did its
generally accepted purpose correspond with its real function; and
why did it occur at the precise moment it did? Trespass was therefore
constituted as an object of study by the concrete conditions of
struggle over the relations of land possession and separation
obtaining in the current conjuncture. The larger task then became the
complete explanation of this area of law in the totality of its
Private and Public, Civil and Criminal aspects, in the broadest
context of its socio-economic and political determinations.
The decision that only a basically Marxist approach would be adequate
to the complexity of this purpose signalled the appearance of a
variety of theoretical and methodological problems, whose essence lay
in that whilst Marxism proclaimed a superiority over other theoretical
systems in the adequacy of its explanations of current phenomena, here
it appeared quite unable to provide even the foundations of a proper
detailed and concrete socio-legal analysis. Not only did the 1970's
debate on the "General Theory" of Law and the State remain pre-
dominantly at a highly abstract level, but there was no evidence to
2suggest that the attempted resolution of general theoretical problems
would ~ produce the mediating categories and concepts essential
for concrete analyses in particular fields of law.
Confronted with this problem, none of the available options - to
persevere with one or other of the principal theoretical approaches,
to drastically limit the scope of the analysis, to descend into
empirical description, or to abandon Marxism altogether - were
considered acceptable. On the other hand, the possibility of a
genuinely Marxist solution to the "post-Althusserian" dilerrma seemed
to exist in the detailed examination of the question of Marx's Method:
this was an area generally ignored by Theoreticeans of law and the
State, who had universally attributed to Marx an abstract> concrete
methodological trajectory based on a highly problematic reading of
Marx's method of investigation grounded, not in Capital and the later
works, but in the 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse.
The original contribution of this Thesis is to develop the
implications of a "non-continuity" reading of Marx's Method for both
the on-going debate on Law and State and the problem of the paucity of
socio-legal analysis. It will be suggested that the principal
theoretical approaches share a rationalist conception of the
"abstract" and the "concrete" and their relation which is fatal for
the analysis of concrete phenomena, and that the only way forward in
the socio-legal field now is the detailed study of particular areas of
law - no less theoretical for being grounded in a definite method of
inquiry whose general principles may be specified in advance but whose
particular trajectory must always respect the specificity of the
3phenomena under consideration. The concrete analysis by these means
of the totality of Trespass and related law, and of the process of its
transformation during the conjuncture, will be shown to have yielded
an understanding of the role of law as a terrain of struggle in the
present crisis that could not have been provided within either of the
principal theoretical traditions. Despite the rejection of general
considerations on law and the State as the basis for concrete
research, theoretical reflections of a general nature will ironically
have emerged quite legitimately in the course of the concrete
analysis.
The reasons for the basically descriptive presentation of the legal
history of Trespass and its recent development in the opening two
chapters are inQicated in the Introduction to Chapter 1, but will
become fully apparent only in the course of the argument of Chapter 4.
Marx's method proceeds by way of the critique of Appearances - of the
categories expressing phenomenal forms "with a certain validity" - so
this is a methodological device rather than a concession to
empiricism. Chapter 3 examines a variety of Marxist and "post-
Althusserian" approaches to the problem of theorising law, and finds
p,
them wanting, on the grounds either of internal ,coherence,
incompleteness or inability to provide the means of explanation of the
phenomena already described. Chapter 4 then questions the assumption
of continuity in the development of Marx's method of inquiry between
1857 and Capital, and presents a case against such an interpretation,
concluding by demonstrating the rationalist methodological foundations
of general theoretical approaches, and indicating the prospects for
the Marxist analysis of Trespass based on a quite different method of
4inquiry, beginning with the concrete (concrete particular) and ending
with the concrete (Concrete Totality). Chapter 5 considers the point
of deprature for the analysis of Trespass, the equal right to exclude,
explaining this concrete particular through Abstraction and ultimately
locating it within the broader context of the totality of Trespass and
related law securing relations of possession and separation in modern
Britain. Chapter 6 then examines the socio-economic determinations of
the Concrete Totality in the conjuncture in a movement from
Phenomenal to Essential relations, culminating with the complete
explanation of' the form and function of Trespass and the reasons for
its transformation in the 1970's; these findings are resumed and some
of their implications considered in the Order of presentation of the
results of the method of inquiry which follows in Chapter 7. The
final Chapter further deve~ops the insights of the concrete analysis,
in relation both to Trespass and Law more generally, emphasizing their
foundation in the methodological conditions of their production, but
recognizing the continuing importance of the "politicist" tradition in
contributing to the theorisation of law as a terrain of struggle ; and
concludes with a brief examination of the possibilities for socialist
intervention in the field of Trespass and related law opened up by the
concrete analysis.
5Ch. 1. 'It1eLegal History of Trespass.
(1) Introduction
One of the fundamental pre-suppositions of this thesis is that legal
categories of thought correspond to phenomenal forms of Appearance
expressing real social relations: "The totality as it appears in the
head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head,
which appropriates the world in the only way it can".l The change
and developnent of legal categories of thought, such as "possession",
"ownership", "exclusion" and "interference", corresponds to changing
social relations, which are historically specific and constitutive of
those categories: the analysis of the determinations composing
legal categories provides the explanation of the social relations
they express.2 A full Marxist analysis of Trespass might therefore
seek to explain this legal phenomenon by indicating the real economic
and social relations that have produced its surface categories, show-
ing the historical conditions through which the totality of real rela-
tions/phenomenal cateogories has changed and developed. But this
would be to pre-judge the crucial question of the role of history in
1. Marx: Introduction to Grundrisse, Pelican Books, (1973) p. 101;
see also pp. 102, 104, 105, 106. This fundamental premise informs
Marx's mature Theoretical development, and remains a valid aspect of
the 1857 Introduction whatever its other methodological weaknesses,
recognized and rectified by Marx after 1858 (see infra Ch. 4.)
2. Hence the analysis begins, not with "the real", but with the
categor ies and articulations of categories reflecting it "with social
validity". Contrary to Althusser, however, we assert the absolute
capaci ty of knowledge ultimately to correspond with "reality", as a
necessary presupposition of Marx's Scientific Materialism (infra Ch.
4. )
6the explanation, which must be considered before any such ambitious
undertaking could be justified.3
Following Marx's argument in the Introduction, the concrete totality
of Trespass is "Concrete" because it is the concentration of many
determinations, hence "unity of the diverse", appearing in thought as
the result of a process of concentration, not as a point of depar-
ture, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence
also the point of departure for observation and conception. The re-
construction of abstract determinations leading towards the reproduc-
tion of the concrete by way of thought is "obviously the scientfically
correct method".4 But if we begin our analysis of Trespass with the
simplest category expressive of its social relations, say "posses-
sion", what then is the relation of the order of appearance of this
category in the analysis to the real historical process of the birth
and development of Trespass? Of course it is not possible to speak of
"possession" as an immutable historical relation, neither does its
development follow a linear trajectory; like "money" and "exchange",
this is a very simple category, which "makes a historic appearance in
its full intensity only in the most developed conditions of society.
By no means does it wade its way through all economic relations".5
Feudal "seisin", as a form of "possession", indicates a set of
economic and social relations quite different from those implied in
the modern legal terminology of "possession"; and other simple cate-
gories comprising Trespass, such as "exclusion" and "intrusion",
3. Again, the detailed reference to the Introduction in relation to
this question is not compromised by the various subsequent
methodological criticisms of the 1857 text in Ch. 4.
4. Introduction p. 101; but consider the different meanings of
"concrete" and "abstraction" developed after 1857, discussed infra •
Ch. 4.
5. ibid. p. 103
7similarly have different connotations depending on the epoch under
consideration.
The claim that "possession" appears in its full intensity only in the
most developed conditions of society implies a qualitative distinction
between this and previous forms expressing different social relations.
Compare Marx on "Labour":
"This example ••••shows strikingly how even the most
abstract categories, despite their validity - precisley
because of their abstractness - for all epochs, are
nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstrac-
tion, themselves likewise a product of historic rela-
tions, and possess their full validity only for and
within these relations".6
Labour has of course always existed in some form in Society. But the
modern category "labour", which enhances the comprehension of that
labour which has always existed, is a product of a real abstraction
(the real abstraction of Labour) created in the midst only of " the
richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as
common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a parti-
cular form alone".7 The modern category "labour" required as a
condition of its genesis indifference towards specific labours,
"corresponding to a form of society in which individuals can with
ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind
is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference".8 Similarly,
real relations of possession have always existed, yet it is the
specific relations of possession of and separation from land charact-
erizing modern bourgeois production that have given rise to the
developed category of "IX>ssession" and its incarnation in equal
6. ibid. p. 105
7. ibid. p. 104
8. ibid.
8exclusive possessory right. This historic form of possessory right,
indifferent towards specific individuals by virtue of its abstract
universality, contrasts with the particularity of feudal possessory
and proprietary rights based on the various forms of "seisin". The
simple abstraction, "possession", which expresses an imneasurably
ancient relation valid for all forms of society, nevertheless (like
"labour") "achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a
category of the most modern society".9
It follows from this that the more developed and complex legal form
cannot regard the previous ones merely as steps leading up to itself;
neither can it be imputed to earlier societies. Because bourgeois
society is the most developed and complex historic organization of
production, whose social relations have moulded the simplest cate-
gories in their fullest intensity through real abstraction, this must
however constitute the initial object of study:
"The categories which express its relations, the compre-
hension of its structure, thereby also allows insights
into the structure of the relations of Production of all
the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and
elements it built itself up, whose partly still un-
conquered remnants are carried along within it, whose
mere nuances have developed explicit significance within
it, etc. Human ana tom contains a ke to the ana tom
of the ape. T e IntImatIons of Ig er development
among the subordinate animal species, however, can be
understood only after the higher development is already
known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to
9. ibid. p. 105. These questions are fully considered (infra) Ch. 4.
Section I; the limited purpose here is to justify, by brief reference
to the Introduction, the manner of presentation of the legal history
of Trespass and its recent development in Chapters 1. and 2.
9the ancient, etc".10
Hence the legal history of Trespass cannot inform its present struc-
ture and organization; the knowledge of its present structure and
organization can, however, provide insights into its history. The
specificity of the historical function of Trespass in securing the
conditions of possession of and separation from land is recognizable
through the knowledge of its operation in a highly developed form. In
analyzing Trespass through the movement from its simplest to most
combined categories the initial point of reference must therefore be
contemp?rar¥ socio-legal organization.ll The historical element
does not playa genealogical role in the explanation but enters it
only as a resource for illustration and comparison.12 The legal
categories with which we are concerned are those created and sustained
in bourgeois society, and not those evident at the "beginnings" of
recorded history.
The brief "history of Trespass" which follows in this chapter there-
fore makes no claim to scientific adequacy, its purpose rather being
two-fold: to provide a descriptive account, which may later be
subjected to critique, but which serves as an adequate introduction to
the historical aspects of Trespass that may be referred to in the
'"course of the concrete analysis; and to emphasize that Marx's method
proceeds by way of Critique of existing partialized accounts - which
abstract from the existence of real essential relations and re-produce
the phenomenal forms of Appearance which give rise to merely "spontan-
10. ibid. p. 105. (emphasis supplied)
11. The methodological trajectory from simple to complex centrally
informs the concrete analysis of Trespass; what is rejected, however,
(infra Ch. 4. Section IV) is the conflation of the abstract with the
simple and the concrete with the complex.
12. infra. Ch. 4. Section IV (2) (a)
10
eous" and "ideolgocial" consciousness.l3 'Ihese considerations also
determine the "innocent" presentation of the "Modern law and its
recent development" in Chapter 2. Scientific knowledge consists in the
re-organization and re-interpretation of the untheorised categories of
bourgeois commentators such that they adequately reflect, not merely
forms of Appearance in isolation, but those forms in their existence
as part of a broader Totality comprising also the real social rela-
tions that give rise to them:
"In the succession of the economic categories, as in any
other historical, social science, it must not be forgot-
ten that their subject - here, modern bourgeois society -
is always what is given, in the head as well as in real-
ity, and that these categories therefore express the
forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and
often only individual sides of this specific society,
thi bi ,,14IS su Ject •••••
(2) 'Ihe legal History of Trespass15
For methodological reasons, then, the scope of the introductory
history sect~on will be limited to the barest account, corresponding
so far as is possible to that contained in the standard legal Histor-
ies and modern textbooks.16 Fbr convenience of presentation,
Holdsworth's rough periodisation will be adopted: the "medieval Corrrnon
law" from 1066 - 1485 and the "common law and its rivals" from 1485 -
13. The problemat ic of "Essence and Appearance" underpins the
concrete analysis, and is more fully discussed and developed (infra)
Ch. 4. Section IV.
14. (1973) p, 106
15. The period considered here will be from the 11th to the 20th
Century.
16. - although even this limited aim is rendered difficult by the
heterogeneity of Trespass as an object and the absence of any unified
treatment of it, even of a descriptive "legal historical" nature.
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1700.17
In the period 1066 - 1485 trespass is a generic term for wrong.18
The wrongful act may be indicted at the instance of the Crown as a
Felony or Misdemeanour19, or an individual may seek redress for it
in the local or Royal Courts depending on the circumstances.20
Our immediate concern is with that particular form of Trespass - the
basis of the modern law - developed as a remedy in the King's Courts
early in the reign of Henry 111.21 The pre-requisite for the issue
of the Writ was that a wrong should have been done to the Plaintiff,
in his body, goods or land, bX force and arms and against the King's
~ - hence the general name Trespass vi et armis. The form of
the writ was an order from the king to his sherriff to summon the
defendant to show whJ:'("ostensurus quare") he has caused damage to
the Plaintiff in the manner alleged;22 why he has insulted,
beaten, wounded and endangered the Plaintiff's life, imprisoned him
until a ransom is paid or an oath given not to sue for a wrong,
abducted his wife, apprentice or a monk, attempted to poison, way-lay
or kill him, driven off his cattle, threatened his tenants, caused his
land to become uncultivable, put a cat in his dove-cot, removed his
17. "A History of English Law" (1966). Other central historical
sources are Pollock and Mai tland: "History of English Law" (1968);
Milsom: "Historical Foundations of the common law" (1969); Maitland:
"The Fo rms of Action at Common law" (1968); and Plucknett: "Concise
History of the Common Law" (1956). For more recent developments we
draw upon Manchester: "Modern legal history of England and Wales
1750-1950" (1980)
18. see: Holdsworth: (1966): Bk III, Ch. 2. Pollock & maitland:
(1968) : Ch. VIII Milsom, S.F.C. : (1969): Ch. 11.
19. see: Plucknett (1956) pp. 371 -372 Milsom (1969): p. 256.
20. "Misdemeanour" replaced "Trespass" as a category of the Criminal
law denoting lesser offences, to reduce confusion with Civil Trespass.
21. ••••• according to Pollock & Maitland : "uncommon in 1250 but
quite cornnonin 1272" (1968) p. 526
22. see Plucknett (1956) pp. 366 - 372
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landmark, destroyed his sea-wall, laid-waste his fields or besieged
his house, and so on.23
Where the Crown does not itself initiate proceedings, then, it is con-
cerned with wrongs complained of by individuals only insofar as they
involve a breach of the King's Peace. Here the award of compensation
may be accompanied by punishment in the form of imprisonment and fine
or outlawry.24 Other classes of wrong that do not involve a threat
to public order, concerning patients badly treated by surgeons, the
negligent shoeing of horses, minor theft, false imprisonment and other
forms of interference with person or property where force and arms are
not used, remain within the Jurisdiction of the sheriff in the local
courts. Yet the area of private wrong in which the Royal Courts take
a direct interest is increasingly broadened by the extension of the
King's Peace beyond particular and personal privilege, and by the
enlargement of the scope of its protection. In a case of 1317, the
artificiality of "vi et armis" and "contra pacem regis" as passwords
to Royal Justice has become apparent: The Plaintiff counts that he
bought a tun of wine from the defendants and left it with them for
safe-keeping until transportation. The Defendants, however, "with
force and arms, to wit with swords, bows and arrows, drew off much of
the wine and replaced it with salt water so that the wine was wholly
spoilt to the Plaintiff's great damage, and against the King's
23. see Holdsworth (1966) Bk III p. 370
24. Only gradually do conceptual distinctions between Criminal and
Ci vil wrongs emerge. For a long time "private" wrong is punishable
because of the Threat to public order. The better distInctIon IS
between cases where proceedings are undertaken by or on the part of
the individual, and those were indictment is at the instance of the
crown.
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Peace".25
Similarly the defendants in many actions of Trespass vi et armis turn
out to be Smiths. In each case the incantations "vi et armis" and
"contra pacem regis" are plainly fictions inserted to secure a better
remedy in the King's Court to that available locally from the Sheriff.
The removal of this artificiality, marked by the Farrier's Case of
1372, sees the birth of Trespass upon the Special Case as distinct
from general or common writs of Trespass vi et armis.26 A writ
demanding that a Smith show cause why ("ostensurus quare cum") he
drove nails into a horse's hoof so that it died was upheld, without
allegation of force and arms and breach of the Peace. Now the King's
Courts would hear Trespasses even though they could not be justified
as Pleas of the Crown by reason of the threat to public order, and
the severity of the outcome for a wrongdoer who had usually been only
negligent was modified since the semi-criminal sanctions attendant
upon Trespass vi et armis no longer applied. Every Action on the
Special Case had to be specially drafted, the "cum" clause being a
preamble setting out the particular source of duty alleged to have
been breached where this was not obvious. This residuary form of
action, itself an early progeny of Trespass, thus provided the basis
for Slander, Libel, Deceit, Trover, and later Assumpsit and Negligence
to develop in the Royal Courts; hence Maitland's famous description
of Trespass as "fertile mother of all actions".
Insofar as it is possible to distinguish Civil and Criminal aspects of
Trespass during this period, the former come to dominate the latter.
25. quoted in Milsom (1969) p. 248
26. ibid. pp. 250-1
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The Criminal law develops and hardens categories of Treason, Felony
and Misdemeanour indictable by the Crown, whilst Trespass becomes
increasingly associated with the Civil law, denoting a "private" dis-
pute litigated by the victim of the wrong.27 Even in respect of the
general form of Trespass vi et armis, the requirement of force and
arms and breach of the peace becomes increasingly notional and the
punitive sanctions diminish in extent and importance, as the specifi-
cally Criminal law takes over the function of maintaining public
order. And finally, Case comes to pre-dominate in situations where
the injury complained of is consequential rather than direct and
wilful, having no connection with the criminal law other than through
its progenitor Trespass.
If the complaint of a wrong is one of the cornerstones of developed
legal systems, then another, of equal if not greater importance, must
be the demand for the enforcement of a Right.28 Such demands in
feudal society predominantly concerned land, the principal form of
Wealth, and the King's Courts became involved in disputes over landed
property and other Rights before interesting themselves in claims for
the redress of Wrongs. The heterogeneity of Trespass as an object and
the problems of treatment caused by it are a direct result of the
mixture of its origins and development in these two aspects of
27. see n. 19. above. As part of this process, the old Appeal of
Felony (undertaken by the victim but carrying serious Criminal
Consequences) declines in importance, overtaken on the one hand by
Criminal indictment, and on the other by semi-criminal Trespass - its
twin if not its direct descendant.
28. See Milsom (1969) pp. 211 - 213
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law.29
Trespass "quare clausum fregit",alleging "vi et armis" and "contra
pacem regis", would provide a remedy in damages for wrongs to land
such as the cutting of timber, the mowing and carrying off of crops
and the trampling of grass, and thus functioned to protect possession.
But from late in the reign of Edward I, in the form of the wri t "de
ejectione firmae", Trespass could also be used by a lessee for a term
of years displaced from land in order to recover damages from his
ejector, and ultimately, by the end of the 15th Century, to recover
lands and Tenements specifically. Importantly the writ protected the
possession of the Termor, who did not have recourse to the Free-
holders' actions, and who previously had a personal action for
specific recovery only against the grantor, through the writ of
covenant, or against one claiming to have purchased from him, through
Raleighs Writ "quare ejecit infra terminum".30
But even though specific recovery of the term has become possible, and
the lessee has a claim-right enforceable against the world, the basis
of the claim remains Personal rather than Real, in that it arises from
interference with the chattle-interest of the lessee in his term and
29. Here we shall only indicate the complexity of the debate
concerning the Origins of Trespass and Case. The question of
genealogy in this sense is misleading in the explanation of the modern
law (see Introduction to this section). Briefly, did Trespass arise
from Appeals of Felony, Novel Disseisin, or from procedures in local
courts, and did Roman law play any part in its development? see
Milsom (1968) select Bibliography: in particular Woodbine (1924 &
1925), Dix (1937), Milsom (1954) and Hall (1957).
30. for detailed discussion of these Writs see: Maitland (1968) p.
43; Milsom (1969) pp. 127-132; Holdsworth (1966) Bk. III Vol 3. pp.
2l3-216
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does not attach to the land.3l What results at the end of the Medi-
eval period comes to be seen as an intolerable legal inconsistency:
The termor, who has supposedly only a limited right of possession
falling short of feudal seisin32, has a better and more expeditious
remedy in the event of displacement than the Freeholder, who cannot
use "de ejectione fimae" but must rather proceed by the cumbersome
Writs of Right and Entry or the possessory Assizes of Mort d'Ancestor
or Novel Disseisn.33 The lessee has succeeded in establishing an
enforceable right of Recovery by appropriating to his own ends a
device intendea principally as a remedy for the redress of a wrong: he
charges that wrong was committed because of interference with posses-
sion; all that need be cited in the writ is the mere existence of the
lease and ejection from the term and specific recovery ensues without
any mention of proprietary Rights in the land, yet it is precisley
such rights that are vindicated in the successful claim.
In the period 1485-1700 Trespass makes increasing incursions into the
31. Later Law would have been simpler if the scope of the Possessory
Assizes had expanded to cover the lessee. The subsequent
classification of the leaseholder's interest as personalty (chattels-
real) is to last until 1925. However, as a chattel-interest in the
13th Century, the lease could be bequeathed, wheras Realty could not.
It does not matter at this time if the action is personal against the
lessor and sounds only in damages, because damages may be adequate
compensation where land is beginning to be conceived as a primitive
form of Capital investment through the Lease. See Holdsworth (1966)
Bk III, Vol 3, pp. 213 - 216.
32. Seisin, Right, Possession are considered in later chapters.
Nei ther leaseholder nor villein tenant are "seised" in fee, and have
no freehold interest. However they do have a form of possession,
coming to be protected by the writ of Trespass. See Maitland (1968)
p. 43; Milsom (1969) pp. 103-106. Holdsworth Vol 3. Bk 3. pp. 88-99;
Pollock & Maitland (1968) [Vol II] pp.2-46
33. To be considered in later Chapters. For detailed discussion of
the Real Actions see Milsom (1969) pp. 106-127; Pollock & Maitland
(1968) pp. 46-76; Maitland op cit; Sutherland (1963) esp. cn Novel
Disseisin. The freeholder (seised in fee) claiming land must bring a
Writ of Right or Entry; and upon ejectment (because he was seised)
the Assize of Novel Disseisin. ---
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law of Real Property. The writ "de ejectio firrnae", already signi-
ficantly detached from "quare claisum fregit" in giving specific
relief aswell as damages, becomes enlarged in scope to benefit the
Freeholder and later the Copyholder, in the form of the Action of
Ejectment.34 By 1601 Coke could pronounce that all Titles for Land
were for the greatest part tried by this means. In this development
the fusion of Tortious and Real actions is becoming apparent; claim-
rights of Title are being cast in the form of the complaint of a
Wrong-the ejectment of the plaintiff by the defendant.
The importance of the delictual element is evident in the complex
fiction necessary in order for the Freeholder to acquired the Termor's
remedy. For the correct form of action for one out of possession of
freehold land in the 14th Century remained technically Real rather
than Personal - the Assize of Novel Disseisin or Mort d'Ancestor,
or one of the Writs of Entry. None of these remedies were so
hazardous as the oldest Real action, the writ of Risht,
anachronistic even by Medieval standards. Yet the pitfalls for a
litigant with a just cause were numerous: the correct choice of writ
was essential; minute accuracy was necessary in wording and pleading;
the plaintiff must win on each of several issues - the complications
of any of which might frustrate the entire claim; the tenant might
cast many essoins where the writ permitted them, and so on. However,
the advantages of Trespass as an action in its own right were also
34. see Holdsworth (1966) Vol VII Ch I; Milsom (1969) pp. 132-140
Maitland (1968) pp. 46-47; Pollock & Maitland (1968) pp. 106-117.
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considerable35: there was no need to select a writ exactly suited to
the nature of the case, and the courts were concerned with substantial
justice rather than minute verbal accuracy in pleading; the action
could be brought either in the King's Bench or the Exchequer, whilst
the Real Actions were the monopoly of the Court of Common Pleas; the
whole case rested on a single issue, the question of the ejectment of
the plaintiff by the defendant; and, because of the Tortious nature of
the action, mesne process was speedy and the collection of damages
easier than with proceedings through the Assize. A defendant on
losing the cas€ was automatically held to have broken the King's Peace
(because the Writ alleged "v i et armis contra pacem reqis"}, whether
violence had actually occurred or not, and was therefore ordered to
prison; to have the order rescinded, or to be released if actually
committed, he must satisfy the Plaintiff for his costs and damages,
and pay a Fine to the King. with the Assize of Novel Disseisin the
enforcement of damages was more difficult because imprisonment was
only awarded where the defendant was judged expressly to have
disseised the plaintiff with Violence. Whilst the semi-criminal
aspects of Ejectment declined in importance in line with developments
in other species of Trespass, the advantage of more expeditious and
certain legal process and procedure remained, sealing the fate of the
35. It is a moot point among legal Historians to what extent its
phenomenal rise was on this account rather than due to the mishandling
of its only effective Real competitor in cases of ejectment, the
Assize of Novel Disseisin. Sutherland (1973) emphasizes the
improvements brought about by Trespass; Maitland (in Pollock &
Maitland [1968]), the internal deterioration of the Assize.
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Real Actions for all but a limited type and number of cases.36
At the beginning of the 15th Century, however, the freeholder could
look only with envy upon the Termor's remedy. Only gradually does a
procedure evolve by whose means the Action of Ejectment can become
generally available for the recovery of possession of Land. The
plaintiff Freeholder must somehow persuade the court that the basis of
his claim is the infringement of a personal leasehold interest in
possession of the land, through his ouster by the defendant. This he
can do only with the assistance of an elaborate legal fiction37: As
the tenant in fee simple (the true owner) of the land he has in
general a right to enter38• He enters in fact and makes a lease for
years to a third person, John Doe, who stays on the land until ousted
by the defendant and then brings an action of Trespass in Ejectment
or Ejectment; To succeed in this action he must prove (1) the
owner's right to enter, (2) the lease, (3) his entry under the lease
and (4) his ouster by the defendant. When all this is established he
recovers his term with damages, and, in reality, the displaced owner
resumes possession of his Freehold.39 The action thus appears in
the records as Doe d. (i.e. on the demise of) Smith v. Saunders. This
peculiar procedure, which according to Maitland well expressed "the
Englishry of English law", became increasingly fictitious, until the
only issue of importance that remained was the question of the claim-
36. see Holdsworth (1966) Vol VII p. 19. and N. 21 below
37. for the best detailed account see Holdsworth (1966) Vol VII pp.
11-16 ; also Milsom (1969) pp. 136-138; Maitland (1968) pp. 47-48.
Here the element of "direct physical force" constitutive of Trespass
becomes even more tenuous.
38. The Right of entry way be "tolled by descent cast", in which case
the Plaintiff will be thrown back on one of the Real Actions - see
Holdsworth (1966) Vol VII p. 19.
39. for the variation in which a fourth party, the "casual ejector",
is involved, see Maitland (op cit)
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ants' risht through his title to enter and make the lease. By the
mid 18th Century Wilmot CJ. could state, with some justification, that
Ejectment had been "licked into the form of a real action".40
Yet the uneasiness of the marriage of principles of Tort and Real
Property Law continued to manifest itself in a specific problem.4l
Because Ejectment was only a personal action in Trespass, a verdict
for the Defendant did not, contrary to the rules governing the Real
actions, prevent further litigation by the same plaintiff on the same
issue of Title; a previous verdict of the courts on identical facts
was not even admissible as evidence in the retrial. All that a
decision against the Plaintiff settled in an action of Ejectment
was the fact that the Defendant was not guilty of the trespass of
which he was accused. The plaintiff might then immediately bring a
further and vexatious action, claiming quite correctly according to
the principles of Trespass that the basis of his case is the alleged
wrong committed, and continuing to be committed, by the defendant -
displacing the question of Title and emphasizing that of the alleged
Tort. Such reasoning of course frustrated the purpose of settling
disputes as to Title by means of Trespass, and the Court of Chancery
made Injunctions available to remedy the abuse from the end of the
17th Century.
In Ejectment, the form of action has evolved in a manner so peculiar
that the relationship to Trespass vi et armis has become virtually
obscured. Yet this development is quite consistent with the general
tendency during the period for Trespass to concern itself less and
40. in Goodtitle v. Tombs [1770] quoted in Holdsworth (op cit) p. 9.
41. see Holdsworth (op cit) p. 16
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less with violent breaches of the peace. The basis of the action
remains the wrongful application of physical force to the plaintiff's
land, goods or person, distinguishing it from Case in which the injury
is indirect or consequential and no force is used, but the degree of
force required is becoming so slight that the merest step on land or
wrongful touch will suffice to ground a successful claim.
By the middle of the 19th Century Trespass "vi et armis" and
Ejectment have acquired most of the features by which their modern
counterparts are recognized today, and further developments are in
form rather than substance. The Real Property Limitation Act 1833
abolished most of the Real Actions leaving Ejectment the supreme
Writ for Recovery of interests in Land, and the Common Law Procedure
~ 1852 finally abolished all fictitious procedure, allowing the
real claimant to sue in his own name. By the Judicature Acts 1873
and 1875 the old forms of Action were abolished completely and
Ejectment assumed its modern form as the Action for Recovery of
~.42 The Law of property Act 1922 reduced in importance the
distinction between Realty and Personalty by assimilating insofar as
was practicable the law or Real Property and chattels Real, and creat-
ing a new classification of legal Estates (having abolished Copyhold)
as Freehold or Leasehold.
Even in the by now consolidated sphere of Tort in its pure form,
Trespass has but a small part to play in the further development of
the Law, being increasingly circumscribed by the offshoots of Case:
Trover, Nuisance, Assumpsit and Contract, and Negligence. The
distinction between Trespass and Case on the basis of the direct
42. considered in detail in Ch. 2.
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forcible or consequential harm attaching to the wrongful act became
hard to sustain with the increase in personal injuries resulting from
traffic accidents (the "running-down" cases) at the end of the 18th
Century and dangerous technological developments thereafter. Whilst
such harm plainly arose out of the immediate application of force, and
ought therefore to be remedied in Trespass, the greater flexibility of
Case in situations where there was no previous relationship between
the parties proved sufficiently attractive for a rule to evolve in
1833 to the effect that a Plaintiff could waive the force and sue in
Case, provided only that the injury complained of was not wilful
aswell as direct.43 The result was that Trespass became increas-
ingly associated with wilful injuries, leaving more and more to Case
incidents of negligence, which then had to be expressly pleaded and
proved. This was the most appropriate legal device for handling
problems of litigation arising from the Industrial Revolution and the
development of the Railways. By the end of the 19th Century Negli-
gence cases had constituted an independent category in the Law of
Tort, and Beven could entitle his textbook in 1889: "Principles of the
Law of Negligence".
Hence today the law in respect of Trespass to Land - the specific
object of this Thesis - may be categorized in terms of a division
between pure Trespass "guare claisurn fregit" and its historical
progeny, the Action for Recovery of Land. The tortious basis of
both is unlawful interference with possession.
Because the emphasis is on possession, it is not the primary function
43. William v. Holland [1833] 10 Bing 112.
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of the Tort to protect ownership as such, however, owing to its
peculiar historical development, where the owner is in possession the
purpose of a suit in Trespass may not be the recovery of damages so
much as the settlement of disputed rights over land; and similarly,
where the owner is out of possession, the purpose of the Action of
Recovery is the repossession of land on the basis of superior Title.
The former claim may be logical enough. The latter, however, where
the Plaintiff does not appear to have any "possession" capable of
being infringed, illustrates the artificality of the inclusion of this
Action within the category of Tort; what is really claimed here is
not interference with possession but better Title, only the Real basis
of the suit has been obscured by an historical accident which contin-
ues to leave its mark in contemporary law.44
44. If, however, "possession" is defined in terms of degrees of legal
right (see infra: Chs. 2 & 5 ) the logical problem does not appear so
acute.
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Ch. 2. 'lb.e Modern Law & its recent develoP!:!lt
For the Methodological reasons indicated this section must also take
the form of a bare account, limited to the legal sphere in abstraction
from other aspects of the Totality. Here the purpose is to reproduce
the categories of Trespass in the order of their appearance in con-
temporary legal commentaries, and to basically describe recent
developments that have taken place in the Criminal Law.
Tres~ss "9uare clausum fre9it" is committed by "intentionally or
negligently entering or remaining on, or causing any physical matter
to come into contact with, land in the possession of another".l The
basis of the Tort is therefore unjustifiable interference with
E9ssession of land:
"Every unwarrantable entry on another's soil the lawen-
titles a trespass by breaking his close; the words of the
writ of Trespass commanding the defendant to show cause
'quare clausum querentis fregit'. For every man's land
is in the eye of the law enclosed and set apart from his
neighbour's; and that either by a visible or material
force, as one field is divided from another by a hedge;
or by an ideal invisible boundary, existing only in the
contemplation of law, as when one man's land adjoins
another's in the same field".2
In the majority of cases Trespasses to land are self-evidently inten-
tional, but a negligently unintentional invasion may also be accounted
a Trespass, provided the injury complained of is direct rather than
consequential (a requirement of all trespass actions). Thus to cause
1. Street, H. (1976) : p 63.
2. Blackstone, Commentaries: Vol 3. p. 209.
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foreign matter to come into contact with the Plaintiff's land3, to
fire a gun into his soi14 or drive nails into his wallS, to
encourage a dog to run into his garden6, or to remove the doors and
windows from his tenements7 are all Trespasses, and as such action-
able without proof of damage. Where on the other hand the injury
complained of is the indirect result of the defendant exercizing his
own property rights, such as allowing the branches8 or roots9 of
his trees to spread over his boundary, suffering his privy to be
out of repair such that filth flows into his neighbour's cellar10,
or fixing a spout on his roof whereby rainwater is discharged onto the
Plaintiff's landll, the proper action is on the Case in Nuisance,
and the claimant must establish the existence of appreciable damage.
It is the fact that Trespass is actionable per se without proof of
damage that enables it to be used for settling questions of Title
(though today there is growing scope for the issue to be decided by
way of declaratory judgement12). The merest direct invasion is
sufficient to ground the action: "If the defendant place a part of his
foot on the plaintiff's land unlawfully, it is in the law as much a
3. "perhaps anything having size or mass, including gases, flame,
beams from searchlights and mirrors, but not vibrations", per Street
(op. cit.) p. 64 n.3.
4. Pickerins v. Rudd [1815] 4. camp. 219.
5. simpson v. Weber [1925] 133. L.T. 46.
6. Beckwith v. Shordike [1767] 4. Burt. 2092.
7. Lavender v. Betts [1942] 2. All. ER. 72.
8. SmIth v. GIdd¥ [1904] 2. KB. 488.
9. Butler v. Standard Telephones Ltd. [1940] 1. KB. 399
10. Tenant v. Goldwin [1704] 2. Lord Raym. 1089.
11. Re~olds v. Clarke [1725] 2. Lord Raym. 1399.
12. as in Acton coryoratation v. Morris. [1953] 2. ALL ER. 932. see
Clerk & Lindsel1 (1975 para. 1317; Street (op. cit.) p. 63. n. 1.
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trespass as if he had walked half a mile on it".13
Ca) WhatConstitutes ·Possession·
Trespass is actionable as the suit of the person in possession; the
test of possession of land is the nature of its occupation or the
degree of physical control exercized in respect of it.14 However,
the type of conduct necessary to constitute "Possession" must vary
according to the type of land. In the case of vacant or unenclosed
land not under cultivation there is little that can be done to indi-
cate possession,15 other than through acts of enjoyment of the land
itself.16 Where there are tenements on the land, possession is
evidenced by occupation or, if the buildings are unoccupied, by
possession of the key or other method of obtaining entry.17 This
"de facto" custody or detention may be defined as:
"any power to use the thing and exclude others •••••• if
accompanied by the animus possidendi, provided that no-
one else has the animus possidendi and an equal or
greater power".18
In order to found a claim in Trespass, p?ssession must be exclusive.
Thus pasturing cattle on strips of grass by the side of a private road
does not give possession of the land, because the right of passage
exercized by other persons prevents the possession from being exclu-
13. Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co. [1874] L.R. 10 per Coleridge C.J. at
p. 12.
14. No consistent theory of possession exists in English law. The
concept is considered in greater detail below: see Pollock & Wright
"possession in the common Law" (1888) ; Harris D.R: "The concept of
Possession in English Law". (1961)
15. Ocean Estates v. Norman Pinder [1969] 2. A.C. 19.
16. Jones v. Wllllams [1837] 2. M & W 326.
17. Jewish Maternitx Societx's Trustees v. Garfinkle [1926] 95 LJKB
766.
18. Terry, "Principles of Anglo American law" ; cited in Pollock &
Wright (op. cit.), quoted in Winfield & Jolowicz (1979) p. 336.
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sive.19 If there is a dispute as to which of two competing claim-
ants has de facto possession, the presumption is in favour of the
person who can show title to the land.20 Once established, de facto
possession gives a right of undisturbed enjoyment against all wrong-
doers except the lawful owner. It is no answer for a defendant to
show that Title and right to possession vest in someone other than the
plaintiff bearing allegedly inferior Title, if that other person is
not himself; jus tertii is no defence unless he can prove that he
committed the act complained of on the authority of the true
owner.21
It would seem an inevitable consequence, therefore, that where at the
time of the commission of a trespass to land a plaintiff owner happens
to be out of possession, either through neglect to enter on the
accrual of Title or through having been wrongfully ousted, he is with-
out remedy in Trespass. However, here as in other areas of the
Law22, the courts have been willing to extend the protection afford-
ed the bare possessor to the legal owner, and this has been accom-
plished with the development of the doctrine of "Trespass by rela-
19. Coverdale v. Charlton [1878] 4. Q.B.D. 104.
20. "If there are two persons in a field, each asserting that
the field is his, and each doing some act in assertion of
possession, and if the question is, which of those two is
in actual possession, I answer the person who has the
title is in actual possession and the other is a tres-
passer". per Maule J. in Jones v. Chapman [1849] 2.
Exch. 803, 821.
21. Graham v. Peat. [1801] 1. East. 244.
22. see supra: Ch. I.
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tion,,23: once a plaintiff entitled to immediate possession actually
enters upon the land, he is deemed to have been in possession from the
moment his right to it accrued, enabling him to recover damages for a
trespass committed during the intervening period. Whilst the law
stops short of equating the right to possession with de facto posses-
sion, only the slightest entry upon any part of the land is necessary
to vest in the plaintiff possession of the whole.24
Cb) Who may sue in Trespass
Although in general actual or constructive possession is essential to
an action in Trespass, an exception is the case of the Reversionary
interest, where the plaintiff has no immediate right to posses but may
nevertheless recover damages for permanent injury to the land without
waiting for the future estate to fall into possession.25 Here how-
ever a claimant must prove appreciable damage - an exception to the
rule that Trespass is actionable per se - and there is no remedy for
bare invasion.26
That the tests of "exclusive occupation" and "physical control" do not
exhaustively define possession is illustrated by the case of a servant
given temporary control of his master's premises. In the absence of
any intention on the part of an owner to treat the occupier as a
tenant, the mere exclusive control of the property is not sufficient
to constitute "possession", which remains with the owner in spite of
23. see Clerk & Lindsell (op. cit.) para, 1330.
24. Ocean Estates v. Norman Pinder (op. cit) The law develops this
fiction to avoid havIng to admIt, again, that it is ownership that is
really being protected rather than possession. See also action for
Mesne profits (infra).
25. Jones v. Llanrwst U.D.C. [1911] 1. Ch. 393.
26. Baxter v. Ta¥lor [1832] 4 B & Ad. 72.
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his physical absence.27 Some commentators therefore distinguish de
facto possession from "possession in law"; whilst in the vast major-
ity of cases the two coincide, it is specifically the latter aspect
which is necessary to found a claim in Trespass.28
Similarly neither guest nor lodger can bring Trespass because posses-
sion remains in the landlord:
"A lodger in a house - although he has the exclusive use
of rooms ••••• is not in exclusive occupation, because the
landlord has retained to himself the occupation •••••••
such a lodger could not bring Ejectment, or Trespass
quare clausum fregit, the maintenance of the action
depending on possession".29
Here the basis of the occupation is contractual, and no estate in-
terest is conferred in the land itself. On the other hand, tenants
and lawful sub-tenants do have such an interest, and have legal
possession sufficient to bring Trespass even against the landlord,
unless his entry was effected in accordance with the provisions of the
lease.30 The lessor of land gives up possession in law aswell as in
fact to the Tenant, and can himself only bring Trespass during the
term if a wrongful act has caused permanent damage to his Reversionary
interest.3l
Whether or not a trespasser has possession and can maintain an action
for subsequent invasions by others depends on the circumstances. In
principle, "even wrongful possession, such as that acquired by a
squatter, will be protected except against the owner of the land or
27.
28.
29.
Bertie v. Beaumont. [1812] 16. East. 33.
see Winfield & Jolowicz (op cit) pp. 337-338.
Allan v. Livereool [1874] L.R. 9. QB 180. per Blackburn J.;
Ae~h v. Parncliffe investments Ltd. [1964] 1. WLR. 1064.
Lane v. Dixon [1847] 3. CB. 776.
supra.
30.
31.
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someone acting lawfully on his behalf".32 A trespasser who expels
one already in possession does not himself thereby gain possession,
in the absence of submission and the expiry of a reasonable time:
"A mere trespasser cannot by the very act of trespass,
immediately and without acquiescence, give himself what
the law understands by possession against the person
whom he ejects, and drive him to produce his title, if
he can, without delay, reinstate himself in his former
possession".33
Since in such cases the Trespasser has not gained possession, it
follows that the use of force by the real possessor in order to re-
enter will be treated as if it were merely a forcible resistance to an
intrusion upon a possession which he had never lost.34
(c) What constitutes -Interference-
The category "Interference" requires definitions of certain types of
acts35 and their subject-matter. The subject of Trespass - what may
be interfered with - includes not only land itself but in principle
all that lies below and rises above it.36 Anything attaching to the
32. Winfield (OPe cit.) p. 337.
33. Browne v. Dawson. [1840] 12. Ad & E. 624. per Lord Denman. What
is a ·'reasonable time" depends on all the circumstances of the casei
here 10 days was considered reasonable.
34. Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club [1920] 1. KB. 720 see also
Adeyinka 0yekan v. Musendiku Adele [1957] 1. WLR. 876.
Whether or not a trespasser has "possession" carries important
consequences in respect of the protection afforded by the Criminal
law. McPhail v. Persons Unknown [1973] 3. WLR 71. (considered fully
below)
35. see supra: notes 3-7 for example of direct invasion.
36. according to the old maxim: "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum". (from the centre of the earth to the utmost reaches of the
sky. )
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soil, such as herbage37, turnips38, trees or underwood, and
similarly the subsoil and minerals beneath it, may be the subject
of invasion. Usually land is divided horizontally such that its
different levels are separately possessed: The owner of a manor may
be in possession of pasturage on the surface of the waste, whilst
another person possesses the peat immediately beneath it39, and yet
a third has an interest in minerals further underground ; and this
last possession may again be subdivided as between the upper and lower
seams of the minerals.40 Where a public highway is used in a manner
beyond what is reasonable for the purpose of passing along it,
trespass may be committed against the person in possession of the soil
on which the highway rests.41
In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, the party in
possession of the surface is presumed also to possess what lies
beneath it. The same may not be said however of air-space above land,
and in this respect the old dictum42 has been embarrassed ; it is
only Trespass to invade that portion of air-space which is requisite
for the full use and enjoyment of the land.43 The flight of an
aircraft several hundred feet above a house is not trespass at common
37. Richards v. Davies [1911] 1. Ch. 90.
38. We1lawa¥ v. Courtier [1918] 1. KB. 200
39. Wilson v. Mackreth [1766] 3. Burr. 1824
40. Butterle¥ Co. v. New Huckna11 Co11ier¥ [1910] A.C. 381.
41. at common law the person whose land abuts the highway. Hickman v.
Maisey [1900] 1. QB. 752.
42. see n. 36.
43. Ke1sen v. Im~rial_Tobacco [1957] 2. QB. 334.
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law44, and the Civil Aviation Act 1949 expressly provides that
aircraft flying at a reasonable height, having regard to wind,
weather, and all the circumstances of the case, do not commit
trespass.45
(d) Remedies
Once the elements of unlawful interference with possession are
established, the plaintiff may seek a remedy appropriate to the
circumstances. Provided that he acts without delay against squatters
or Trespassers, one in possession may resort to self-help and use a
reasonable degree of force to eject an intruder without giving grounds
for any civil action.46 Otherwise damages are recoverable according
to the degree of harm caused, and may also be claimed even though no
substantial loss has occurred, although here the award is likely to be
nominal. In such a case the plaintiff will generally attempt to
secure an injunction to prevent the continuance of an inter-
ference.47
(e) Infringement of the Ri<Jhtto possess; the Action for Recovery
The action for Recovery of Land, as distinct from pure Trespass
"quare clausum fregit", cannot be said to have its legal foundation in
"interference with possession" in the strict sense in which this term
has been considered. Here the plaintiff is "out of possession" and
44. Bernstein v. Skyyiews Ltd. [1977] 3. WLR. 136.
45. S. 40 (1). However an action in Nusiance remains available.
46. Hemmin<Js v. Stoke Poses. (op. cit.) but see n. 34.
~7. as in Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco (op. cit.) where a mandatory
lnjunction was granted for the removal of an advertizing sign
projecting some four inches into the plaintiff's air-space. see also
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 38. p. 749.
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establishes a claim against the person in possession on the basis of
superior Title. The court may decide on applicataion that the
claimant has a greater right than the defendant, whose continued de
facto possession thereby becomes a wrongful infringement of the
plaintiff's possessory right, but only by construing the Action for
Recovery in this convoluted way can it logically be brought within the
ambit of the Tortious principle i in contemporary law it continues to
disPlay the birth-marks of its peculiar historical origin as an
offshoot of Trespass, long since licked into the form of a Real
action, and yet subsumed, somewhat uncomfortably, within the modern
category of Tort.
The Action may be brought either in the High Court or the County
Court.48 A writ enforcing an order of possession cannot be issued
without leave of the Court, for which every person in actual
POSsession must have had notice of the proceedings.49 A special
SllITmary"squatters procedure" has, however, been devised to enable
a plaintiff to obtain an order for possession, and a writ for its
enforcement, against persons in occupation of his land if they entered
or remained there without licence or consent, irrespective of whether
all or any of those persons have been identified.50
In an Action for Recovery the plaintiff must win by the strength of
48. see Halsbury Vol 32 p. 371.
49. Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) Ord. 44 rule 3. (2).
50. RSC ord 113. County Court Rules (CCR) ord. 26.
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his own Title and not by the weakness of the defendants,51 but
it remains an open question whether proof of absolute right is
necessary and whether therefore "jus tertii" is a good defence.52
If the Plaintiff must show an absolutel¥ good Title, then the
defendant may defeat his claim by indicating the existence of one
better·53 f, I however all that is required is a relativel¥ better
Title, then the Plaintiff will win despite this by showing a de facto
POSsession prior to that of the defendant.54
To an Action for Recovery may be joined a claim for Mesne Profits,
another species of Trespass lying for damage suffered by the Plaintiff
through having been out of possession.55 Where however the action
for Mesne Profits is brought separately, because all Trespass actions
other than Ejectment require possession in the strict sense, the
Plaintiff must enter the land before he sues ; then, by the fiction of
Trespass by Relation, he is deemed to have been in possession during
the whole period for which mesne profits are claimed.56
ID Justification of Tresptss
If the interference complained of can be legally justified it cannot
51 Da52' ~nf?rd v. McAnult¥ [1883] 8 App. cas•.~5~.
ec '. 1t 1S clear (supra ,) that jus tert11 1S no defence in a pure
t10n of Trespass.
53. proponents of this view are Holdsworth (op. cit.) Vol VII pp.
57-67 and 56 L.Q.R. 479; Salmond: Torts (16th ed.) p. 46. Winfield
~oP. cit) p. 350. The principal authority is doe d. Carter v.
~ [1849] 13 QB. 945.
A4• the view taken by Clerk & Lindsell (op. cit.) para. 1360. see:
~ v. Whitlock [1865] LR 1 QB. 1. Allen v. Roughle¥ [1955] 94••L.R. 98.
~5. R.s.C Ord. 15 Rule 1. The plaintiff may claim not only profits
aken by the defendant during his occupancy, but also damages fordeter··· .. n5 10rat10n and reasonable costs of recover1ng possess10 •
6. SUpra.
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be Trespass. Acts which would otherwise be Trespass may be prevented
from being so through the existence of some specific legal provision
a person entering land under arrangements made by a Local authority
for the public to have access to open Country is not a Trespasser
provided that the specified conditions are complied with57 i a
bailiff commits no Trespass if he enters private premises for the
Purpose of executing a court order58, nor does a landlord if he
distrains for Rent59 a policeman may enter premises for the
Purpose of investigating a disturbance60 i and again, licence is
given by law to enter adjoining land to abate a Nuisance or to prevent
the spread of fire,6l or to return goods that have been deposited
on the defendants premises by the plaintiff.62
Similarly, a person who enters land with the express or implied
permission of the possessor has a licence, and cannot be a Trespasser.
HOWever, a gratuitous licence may be revoked at any time by notice, so
that if the licensee remains on the land he becomes a Trespasser.
Even a contractual licence, given in return for valuable .con' l'slderation, can normally be revoked at the election of the lcensor
although he may be liable for breach of contract63 i whether a
COntractual licence is legally revocable is a question of construction
of the contract in the light of all relevant and admissible
~~. ~ational Parks and Access to countryside Act 1949 S. 60.
~side Act 19$8 ss. 16-19.
59· §9utham v. Smout [1964] 1. QB. 308.
60· see Clerk & Lindsell (op. cit.) Ch. 16.
61· ~ v. Smith [1833] 6. C & P. 216.
62· ,£ope v. Share; (No.2) [1912] 1. KB. 496.
63· ~a v. Sheward [1837] 2. M & W. 424.
• !hompson v. Park [1944] K.B. 408.
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circumstances.64
{<J} Develo~ts in the Criminal law.
Trespass today remains pre-dominantly a category of Private Law. The
punitive sanction which originally attached to violations of
possession "with force and arms and in breach of the peace" was
formally abolished in 1694 and obsolete in legal practice long
before that date.65 Nevertheless, specific forms of Trespass have
been made Criminal by Statute, as where particular property is66
involved, such as Railways67, certain enclosed gardens in public
places, or the premises of Foreign Missions68 ; or where a
particular crime is intended such as Theft69 or the pursuit of
Game70 ; or where there are other special circumstances, as where
the Trespasser is in possession of a firearm7l or other weapon of
offence.72 Additionally, Trespass is a Crime with certain
64. see Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd. [1915] 1. K.B. 1.
Winter Gard~heatre Ltd v. MIllenlum Productions. [1948] AC 173.
also Clerk & Lindsell (op. cit.) paras. 1345-1349.
65. Exemplary damages may be awarded only where the wrong is an
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of
Government, or where the wrongdoers' conduct has been calculated on a
profit exceeding the compensation payable to the plaintiff. (see
Clerk & Lindsell [OPe cit.] para 1357).
66. Railwa¥ Resulation Act 1840 s. 16. British Railwa¥s Act
1965 s , 35. (6).
67. Town Gardens Protection Act 1863 s. 5.
68. Criminal Law Act 1977 (Part II) s. 9.
69. Theft Act 1968 s. 9.
70. Game Act 1831 S. 30.
71. Firemans Act 1968 S. 20. (1)
72. CrImInal Law Act 1977 (Pt. II) S. 8.
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exceptions where violence is used for securing entry to premises73,
or where the Trespasser fails to leave after being asked to do so by a
"Displaced Residential CCcupier" or a "Protected Intending
Occupier",74 or where court officers are obstructed in the execution
of process for posssession.75 Otherwise, however, the familiar
notice "Trespassers will be prosecuted" is no more than a "wooden
falsehood".
Ch) Conclusions
Trespass can certainly boast an illustrious History, yet in its most
important aspects appears to have become something of a legal back-
water, its Criminal role long since absorbed into a separate category
of law, and its function of conflict resolution definitively over-
shadowed by actions on the Case in Nuisance and Negligence. Even as a
means of testing Title to Land it can be expected to lose ground to
the increasingly popular ~claratory Judgement. Only the Action for
Recovery, whose real connection with Trespass aside from historical
accident is dubious, continues to play a crucial yet subterranean role
in the Modern Law.
73. ibid. S. 6.
74. ibid. S. 7.
75. ibid. S. 10.
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Ch. 3. 'llleoretical !fl>roachesto Law
The explanation of the historical and conjunctural, civil and criminal
dimensions of Trespass requires the theoretical analysis of this area
of Law and its relation to the state. Existing theoretical approaches
to Law and Statel will be judged according to their internal
coherence, the possibilities they offer for historical and concrete
analysis, and their political implications for Law as a field of
struggle. Finally the prospects for the adequate theoretical and
concrete analysis of Trespass will be considered.
The necessary pre-conditions for an adequate historical-materialist
account of Law (specified conceptions of Totality and of determination
by the Economic) are established in two principal approaches, on the
one hand in the theory of "state derivation" ("staatsableitung"), and
on the other in the work of AI thusser and Poulantzas. Three
secondary approaches of more limited scope may be identified, the
"post-AIthusserian" current of Hindess and Hirst, the "Gramscian"
Approach of Hall et. al., and the tradition of Marxist Historiography
1. The analysis of Law cannot but take some account of the State
because of the close historical and conjunctural associaton. The
precise nature of the relation remains however problematic (see:
Poulantzas's concept of the "juridico-political", infra.)
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represented by E.P. Thompson.2
The principal approaches were developed in the 'sixties in reaction
against humanistic , economistic and voluntaristic conceptions of the
State. Both reject the theoretical separation of the political from
the economic which leads to the neglect of their formal institutional
relation and to the conception of State activity as manipulated and
determined by dominant class Will.3
The secondary ap~roaches were developed in reaction against one or
other aspect of the principal debate. Both Hirst and '!hompson,from
Widely divergent traditions and positions, have recently produced
critiques of Althusserian rationalism4, whilst Hall and his
~. The work of Bernard Edelman will also be considered;
Al~husserian" in some respects, "post-Althusserian" in others, it
def1es easy classification. In his review of Marxist Theories of LaW,
iessop (1980) discusses it with that of Hirst: "On Interpellation and
begal subjecti vi ty" pp 361-363. Epistemologically, however, it
elongs to the Althusserian tradition: (infra.). Here it will be
con~idered "secondary" in relation to the principal approaches because
of 1ts extreme specificity and limited focus compared to the breadth
~f the work of e.g. poulantzas. Jessop places Thompson in a
'Gra~scian" category with Hall et. al. (pp 363-365) Here however
Marx1st Historiography will be considered separately. In other
respects, Jessop's general framework is unexceptionable.
3. In "Stamocap" Theories, the general concepts of contradictions and
laws of motion tend to produce umproblematic responses at the level of
the State through monetary control, expenditure, Law etc. see: Glyn &
Sutcliffe (1972); Gough (1975); Yaffe & Bullock (1975). For a general
a~ount of Fundamentalist and Neo-Ricardian positions see Holloway &
P1cciotto (1975) pp 10-15; For a more detailed account and critique
See Fine & Harris (1979). Neither approach adequately grasps the
spec.if~cityof the political. For a more traditional Marx~st-Leninist
P?Slt1on which arguably (see Jessop p. 340) tends 1n the same
d1rection, see Balibar's (1977) defence of the concept "Dictatorship
of the Proletariat" against its abandonment by the 22nd Congress of
the PCP.4. Hirst and Hindess broke decisively with the Althusserian approach
of "Pre-Capi tal ist Modes of Production" in "Mode of Production and
Social Formation" (1977), its auto-critique. subsequently (see Cutler
~t. al. 1977) the reasons for this break have been made more explicit,
~nvolving the rejection not only of Althusserian rationalism/essential
i sm, but of "epistemolog ical discourse" tout court. (see infra).
Thompson's er itique of "AIthusserian structurallism," embryonic in
(1975) pp. 258-269, has been fully developed in "The Poverty of
Theory" (1978).
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collaborators have developed a Gramscian form of conjunctural analysis
which attempts to transcend the Theoreticism inherent in the dominant
general approaches.5 In neither case is the way forward seen to lie
on the terrain of the principal theoretical debate.
This however raises a further problem, concerning the extent to which
Thompson and Hirst particularly, and Hall et. al. to a lesser degree,
have abandoned or ignored crucial distinguishing features of the
fundamental Marxian problematic, and in so doing raised again the
spectre of Voluntarism in their conceptions of Law and State.6
I. The State Derivation ~roach7
The methodological point of departure for the "Staatsableitung"
analysis of the state is the category of Form. Bourgeois social
relations have given rise to historically specific separated Economic
and Political Forms. The investigation of the relation between the
economic and the political therefore begins by asking what is the
basis of the particularization (Besonderung) of Capitalist Society
into apparently autonomous spheres of State and Society: "What is it
about social relations in bourgeois society that makes them appear in
5. See Hall et. al. (1978 a); Hall: (1979); (1980 c.); (1980 a.r.
6. This argument will be elaborated in the course of the chapter.
7. This term has been adopted by Holloway and Picciotto (1977),
(1978) in introducing the West German Staatsableitung debate to
Britain. They emphasize the inadequacy of the designation "Capital
logic" for all but a minority of the contributions: see (1978) p. 180
n.20; (1977) p. 99 n.ll. See Balbus (1977) for good example of the
Capital 109ic approach.
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separate forms as economic relations and political relations?"8 Why,
in the words of Pashukanis,
"••••does class rule not remain what it is, the factual
sUbjugation of one section of the population by the
other? Why does it assume the form of official state
rule, or - which is the same thing - why does the
machinery of State Coercion not come into being as the
private machinery of the ruling class; why does it detach
itself from the ruling class and take on the form of an
impersonal apparatus of public power, separate from
society?,,9
If Law, State and Economy are historical forms of the capital
relation, then their fetishized appearance as separate spheres cannot
be unproblematically constituted the starting point of analysis10
since it is precisely this division that must be explained. The
logical and historical derivation of the relation between these forms
will indicate the function, limits and possibilites of State and Legal
activity at the various stages of development of the CMP. The basis
of the critique of Voluntarist positions thus becomes clear:
"For by explaining and criticizing state institutions as
the instruments of manipulation of the ruling class, it
is not possible to discover the limits of that
manipulation. These can only be revealed by an analysis
which shows in detail the needs for and limits to state
intervention arising from the contradictions of the
capitalist process of production as a labour-process and
a valorization process."ll
The unity of the German Debate is therefore given in the derivation,
8. Holloway & Picciotto (1978) p. 18.
9. Pashukanis, EB. (1978) (emphasis supplied). The conception of
Totality through the category of Form should not be confused with the
problematic of Phenomenal forms of Appearance/Real essential
relations, however, a close relation exists between them: see Holloway
& Picciotto (1978) p. 179 n.10; Blanke et. al. (1978) p. 194 n.21.
10. as in Poulantzas, e.g. - according to Holloway & picciotto (1978)
p. 4.
11. Muller & Neususs, in Holloway & picciotto (1978) p. 33. Their
contribution began the West German Debate. Compare Hirsch, J. (ibid)
p. 56: "The basic assumption of (voluntarist) Theories is that there
is an "autonomous" political apparatus ••••• which is sUbject to the
dictates of the political decision-making process." I SHEFl-llLOj'
IIWIVFR\ITV
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from Capitalist social relations, of the necessary form of the State
as a separate institution. The specific point of departure remains
however open to dispute. Whilst there is general agreement that
Essential Relations should take precedence in the analysis over
Surface Appearances12, two distinct approaches are discernible
within this position, one associated with Berlin and drawing on
Pashukanis's starting-point in the circulation of commodities, and
the other identified with Frankfurt and beginning with the form of
exploitation of Labour by Capital in the CMP. The former will be
represented in this exegesis by Blanke, Jurgens and Kastendiek13,
and the latter by Hirsch14 and the main British contributors to the
debate, Holloway & Picciotto.15
Ca) Blanke, JUf<Jens and Kastendiek:
For Blanke et. al. the point of departure is commodity - circulation
and the economic form through which this movement is secured.16 The
material - economic nexus of Value is the preconditon of a type of
Societization free from personal, physical force, governed through the
institutions of Exchange, Price and Honey. The value - nexus incorp-
orates both a relation between things and a relation between people:
12. the exception being Flatow & Huisken, who begin with the
"community of interest" on the surface of society: see Reichelt, H. in
Holloway & picciotto (1978) pp. 43-56.
13. Blanke et. al., in Holloway & Picciotto (1978), develop
Pashukanis's "General Theory of Law and Marxism" (1978); this latter
work will not be directly considered here, but its methodological
premises will be examined in Ch. 4 (infra).
14. also in Holloway & Picciotto (1978).
15. For a discussion of other currents within the approach, e.g.
Sauer D. and Tuschling B, see Jessop (1980), where work not available
in English is considered (see n.89 infra). Jessop does not, however,
discuss Holloway & Picciotto; this is a peculiar omission since
Picciotto paricularly (1979), in the field of Law, has attempted to
render the approach concretely applicable to Britain's National
conjuncture: (see infra)
16. op_ cit. p. 122.
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on the one hand, value is the "reified form of the sociali ty of
labour," and the worker is represented in it as nothing more than an
impersonal abstract quantity; on the other hand, the realization
of Value in the act of Exchange requires a conscious act of will on
the part of the commodity owner: "Commodities cannot themselves go to
market and perform exchanges in their own right.,,17 Just as in
Exchange unequal concrete labours and use-values are rendered
commensurable according to an ,abstract measure ("a quantity of gold
representing labour-time"), so the exchanging parties, in reality
concretely different beings with different needs and capabilities,
require "the formation on this plane of action of an abstract point of
reference making this commensuration possible. This point of refer-
ence is man as the subject of exchange.1I18 By these means the
parties acquire an identical social and formal quality:
"'Ibesocial quality is that they have a Will which
relates to the act of Exchange and this to all other
subjects of Exchange. The relationship is expressed in
the form of a mutual recognition as private property
owners •••• and in freedom of contract.1I19
At the moment that relations of will are agreed and fixed they give
rise to a system of legal relations: IIAtthe same time that the
product of labour becomes a commodity and a bearer of value, man
acquires the capacity to be a legal subject and a bearer of
rights.,,20 'Ibeex[>ression of the joint act of Will founded on
mutual recognition is the category of contract, the 1I0riginalmodus of
law", which presupposes constraint or the compulsion to perform
17. Capital I. p. 178.
18. Blanke et. al. (op. cit.) p. 123.
19. ibid. (emphasis supplied).
20. Pashukanis (op. cit.) p. 112
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contracts: pacta sunt servanda:21
"What arises, however, is no one-sided disposision over
the Will of another, but mutual obligation based on
common agreement. with the ever-broadening nexus of
exchange and thus of legal relations, the rules of
exchange must be made more general so as to provide for
the Equality essential to the conditions by which
exchange and its law of equivalent operates. The
imelernentationof the law of value constitutes the
imelernentationof the rule of law. i,~~
From the commodity-form is derived the function of coercive Force,
providing certainty in the for~ulation of Law and its enforcement.
The next step in the derivation is "the developnent of certain
principles of form which this coercive force must observe if it is
to conform adequately to the form of the cornrnodity.,,23'!heLaw
becomes increasingly impersonal and public, an instance separated from
Civil Society through the development of the Norm and the generality
of its application. So, in Law:
"•••there emerges, on the side of the subjects, the
adequate form of a reified social cohesion, and the
fixed, positive norms find a material sanctioning
instance analogous to the function of Money vis a vis
prices: The extra economic force of Coercion.,,24
"COercion ••••has to appear as emanating from an abstract
collective person, exercized not in the interest of the
individual ••••but in the interest of all parties to legal
21. Blanke et. al. (op. cit.) p. 123. The basis of this position is
Marx's argument in ch , 2 Vol. 1. of Capital: "The Process of
Exchange," (see p , 178), as it is appropriated by Pashukanis in his
Ch. 4. "Commodity and Subject." (see p. 113)
22. Blanke et. al. (op. cit.) (emphasis supplied). Compare Marx:
"The content of the juridical relation is determined by the economic
relation" (op. cit.) p. 178.
23. Blanke et. al. (op. cit.) p. 124
24. ibid.; the important point being the extra-economic nature of
the coercion.
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transactions.,,25
By these means equal legal subjects are constituted and set free in a
separate sphere of Politics. The resulting interactions "take the
~ of struggles to establish, or disagreements on how to inter-
pret, rights; their content, however, is economic, i.e., dictated by
movements of production and value-realization.,,26
The separation of the direct producers from the conditions of Product-
ion provides the basis for the development of Money into Capital and
Labour into Wage-Labour, and requires a decisive functional change in
the extra-economic coercive force. With the emergence of Capital, the
principle of Equivalence in Exchange is undermined, and exchange
relations become unequal in content whilst continuing to appear
equivalent in form. Labour-power exchanges at its value as a
commodity, but produces a higher value by virtue of its use-value,
appropriated in Production and realized in Circulation by the Capital-
ist, whilst in appearances all labour is duly rewarded and profit
thereby justified as the return of Capital. The function of extra-
economic force now becomes specifically the protection of private
property in the form of the Capital-relation: the "equal right" of
Capital and Wage-Labour, the right of ownership of labour-power as a
commodity, and the right of Capital to the proceeds of production.27
In this manner the rule of Capital is secured through a change in the
coercive function which leaves no mark on the form of Law. At the
same time the dual stucture of capitalist rule is expressed in the
separation between "Private Law", which continues to govern the
production process, and "Public law" relating to the abstract and
25. Pashukanis (op. cit.) p. 143. See also Neumann, F. (1957).
26. ibid.
27. ibid. p. 125.
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general form of Public Authority. This division of bourgeois law into
apparently autonomous spheres enhances and consolidates the apparent
externality of the relationship of economics to politics.28 The
objective nature of this development now requires that the analysis
"pursue the mode in which the forms affect each other as external
and trace the general features of their effect as class relations
within production.,,29
The further development of the concept of the particularization of the
state defines the character of extra-economic coercive force as
class-coercion: On the one hand, the conditions of existence of
capital-in-general are secured in the appearance of class power as a
neutral separated force standing above the exchanging parties through
the general norms that constitute the form of law, whilst on the
other, the operation of individual capitals is made possible because
the extra-economic coercive force guarantees not just the possibility
but the necessity for the sale of labour-power, as a result of the
separation of the direct producers from the conditions of production.
By this analysis Blanke et. al. claim:
"•••to have shown wh¥ the "state" (as a concrete
structure) constitutes in essence a general force of
coercion which confronts even the individual bourgeois
(individual competing capital) as a separated, neutral
instance, but which, at the same time and only through
this separation is, by vIrtue of its existence as a
central force guranteeing the law, a class force.
Precisely in order to be a class force, the state must
dissociate or 'particularize' itself (sich besondern)
28. ibid. p. 126
29. ibid. p. 127.
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from the ruling class.,,30
Because material-economic relations present themselves as monetary
relations, and relations between the subjects of exchange take on the
form of legal relations, extra-economic interventions are mediated
through Money and Law, and limited by those forms. The use of Law
as a medium of State intervention is constrained by its externality in
establishing standards or norms of behaviour that can only indirectly
regulate the Wills of legal su~jects in the exercize of their rights.
Similarly Monetary Policy is limited insofar as it affects subjects
only as abstract "money-owners" whose function in the reproduction
process is beyond immediate State control.
The limits of State activity also depend on whether the intervention
is directed against Capital or Wage-labour. Where the State attempts
to curtail the controlling freedom of Capital, as for example by
imposing Price and Monetary controls, Capital may retaliate by with-
holding investment, withdrawing capital, removing production to other
countries, decreasing production, demanding compensation or reducing
wages. Where on the other hand the State intervenes to facilitate
Capital accumulation and reproduction, as by attempting to force the
working-class to sell labour-power at a certain price or legislating
in the field of industrial relations, the limit of State activity
depends upon the organization of the working class and the historical
30. ibid. p. 129.
--------~---------~------
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phase of "class constellations.,,3l The mere defence of existing
rights in situations of economic crisis may constitute a threat to
capital accumulation. Irrespective of this degree of organization,
further limits may be imposed where an intervention mediated through
the regulation of working class rights affects also the system of
capital reproduction, as where working class mobility is restricted
(e.g. in Fascism) with consequences dysfunctional for the efficient
allocation of labour resorces in production.
(b) Hirsch:
The Frankfurt Approach derives the necessary Form of the State as a
separate institution, not from commodity-circulation, but from the
specifically Capitalist mode of social labour, "the appropriation of
the surplus-product and the resulting laws of reproduction of the
whole social formation, which objectively give rise to the particular
POlitical form.,,32 Because the establishment of Capitalist
relations of production is the condition for the fullest development
and generalization of commodity - production, Hirsch criticizes the
POint of departure in:
"a concept of corrmodity producing society which disregards
the existence of Capital (and which) is therefore an
inadmissible abstraction, both logically and
historically. Rather the antagonism of wage-labour and
Capital, exploitation and surplus-value, is contained in
the fully developed concept of commodity-producing
Society: the exchange of equivalent commodities merely
mediates •••••the production and appropriation of
surplus-value, the exploitation of living labour-power
31. ibid. p. 141.
32. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 58.
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and the valorization of capital.,,33
The emphasis at the outset is therefore on the coercive class-
character of the State, in the Berlin current subordinated to the
function of organization of antagonistic isolated Capitals in
circulation through the institutionalization of general over private
interests: here the function of extra-economic coercive force, as
guarantor of the meeting of independent wills in Contract, is derived
from the inability of individual subjects to provide the conditions
for their own economic intercourse. According to Hirsch, however,
this merely derives the form of the separate juridico-political
instance from a functional deficiency, wheras function should be
derived from form:
"One cannot make statements about the way in which the
state apparatus functions, and about the conditions and
possibilities of the political management of the system,
before one has worked out consistently from the analysis
of the basic laws of the social reproduction process what
are the conditions for the constitution of the social
form of the bourgeois State and the resulting
determinants of its functions.,,34
Since here the State is not an institutionalization of the interests
of "Capital in General", the question of the limits of its activity
is integrally posed at an earlier stage in the development of the
argument.
In the production process, each individual transaction conforms to the
principle of equivalence, the worker selling labour-power and the
Capitalist buying it at its value. However, the capital exchanged for
labour-power is in reality merely a portion of the product of the
labour of others which has been appropriated without equivalent,
33. ibid. p. 59.
34. ibid. p. 58.
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moreover, not only must this capital be replaced by the producer, but
replaced together with an added surplus.35 The constant sale and
purchase of labour-power is the mere form of the exploitation of
Labour by Capital, and this process constantly reproduces itself,
behind the backs of individuals, through the "blind operation of the
law of value.,,36
The conditions for the constitution of the Form of the bourgeois state
may now be logically derived: (1) The appropriation of surplus-value
does not depend in bourgeois society on direct relations of force but
is secured through the operation of hidden laws of reproduction. (2)
Because this form of social reproduction requires the free disposal
by the worker of labour-power and the capitalist of surplus-value in
equivalent exchange, an essential element in the establishment of
Capitalist Society is the abolition of direct relations of force and
dependence. The manner in which the social nexus is established:
"necessarily requires that the direct producers be
deprived of control over the physical means of force and
that the latter be localized in a social instance raised
above the economic reproduction process: the creation of
formal bourgeois freedom and equality and the establish-
ment of a State Monopoly of force.,,37
Thus the particularization of the bourgeois state "can not be under-
stood as the institutionalization of a 'general will', but means
rather the sep?ration of the political apparatus of bourgeois
35. ibid. p. 59.; see also: Marx: Capital Vol. I. p. 729.
36. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 60.
37. ibid. p. 61.
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society from real individual and common interests."38 'Ihe
Capitalist State is first and foremost the expression of a particular
historical form of class rule and not simply a bearer of social
functions. Such functions are limited by the externality of the
political instance to the social process of production and
reproduction. However, the autonomy of the State as the authority
guaranteeing the rules of equal exchange and commodity circulation is
undermined when the conditions 'of the reproduction and self-expansion
of Capital are threatened. The appearance of generality and class
neutrality, determined by its separate form, is shattered by the
necessity to intervene directly and with force:
"Freedom, equality cmd the rule of Law therefore only
represent one side of bourgeois rule, which is based in
the last analysis on the direct physical use of force.
Likewise, the rule of general laws turns out to be
contantly breached by executive measures which become
necessary in certain sItuatIons to guarantee the general
material conditions of production and reproduction and to
suppress the working class."39
The bourgeois State is therefore caught in a contradiction arising
from the form of its particularization, between the abstract-
generality of its rules and the concreteness of its interventions in
specific situations: the protection of market principles goes hand in
hand with the direct exercize of force "for the specific and
particular purposes of ensuring the reproduction and self-expansion of
capital and the domination of the bourgeoisie.,,412lHaving derived
the form of the State from the Capital-Labour relation, therefore, the
necessity of the function of State intervention ultimately results
from the fact that the capitalist process of reproduction structurally
presupposes social functions which cannot be performed by individual
38. ibid. p. 62.
39. ibid. p. 65.
412l. ibid.
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Capitals.4l
Only at this stage in the derivation of the form and function of the
autonomized bourgeois State is it obvious that its apparatus can and
must clash not only with the working class or sections of it, but
also with the interests of individual Capitals and groups of Capitals
as determined by the requirements of valorization. But even here the
representation of the interests of "Capital in General" is only
secondary and subordinated to the fundamental contradiction, and there
is no guarantee within the formal articulation of State and Society
that such a functional relationship will in practice be secured.42
The fundamental content of state activity is determined according to
developments in the process of Capital reproduction, which must take
place on an ever-expanding scale as a process of accumulation: "the
permanent reconversion of surplus-value into Capital is imposed on the
individual Capitalist as an external coercive law through
competition.,,43 Accumulation takes place in accordance with trans-
formations in the composition of capital, allocated as Constant
capital (buildings, raw materials, auxiliary products) and Variable
capital (that which is spent in the purchase of labour-power and the
process of creation of surplus-value).44 The greater the or9anic
£_omp;>sitionof Capital (the ratio of "living" to "dead" objectified
labour), the lower the rate of surplus-value and therefore of Profit.
Given the basis of the Capitalist system, however, the competitive
development of the productivity of social labour through technical
41. ibid. p. 66.
42. This point is in explicit opposition to the Berlin tendency; (see
Blanke et. al. supra p ).
43. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 67.
44. see Mandel, E. (1977) p. 167.
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transformations of the labour process and development of the product-
ive forces appears as the pre-condition of further accumulation. By
the very requirements of its own reproduction, capital is therefore
forced to introduce changes which tendentially destroy its basis
through rendering living labour superfluous: The increasing organic
composition of Capital (more "dead", less "living" labour) results in
the tendency-of the average rate of Erofit to fall:45 "In this
tendency lies the absolute necessity of that which is contained only
as a possibility in the circulation of money: the manifest crisis of
Capitalism.,,46
However, with the expansion of Total Capital in periods of rapid
accumulation, through the introduction of new machinery, the increas-
ing division of labour and development of the world market, the
variable constituent may also increase (although in constantly
decreasing proportions) as an ever-greater amount of capital is re-
quired to employ the same or a growing number of workers. Thus the
unemployed "reserve army" of living labour, whilst always latent,
becomes manifest only with the stagnation of the accumulation process,
which may be avoided through successful mobilization of counter-
tendencies: "The same influences which produce a tendency in the
general rate of profit to fall, also call forth counter-effects, which
45. ibid. p. 166. iHirsch (op. cit.) p. 68
46. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 70.
hereafter T.R.P.F.
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hamper, retard and partly paralyze this fall.,,47 Thus the increas-
ing productivity of labour may reduce capital expenditure by cheapen-
ing the elements of Constant capital and increasing the economy of
their use, consequently curbing the rise in organic composition.
Similarly Constant capital costs may be reduced by increasing the rate
of turn-over through progressive techniques of organization, planning
and management, or the improvement of means of communication. The
technological transformation of the labour-process therefore gives
rise both to the TRPF and to consequences which weaken its effect.48
Crisis erupts with the failure of the countervailing influences, when
the amount of surplus-value appropriated by individual capitals is no
longer sufficient to maintain the necessary rate of accumulation, and
hence the existing mass of surpl.us-value can no longer be profitably
capitalized. Here:
"accumulation has reached a point where the profits
associated with it are no longer large enough to justify
further expansion. There is no incentive to invest and
because there is no new, or no substantial new invest-
ment of capital, the demand for all commodities
declines.,,~9
The ensuing crisis functions as the vehicle for the mobilization of
the counter-tendencies, as part of the process of "re-organization of
an historical complex of general social conditions of production and
relations of exploitation, which can proceed (however) only in a
47. Marx: Capital III p. 233. Ch.14.
48. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 72.
49. Mattick, P. (1959) p. 43. (quoted in Hirsch p. 75)
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crisis-ridden manner."50 'Thisreorganization involves: changes in
the form of Capital itself, through concentration and centralization,
Monopolies, extension of the credit system and transformation of
relations of property and control through joint-stock companies; the
expansion of Capital in external fields of production and the
creation of a world market; and the accelerated development of the
productive forces and scientific-technical progress.51 At any given
moment the limits and possibilities of Capital expansion are
"determined by general social conditions, which include
the level of Technology, the size of the already
accumulated capital, the availability of wage-labour, the
possible degree of exploitation, the extent of the
market, political relations, recognised natural resources
and so forth. It is not the market alone but the whole
social situation in all its ramifications which allows
for, and sets limits to, the accumulation of
Capital."52
The modern Interventionist State is therefore to be understood as a
form of organization of social relations, peculiar to Capitalism,
within which the contradiction between the growing socialization of
production and the private nature of appropriation can temporarily
move. The investigation of state functions must proceed by cate-
gorial analysis of the historical process of capitalist reproduction
and accumulation, through a frame of reference incorporating three
basic moments. Firstly, the increasing economic and political
strength of the working class which accompanies the progressive
extension of the Capitalist system leads to the necessary function of
social pacification, exercized through Welfare-State intervention.
This mode of bourgeois domination depends, however, upon the undist-
urbed progress of Capital accumulation and continuous economic growth,
50. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 74.
51. see ibid. pp. 76-81.
52. Mattick (1969) p. 74. (quoted in Hirsch p. 74).
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"the preconditions, in the long run im{X)ssible to satisfy, for the
relative latency of the terrorist use of force and for the maintenance
of the peaceful, civilized, formally legal and democratic form of
appearance of bourgeois rule.,,53
Secondly, the "normal course of accumulation" is increasingly
threatened by the TRPF, and by frictions and disturbances in the
reproduction process associated· with the progressive monopolization of
Capital. Under monopoly conditions, the law of value operates less
efficiently as a mechanism for regulating the distribution of social
labour and imposing proportionality between the various spheres of
production than under conditions of competitive Capitalism, and the
state apparatus must intervene in specific situations, in favour of
individual capitals, by influencing the conditions of valorization
through subsidies, currency and taxation measures, or direct
redistribution of revenue. As the productive forces develop, the
process of accumulation requires the exercize of functions of capital
organization that can no longer be supplied by individual capitals,
and must therefore be realized through the intervention of the State.
These processes lead to the consolidation of an extensive state or
state-controlled finance and credit apparatus, which in turn requires
a largely centralized banking system and the foundation of large-scale
insurance and investment funds.54 Beyond these general and
structurally determined interventions, the state performs the function
of global economic management, instrumentally controlling and regulat-
ing the sphere of circulation against the tendency to cyclical crises
of over-production. In this respect fiscal policies may be supple-
53. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 85.
54. ibid~ p. 87.
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mented by forms of wage-regulation through incomes policy, "concerned
explanations" and moral appeals, the total effect of which is to re-
duce in absolute or relative terms the real income of the working
class. Such interventions necessarily give rise to social conflicts
across a broad spectrum of different interests, generating opposition
from organized labour and disfavoured monopoly or non-monopoly
Capitals:
"The contradictions'of the process of Capitalist re-
production reproduce themselves in intensified form on
the political level in conflicts over tax-rates and
quotas and over the extent or allocation of state
expenditure - with the struggle of the working class to
maintain and improve the material conditions of its re-
production being of necessity increasingly directed
against the state. These conflicts must increase all the
more as the process.of capital accumulation slows down
and comes to a standstill ••••This means that the material
conditions of production and the development of the
productive forces of society become a central area of the
functions of the bourgeois state which at the same time
must thereby reveal ever more clearl~ the limits of its
E?ssibilities, limits determined by Its form.~~
The third aspect of State Function is derived from the inability of
individual capitals to provide the conditions for the continuous
revolutionization of the productive infrastructure, made necessary by
intensifying competition on the world market, and essential to the
increase or stabilization of the rate of profit. Increasingly the
material conditions of production are provided by the state through
nationalization or quasi-nationalization since "because of their
specific technological peculiarities and the character of their use-
value (these essentials) cannot - or only to a limited extent or in an
inefficient manner - be produced even by highly monopolized individual
55. ibid. p. 90 (emphasis added).
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capitals.,,56 As the process of accumulation advances, Capital's
requirement for comprehensive research and development is increasingly
satisfied by the State in its organization of Science and Technology.
This function leads ultimately to direct State Intervention in
individual industries with the provision of finance for technological
development.
Several consequences as to the nature and limits of State activity
follow this analysis of Form and Function. The first concerns the
capacity of the State apparatus to manage the economic and social
reproduction process. The production and appropriation of a mass of
surplus-value sufficient in relation to the stage of accumulation
reached cannot be essentially affected, but only modified, by State
intervention, which remains merely a form of the contradictions of
Capital within which they can temporarily move whilst nevertheless
continuing to be historically determining. The State apparatus and
Capital cannot therefore be conceived in a mechanical relation of
opposition. The reproduction of Capital is conditioned by an instance
formally separate from the ruling class, but not "detached from the
movement of Capital, as though Capital had a pivot outside it-
self.,,57
Secondly, "to speak of the management capacity of the State apparatus
56. ibid. p. 93.
57. ibid. p. 99. hence the critique of Voluntarism.
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is to commit an error from the very beginning",58 rather the
bourgeois State must be conceived as the functional unity of a heter-
ogeneous conglomerate of only loosely linked part-apparatuses.59
The fragmented structure of the political - Administrative apparatus
is a result of the fundamental contradiction under Monopoly conditions
of its having to simultaneously consider the interests of competing
individual capitals and secure the political domination of the
bourgeoisie as a class:
"It is impermissible to claim abstractly for the State
Apparatus as a presupposed whole the function of
'guaranteeing the general external conditions for the
reproduction of Capital'. It has always had to, and
increasingly it must, secure the quite particular
profit interests of dominant Monopolies and monopoly
groups, which brings it into serious difficulties and
conflicts in the performance of its function of assuring
the minimal conditions for the reproduction of car-ital
as a whole and keeping the class struggle latent.'~~
Thirdly, since analysis of the laws of motion of Capital accumulation
has shown that the fall in the rate of profit cannot be prevented in
the long term and hence that the process of accumulation must tend to-
wards stagnation, the State Apparatus is "ever more strongly drawn
directly into intense economic struggles and is thereby forced to
confront the proletariat as a barely disguised apparatus of
repression."6l In order to defend the profit of Capital the State
intervenes to secure the reduction of real mass incomes through wages
POlicy, tax exploitation and the direct redistribution of revenue,
assisted by the ravages of inflation. At the same time, resources for
the pacification of Labour become scarce, and past policies "rebound
on the State apparatus when substantive reforms prove to be
58. ibid. p. 100.
59. The functional definition of the State bears an interesting
resemblance to that of Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1968).
60. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 101.
61. ibid. p. 103.
60
unrealizable, leading to a dismantling of Welfare-State
illusions. ,,62
The effect of these developments is:
"a tendency to destroy the basis of bourgeois domination,
namely the illusion of the State's 'neutrality' and
'dedication to the common weal', and to put in question
its ability to guarantee the material and ideological
conditions of capital reproduction.,,63
(c) Holloway and picciotto
Holloway and Picciotto, in introducing the Staatsableitung debate
into Britain, have stressed the importance of historical and concrete
analyses of the State and Law.64 Their critique of the German State
derivation approach centres on the tendency within the Berlin school
to reduce history to a logical category of Capital.65 This failure
is connected, as for example in the case of Blanke et. al., with the
POint of departure in commodity circulation: The effect of the
absence at this earliest analytical stage of the coercive class
character of the State is to render the approach fundamentally
a-historical, because here the motive power of Capitalist development
must logically lie in relations of conflict between individual
capitals or commodity producers, rather than in antogonistic relations
between Capital and Labour - in capital accumulation seen as a process
62. ibid. p. 104.
63. ibid.
64. Holloway & picciotto (1977) ; (1978). picciotto (1979).
65. Holloway and picciotto cite the work of Altvater, Muller & Neususs
and Blanke et. al. as prone to 'capital-logic' tendencies. (1977) p.
99. (n, 11)
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of class struggle.66 At the same time a distinction emerges between
Logic and History such that historical analysis, whilst admitted to be
of great importance, becomes external and secondary to the abstract
derivation of Form from Function:
"On this level of abstraction (Form analysis), however, we
can give only the general points of departure for the
development of 'functions' of the process of reproduc-
tion ••••The question of how this formation takes place
in detail, how it is transposed into structure, institu-
tion and process of the State, can no longer be answered
by form analysis. It would have to be made the subject
of historical analysis. Indeed the exact delimitation of
form analysis raises difficult problems. It depends on
how one determines the historical character of Marx's
concept of Capital in general.,,67
Holloway and Picciotto retort: "If form analysis is to be understood
as purely logical, and historica~ analysis as empirical, this will not
help us to develop an historical - materialist theory of the develop-
ment of the State.,,68 en the contrary, the Capital relation must be
conceived as an historical - materialist and not just a logical cate-
gory.69 In this respect the most adequate position is considered to
be that adopted by Hirsch.70 The initial derivation of the form
of the State from the nature of the Capital relation enables a
historical analysis of the development of its functions7l which
is:
"based on the categorical analysis of. •••the process of
capital reproduction and accumulation; it must be borne
in mind, however, that this is not a question of the
logical deduction of abstract laws, but of the
conceetuallx informed understandins of an historical
66. ibid. (1978) p. 22.
67. Blanke et. al. (op. cit.) p. 119.
68. Holloway & picciotto (1978) p~ 22.
69. see; abid (1977) p. 85.
70. ibid. p. 99. n. 18. But for critisisms see (1978) pp. 27-28.
71. here function is derived from form, rather than form from function
as in the Berlin current (supra).
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process.,,72
The initial moment in the historical formation of the Capitalist State
is the generalization of commodity production and the establishment of
the preconditions of accumulation.73 The crucial function of the
Mercantile State is to guarantee exchange as the mediation of the
separation of Production and Consumption. Feudal systems of communal
property are replaced by institutions of private property through the
constitution of individuals as legal subjects, bearers of rights and
duties enshrined in definite legal procedures,74 as labour is
separated from the land and left with only its labour-power to sell.
The particularization of the State as a separate form is thus
beginning to be established through the dissolution of feudal bonds
and the creation of exhange-rights and a "free" market in labour,
however, until the commodification of Labour itself is achieved on a
universal scale with developed commodity production, "social relations
and State forms are by no means dominated by equal exchange but rather
by its opposite, compulsion.,,75 In this period unequal relations
of appropriation must be backed by authority and force, and "free"
labour is organized and controlled through "bloody legislation against
the expropriated,,,76 vagabondage laws, statutes of Labourers, Laws
of Settlement and fbuses of Correction. Similarly the structuring of
the Mercantile State around trade privileges, monopolies and
regulations of commercef indicates the essential inequality of social
relations, overlain nevertheless by a developing legal framework of
72. Hirsch (op. c i t , ) p. 82. (emphasis supplied). Holloway &
Picciotto's sensitivity to this problem distinguishes their
contribution. -----
73. Holloway & picciotto (1977) p. 86.; see Marx: Capital I. Part
VIII: "So called Primitive Accumulation."
74. see picciotto (op. cit.) p. 172.
75. Holloway & picciotto (1977) p. 87.
76. see Marx: Capital Vol. I Ch. 28.
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individual freedoms, rights and duties.
The second and "Liberal" moment of the State is characterized by the
completion of the process of separation of labour from the means of
production and subsistence, such that capital appears as naturally
belonging to the buyer of labour-power and the worker enters produc-
tion, not because of direct political or social coercion, but on the
basis of the "dull compulsion of economic relations." Circulation now
becomes the sphere of realization of surplus-value created in the
exploitation of Labour, where commodity-capital becomes Money-capital
and must be returned to the sphere of Production in the shortest
possible time in the process of accumulation. Social relations are
thus secured on the basis of free and egual exchange in the sphere
of Circulation, however, the principle of equivalence, embodied in the
contract of Employment, operates only in this sphere,
"within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-
power goes on, the very Eden of the innate rights of Man.
It is the exculsive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property
and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of
a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined
only by their own free will. They contract as free
persons, who are equal before the Law. Their contract is
the final result in which their joint Will finds a common
legal expression. Equality, because each enters into
relation with the other as with a simple owner of
commodities, and they exchange equivalent with equival-
ent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his
own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own
advantage •••••When we leave this sphere of simple
circulation or the exchange of commodities •••••a certain
change takes place in the physiognomy of our dramatis
personae. He who was previously the money owner now
strides out in front as a Capitalist; the possessor of
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Labour+power follows as his worker. ,,77
The particularization of the State as a separate instance with a
Monopoly of Force raised above the economic reproduction process is an
essential precondition of the appearance of equality in the exchange-
relation, and enables exploitation to take place through the "dull
compulsion" of economic laws. Legally this movement is accomplished
by the removal of restrictions on labour mobility78 and the aliena-
bility of labour-power through the contract of employment, and by the
generality of application of the Law, which provides certainty and
calculability in transactions between legal subjects: "the law must be
general in its formulation, its generality must be specific, and it
must not be retroactive.,,79 However, there is a contradictory
tension between the need for generalit¥ of application and
.e_recisionin formulation, "which can be traced back to the contrad-
iction between the formal equality of exchanges and their actual
(unequal economic) content.,,80 This primary contradiction of the
Liberal moment of the State derives from the need of Capital to
extract Absolute surplus-value from living labour in the process of
accumulation; because if allowed to do so Capital will physically
exhaust Labour, the Law cannot continue to operate solely on a general
level, guaranteeing liberal self-regulation and providing procedures
for the recuperation of market transactions that have failed, but must
increasingly intervene in production specifically, through the
activities of bodies of State officials who can selectively imIX>se
conditions of exchange - equivalence where these have broken down or
77. ibid. Ch. 6 p. 280; see Holloway & picciotto (1977) p. 88.
78. by for example the Truck Act (1831) and the Master and Servant
Act (1830); for a discussion of this aspect see Kinsey. R. (1979).
79. Neumann, F. (1957) p. 28.
80. Picciotto, S. (1979) p. 174.
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cannot be provided through the free operation of the market. Thus
Factory, Social Welfare, Education and Poor Law reforms, effected
through specific codes of legislation, are necessary in order to
moderate the thirst of capital for absolute surplus-value, and to
maintain the appearance of equality in the sphere of Circulation
essential for the containment of the initial contradictions of
accumulation.81
The third moment of the State is defined by the exploitation of Labour
in the form of Relative rather than Absolute surplus-value,82
which expels living labour from Production and thus tendentially
undermines Capital's conditions of valorisation, a contradiction
expressed in the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall.83 Ensuing
periodic crises involve continual economic, political and legal
restructuring of the capital relation, as the State apparatus
struggles to restore the conditions of accumulation through the
mobilization of counter-tendencies. This requires the lowering of the
organic composition of capital and the raising of the rate of surplus-
value, the redistribution of resources from unproductive areas to the
centres of accumulation, and the increasing exploitation of Labour.
The outcome of the crisis, however, depends on class struggle at every
level, and cannot be deduced from the formal requirements of "Capital
in General." The present attempt by British Capital to raise the rate
of surplus-value:
"does not simply mean the introduction of new Technology
or the announcement of wage-cuts by individual employers,
what is involved is rather a very long and complex
struggle conducted at all levels, embracing such elements
as the repeated attempt to restructure relations between
81. see Marx: Capital I. Ch. 10. "The Working Day" pp. 340-417.
82. see abide Part IV.
83. see Hirsch (op. cit.) supra: p.
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Trade Unions and the State and within the Trade Unions
themselves (Donovan Commission, In place of strife,
Industrial Relations Act, Social Contract), massive
ideological compaigns (on productivity, inflation, etc),
changes in State expenditure and taxation, the complex
interplay of political parties, plans to introduce worker
directors, etc.,,84
In this context, the first and most general limitation on the
effectiveness of State activity is the nature of surplus-value
production, whose contradictions can never be abolished but only
modified by external State intervention. Secondly, it cannot be
assumed that Law and State will function "rationally" in the interests
of Capital in general. Whilst ever-c1oser ties must necessarily be
created between individual capitals and the State, making the economy
more planned and organized, the anarchy and competition of Capitalism
is not thereby overcome but rather reproduced within the State
Apparatus itself. This means an inevitable dislocation between State
activity and the interests of Capital in general. The third and most
important limitation on juridico-po1itica1 intervention results from
the separation of the Political and the Economic. Whilst the State
must promote the accumulation of Capital, it must also:
"by reason of its very form, remain external to that
process. Its action is essentially of a mediate nature -
mediated basically through the forms of Law and Money.
This imposes a certain bluntness on State measures to
restructure Capital. The lack of specificity of the
effects of the restriction of Credit and the money supply
in the present crisis situation in Britain provides a
good illustration of this.,,85
Here the particularization of the State, as a necessary precondition
of developed surplus-value production, is increasingly undermined
through direct intervention, not only in exchange relations, but in
84. Holloway & Picciotto (1977) p. 94.
85. ibid. p. 96. The conception of the "mediate" nature of State
activity is indebted to the analysis of Blanke et. al. (op. cit.)
(supra).
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the conditions of valorisation in production. Increasingly the State
contradicts its formal generality with selective and specific measures
in particular fields (industrial aid, tax concessions etc) and gives
rise to intensified political competition between favoured and dis-
favoured sections of Capital, whilst at the same time the State
Apparatus as an instrument of force and repression becomes visible as
the struggle between Capital and Labour intensifies.86 Similarly
the generality of Law is increasingly undermined by the modification
of the legal apparatus and its supplementation by new forms:
"the general codes for the liberal form of law have become
the overblown regulatory systems which increasingly
require an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus. The old
contradiction between generality of application and
specificity becomes the conflict between legal certainty
and administrative discretion."87
The general jurisdiction of courts of law is complemented by specific
Tribunals, which can work more closely with the bureaucratic
apparatus. Even central aspects of Private Law (liability, individual
responsibility) are undermined by the increasing socialization of the
means of production and the need for its legal containment. Finally
there is the drift towards open coercion which tendentially threatens
the autonomisation of Law, "the outlawing and forcible suppression of
non-permitted labour struggles, the repressive use of the law relating
to foreigners and restrictions on the freedom of demonstration and
86. This aspect is more fully developed by Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 106.
(supra)•
87. Picciotto (op. cit.) p. 176.
68
opinion.,,88
Cd) Conclusions
The State Derivation approach represents a significant advance over
crude economism (reduction to the material base) and instrumental
voluntarism (reduction to dominant Class Will). However, the
suspicion of economic reductionism persists, in the theoretical
consequence of the derivation of Law and State from commodity
relations.89 '!hequestion of "how the contradictions of Capital
express themselves in political form and what is the relation between
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the dynamic of
POlitical development,,90 is not adequately answered in the analysis
of the juridico-political. Most serious is the failure to recognise
specific variations in forms of legal right and sUbjectivity through
their sUbsumption within a unitary category of economic subject,9l
and the tendency to reduce the State to its constitutional legal
88. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 106. Given Holloway & picciotto's general
acceptance of Hirsch's problemmatic (supra) the under-representation
in their analyses of the directly coercive aspects of Law and State is
surprising. Hirsch's analysis is certainly the more prescient in this
respect.
89. All currents within the approach begin with some aspect of
commodity relations, e.g. the circulation of commodities (Pashukanis,
Blanke et. al.) the exploitation of Labour by Capital (Hirsch), the
commodification of labour-power and its exchange with Capital
(Tuschling),the contradiction between the production of use-values and
the realization of surplus-value through exchange (Sauer); see
Jessop's discussion (op. cit). At this level of critism we are not
concerned with the merits or otherwise of Pashukanis's specific
contribution, for which see Jessop pp. 349-351.
90. Holloway & picciotto (1977) p. 92.
91. This point will be developed in the discussion of Hirst's
contribution (infra sections III & IV.)
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aspect.92
Marxist Theory should also be judged by its capacity to enable
historical research and concrete analysis of the current situation,
and the prospects of the theories considered are not good in either
respect. The highly abstract nature of the analysis of form and
function of Law in the Rechsstaat at the level of the Mode of
Production:
"ignores their historical constitution and periodization
as well as their possible overdetermination through other
social forms and/or forces. This entails a certain
theoretical indeterminacy at more concrete and complex
levels of analysis and raises important questions about
how a research project should move to lower levels richer
in determinations without denying the shift by treatin9
these levels as mere instances of the abstract andlor
wIthout abandonIn9 erevIous analyses In favour of a
surface descrietion of emeirical ehenomena."~~
The contributions of Holloway and picciotto on the State, and of
Picciotto specifically on Law, represent a less then successful
attempt to provide Hirsch's programmatic "conceptually informed
understanding of the historical process."94 They recognise that
the problem:
"is to analyse social developments not simply in terms of
the form of class struggle (for this tends to an over-
determInist view of social development), nor simply in
terms of its content, but to see that social development
is determined by a dialectical interaction of form and
92. This tendency exists even in the best examples such as Hirsch.
Poulantzas on the other hand is more sensitive to the State's rate as
functional unity of legality and illegality (infra ).
93. Jessop. (op. cit.) p. 348 (emphasis supplied).
94. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 82.
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content. ,,95
Thus "concrete" analyses should be seen not as a departure from the
State Derivation debate "but as a develo{:ment of it, the content of
class struggles (being) analyzed in a relation of dialectical tension
to their form.,,96 However, their actual analyses of the develo{:ment
of the form and functions of State and Law remain at a high level of
generality and abstraction, which indicates incoherence and ambiguity
in the "dialectical" research programne. At this point a theoretical
economism may be asserting itself in the form of an irreconcilable
opposition between the abstract and logical on the one hand, and the
concrete and historical on the other, the latter becoming mere
instances of the former in the absence of the proper development of
mediating theoretical determinations. This enables certain crucial
reductions, with definite political consequences, to enter the
argument. The very question of the limits of State and Legal
activity, whilst validly posed and adequately answered at the most
general level, in its more concrete application acquires an
essentialist dimension. From the separation of the Political and the
Economic is derived the necessitx of the State, by reason of its
form, to remain external to the process of accumulation "Its action
is essentially of a mediate nature - basically mediated through the
forms of Law and Money.,,97 '!hecrisis demands that this generality
be continually "undermined" and contradicted by selective and
specific State interventions in the process of valorization, and by
increasing particularity in legal relations with the administration of
specific bureaucratic codes through Tribunals. The effect of these
develo{:ments is "a tendencx to destrox the basis of bourseois
95. Holloway & picciotto (1978) p. 30.
96. ibid. p. 31.
97. ibid. (1977) p. 96.
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domination, the illusion of the State's neutrality, and to put in
question its ability to guarantee the material and ideological
conditions of capital reproduction,,98
This analysis cannot provide, without distortion, adequate under-
standing of the complexity of contemporary juridico-political
developments. The successful ar~iculation by the New Right of an
"Authori tarian Populism,,99 is enough to cast doubt on the
apocalyptic tone of the analysis : (1) '!he emphasis on the "mediate"
and external nature of State activity through Law and Money does not
take sufficient account of repressive aspects of law or of direct
State coercion in the drift towards a fundamentally more authoritarian
society. (2) If this drift can be secured nevertheless with a degree
of popular consent, despite the dismantling of Welfare State functions
and the specificity of political interventions, then the
"contradiction" supposedly "destroying the basis" of bourgeois
domination and questioning the ability of the State to manage the
crisis is revealed as essentialist.100 If the limitations on State
activity can properly be described only as tendential, then the
value of the approach in analyzing the complex content of the current
situation must be doubtful. (3) Similarly in respect of Law, the
category of "contradiction" between generality and specificity,
certainty and administrative discretion is essentialized, and employed
at a level so abstract as to be virtually meaningless in the face of
98. Hirsch (op. cit.) p. 104. (emphasis supplied).
99. the term is Hall's refinement of Poulantzas' s "Authoritarian
Statism. " These aspects wi 11 be considered below : see Section III
and Ch. 8. S. II.
100. The effect of this essentialism is "apocalyptism" - the under-
estimation of the resourcefulness of the State in managin9 the
crisis.
72
the diversity of current legal struggles. The theoretical
determinations necessary for the adequate analysis of different forms
of right and subject embodied in legal institutions and legislation
are absent.
Consequently, at the level of political practice, only the vaguest
prescriptions are offered, centr~ng on the limitations of llbourgeois
rightll,101 and ignoring the specificity of various contemporary
legal struggles. Law as a Terrain of stru9sle, a form of the
capital-relation within which real political and social advances may
be made, is not properly theorized, and in this absence an
essentialist economic determination asserts itself.
The preceding criticisms may be briefly resumed as :a tendency to
reduce Law to the Economic; and a tendency to reduce the State to Law
and constitutional legality.
II '1he Althusserian ~roach: Poulantzas
The Althusserian approach is characterized by the systematic defini-
tion of a field of concepts - Mode of Production, Social Formation,
determination in the last instance and overdetermination, Relative
Autonomy - distinguishing a scientific dialectical and historical
Materialism from bourgeois ideology. Its specific targets are the
distortions of Stalinism and the humanist reaction to Soviet theory
and practice. The motor of History is class struggle, its conditions
determined fundamentally by economic contradictions between the forces
and relations of production; history is therefore a process without a
101. see picciotto. (op. cit.) Arthur, C. (1978).
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human or class subject.102 In this process, individuals function as
bearers (trager) of the social relations entailed in the reproduction
of a complex structured whole (the Mode of Production), comprising
several Relatively Autonomous regions (economic, juridico-political,
ideological) with specific effectivities, whose articulation is deter-
mined in the last instance by the economic - which assigns to one or
other of these levels the dominant role.103
For Poulantzas, the foremost repreGentative of the Althusserian
approach in theorizing Law and state,104 the homology in the CMP
between relations of Property and of real appropriation105 (the
Capitalist separation of the direct producer from possession of the
means of Production) determines a s~cific autonomy of the political
and the economic:
"'!hisautonomy has theoretical consequences for the object
of study. It makes possible a regional '!heory (in the
very strict sence) of an instance of this Mode, e.g. a
theory of the Capitalist State; it permits us to consti-
tute the political into an autonomous and specific object
102. Althusser, L. (1976) p. 52.
103. abide (1969). (1970).
104. Althussers own contribution is primarily at the level of
Philosopy [see however "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus" in
Althusser (1971)], which in his self-criticism (1976) becomes "Class
Struggle in Theory", replacing the defination "Theory of Theoretical
practice."
105. Poulantzas, N. (1973) begins with the "invariant-elements" of
"production in general": labour, means of production, non-labourer,
relation of real appropriation, relation of property. [The
structuralist tendency in the approach is most fully realized in
Balibar's "combinatory of elements" (1970).] The question of
Poulantzas's structurallism will not be considered in this brief
account. Jessop has stressed the continuity in Foulantzas's treatment
of Law from 1968-1978 (op. cit.) and this substantive content will
also be emphasized here. Methodologically, however, a definite shift
is apparent, and "structurallist" terminology is entirely absent from
"State, Power, Socialism" (1978).
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of Science,,1106
The "juridico-po.lit ical" must therefore be studied in terms of its
historically determined place and function within the complex totality
of structures and practices involved in the reproduction of the CMP.
The existence in bourgeois society of a "separation" between economic
and juridico-IX>litical relations is thus constitutive of the IX>int of
departure for analysis, and the question of the source of this
"particularization" does not irrmed~ately arise.l107 '!he investi-
gation of Law and State in specific Modes of Production leads to their
analysis in actual Societies through the concept of the articulation
of Modes of Production in concrete Social Formations.
The close relation between Law and State enables the analysis to
proceed in terms of the specific effectivity of the "juridico-
POlitical" instance and its corresIX>nding ideology at the economic,
POlitical and ideological levels. The designation "juridico-
POlitical superstructure of the State" nevertheless spans two
relatively autonomous levels, "namely the juridical structures (the
law) and the IX>litical structures (the State) •••••whose concrete
combination depends on the mode of production and the social formation
under consideration.,,1108 The problem of this articulation is thus
displaced from the abstract to the concrete analysis, and the use of
the conmon term is considered "legitimate in so far as the Marxist
classics have effectively established the close relation between these
1106. ibid (1973) p. 29.
1107. this is the basic methodological IX>int on which Poulantzas is
criticized by Holloway & picciotto (1978).
1108. Poulantzas (1973) p. 42 n.
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two levels.,,109
Firstly, in respect of socio-economic relations and the economic class
struggle, the juridical structures of the Capitalist State have as
their effect the isolation of agents in the Mode of Production such
that the antagonistic nature of class relations is concealed. This
isolation effect "is terrifyingl~ real; it has a name: competition
between the wage-earning workers and between the Capitalist owners of
private property"ll0 and covers the "whole ensemble of socio-
economic relations." The historical function of the juridico-
POlitical instance is to dissolve restrictive feudal relations secured
through mystical and religious ideologies by setting up political
individuals-persons as free and'equal subjects of Law, instituting a
system of rules which organizes Capitalist exchanges, including the
sale and purchase of labour-power, and providing the "framework of
cohesion" in which commercial encounters can take place.lll '!he
institutional fixing of "private" State-subjects is accompanied by
the developnent of rules of "public" Law, presenting the character-
istic abstraction, generality and formality of the modern juridical
system and regulating the relations of the subjects of the State to
the central power.112
Secondly, however, in relation to the organization of the State and
the political class struggle, the effect of the juridico-political is
109. ibid. This conflation is one of the weaknesses in Poulantzas's
analysis: see infra: conclusion to this section.
110. ibid. pp. 130-131 (emphasis in original).
Ill. ibid. p. 53.
112. ibid. p. 163.
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to constitute a factor of cohesion.113 Public unity is accomplished
at the same time as private individuation, such that the State
"represents the unity of an isolation which, because of the role
played by the ideological, is largely its own effect."1l4 '!heState
strives to overcome economic isolation within dominant classes and
class functions, through their organization at the political level;
its class character is thus refracted through the universality of
the isolation effect:
"The institut.i.onalized power of the Capitalist class State
presents its own class unity, precisely insofar as it can
pose as a national-popular State, i.e. as a State which
does not represent the power of one or several deter-
minate classes, but which represents the power of the
political unity of private agents, given over to
economic antagonisms which the State claims to have the
function of surmounting by unifying these agents within
a 'popular-national" body.,,115
A certain "Relative Autonomy" vis-a-vis the politically dominant
classes is thus inscribed in the institutional Materiality of the
State Hence also the critique of Voluntarist and instrumentalist
conceptions:
"State Power is not a machine or an instrument, a simple
object coveted by the various classes; nor is it divided
into parts which, if not in the hands of some, must
automatically be in the hands of others: rather it is an
ensemble of structures.,,1l6
Similarly the modern bureaucratic apparatus presents itself "as the
unity, the organizing principle and incarnation of the 'general
113. ibid p. 44.
114. ibid. p. 134.
115. ibid. p. 276.
116. ibid. p. 288.
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interest' of Society."n7 It is correlative with the "axiomatiza-
tion of the juridical system into rules/laws which are abstract,
general, formal and strictly regulated and which distribute the
domains of activities and competences."n8 '!hisformal-rationality
is a precondition of the systematic masking of knowledge and of
secrecy within the bureaucracy, and is "possible only where political
class domination in paricular is absent from the bureaucratic
apparatus, being supplanted by this ideology of organization."n9
The Capitalist State therefore presents this peculiar feature, that
nowhere in its actual instituations:
"does strictly political domination take the form of a
political relation between the dominant classes and the
dominated classes. In its institutions everything takes
place as if the class 'struggle' did not exist. The
State is organized as a political unity of a society of
divergent economic interests and these are presented not
as class interests but as the interests of 'private
individuals', economic subjects: this is connected to the
way in which the State is related to the isolation of
socio-economic relations! an isolation which is partly
the State's own effect." 20
The Relative Autonomy of this State is possible through its double
function of isolation (of all economic subjects) and unification (of
the dominant classes through their political organization). The
relation between the national-popular class State and the dominant
classes is secured through their hegemonic leadershie within the
117. ibid. p. 216.
118. ibid. p. 349.
119. ibid. p. 216; p. 350;
knowledge and the structures
further in the "Foucauldian"
(1978).
120. ibid. (1968) p. 85.
The question of the materiality of
through which it is expressed is taken
aspects of "State, Power, Socialism"
E?wer bloc.121 The class struggle in a Capitalist formation:
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"makes it possible for a 'power bloc', composed of several
politically dominant classes or fractions to function.
Amongst these dominant classes and fractions one of them
holds a particular dominant role, which can be
characterized as a hesemonlc role ••••The hegemonic
class is the one which concentrates in itself, at the
political level, the double function of representing
the general interests of the peopIe7nation and of
maintaining a specific dominance among the dominant
classes and fractions."122
The paradoxical character of class power resides in the State's
maintenance of a relative autonomy with regard to the dominant
classes, at the same time as it'constitutes, through the hegemonic
POwer bloc, their "unambisuous and exclusive p?litical
power. ,,123 Thus it is the political rather than directly economic
interests of the dominant classes that are represented in the Capital-
ist State, which may therefore intervene against the long-term
~onomic interests of one or other fraction of the dominant classes
where this is necessary for the realization of their p?litical class
interests. In this sense the State has "inscribed in its very
structures a flexibility which concedes a certain guarantee to the
economic interests of certain dominated classes, within the limits of
121. These are Poulantzas's key political concepts, enabling the
mediation of the structure by "class struggle." As with Althusser,
the position of class struggle within the analysis and its relation to
the "st ructure" of the Mode of Production is problematic, leading to
charges of Theoreticism. Poulantzas' s appropriation of "hegemony",
"historic bloc" etc, is indebted to Gramsci. The question of
Poulantzas's reading of Gramsci cannot be considered here; see however
Hall, Lumley & Mclennan in "Cultural Studies 10" (On Ideology) (1977)
122. ibid. p. 141. (emphasis in original).
123. ibid. p. 288 (emphasis supplied)
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the system.,,124
Thirdly, the effect of the juridico-political at the level of Ideology
is specified according to the central role played by juridico-
political ideolo9~ in the CMP. The function of ideology in general
is to insert agents, through their practical activities, into a given
structure as it supports, thus
"hiding the real contradictions and reconstituting on an
imaginary level a relatively coherent discourse which
serves as the horizon of agents' experience ••••by moulding
their represent.atIons of their real relations and
inserting these in the overall unity of the relations of a
formation.,,125
The relation between the dominant ideology and the politically
dominant class is secured through the constitution of the ideolo9ical
as a re9ional instance within the unit~ of a structure which has as
its effect the dominance of a 9iven class : "The dominant ideology,
by assuring the practical insertion of agents in the social structure,
aims at the maintenance (cohesion) of this structure, and this means
above all class domination and exploitation.,,126 The ideological
instance is itself divided into various regions: moral, juridical,
POlitical, aesthetic, religious, economic, and philosophical, the
dominance of one over the others reflecting the unity of the broader
structure. In the CMP, where the economic generally plays the
dominant role, "we see the dominance of the juridico-p<;>litical
124. ibid. p. 190.
125. ibid. p. 207. (following Althusser (1969) (1971).
126. ibid. p. 209.
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region in the ideological.IIl27 'rhus:
"Liberty, equality, rights, duties, the rule of law, the
legal state, the Nation, individuals/persons, the general
will, in short all the catchwords under which bourgeois
class exploitation entered and ruled in history, were
directly borrowed from the juridico-political sense of
these notions.lIl28
This particular ideology is in the "best;pos it ion" to fulfil the role
of ideology in the CMP, penetrating every layer of the social
structure and securing the effect of isolation : IIItis the best
£laced to hide the real index of determination and dominance of the
structure, and to cement the cohesion of social relations by
reconstituting their unity on an imaginary plane.lIl29 It is also
the framework for the rational-legal legitimation of bourgeois class
domination, enabling the class state to be represented as the unity of
the people-nation.
Poulantzas can then characterize various forms of State, IINormalll,
IIExceptionalll, and "Authoritarian.1I The "Normal" State is defined
according to the orsanic regulation of forces within the power bloc
and between the power bloc and the masses under conditions of Repre-
sentative Democracy, Universal suffrage, and competition between
POlitical parties, securing a stable hegemony based on "constitution-
alized Violence" and the rule of law, the abstraction and formality of
legal procedures, and the separation of powers. The "Exceptional"
State, on the other hand, is characterized by a crisis in the
127. ibid. p. 211.
128. ibid.
129. ibid. p. 215. Poulantzas's analysis of ideology in (1973) is
heavily couched in the structurallist terminology of "dominance II,
"subordination", "effects of the structure", "place", "position",
"region", "level", "Lnse rt Ionv , "agents" and so on. Most of these
terms are absent in his analysis of Law and legal ideology in (1978).
The ir use tends towa rds "abs tract-formalism" at the expense of more
concrete content. (see infra: Ch. 4.)
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restructuring of the power bloc and its relation to the people that
cannot be resolved "organically" because of the breakdown of
conditions of representative democracy, the suspension of elections,
and the banning of organized political opposition, leading to a
pervasive hegemonic crisis and a corresponding drift towards
coercion and physical repression, the decline in the separation of
powers and the rule of Law, and increased bureaucratism and
arbitrariness in State activity. In such conditions the precise
organization of the power bloc will determine either a Fascist State
or a Military dictatorship, neither of which political forms can
secure the organic and hegemonic domination possible in bourgeois
democracies.1313
Of more direct relevance to Western democracies is the development of
an "Authoritarian Statism", characterized by "intensified State
Control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined with
radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with
draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called 'formal'
liberties. ,,131 '!hisState form, whilst having roots in the "Normal"
State, nevertheless permits the incorporation of increasingly
exceptional features without however thereby becoming a fully
"Exceptional" State. The generality and abstract-Universality of the
juridical system is challenged in this moment through State
intervention in increasingly significant areas:
"It can no longer be confined to the mould of general,
formal and Universal norms essentially adapted to State
involvement in maintaining and reproducing the 'general
conditions' of production. The economic role of the
State is modelled on specific acts of regulation, corres-
1313. see Poulantzas: "Fascism and Dictatorship" (19713) and "The
crisis of the Dictatorships" (1976).
131. "State, Power, Socialism" (1978) p. 2134.
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sponding to clearly defined conjunctures, situations and
interests. The mUltiplicity of socio-economic problems
tackled by the State also requires more and more
elaborate concretization of these general norms.,,132
A number of aspects of this process may be identified: (1) The power
to fix norms and enact rules is shifting from the Legislature to the
Executive and the State Administration. The Universal rationality of
Parliamentary Legislation is giving way to the instrumental rational-
ity of bureaucratic efficiency. Moreover, the initiative in
£roP9sin9 laws now belongs not to elected representatives but to the
Executive Civil Service: "Such laws are no longer inscribed in the
formal logic of the juridical system but are entered in the account
book of concrete, day to day economic policy embodied by the
administrative apparatus.,,133
Correspondingly, social control through general and universal norms
defining "right" and "wrong" is now "combined with individualized
regulation that starts out from the 'mentality' (the presumed
intention) of each member of society considered as a potentially
guilty subject.,,134 The movement is from the punishable offence
laid down by Universal and General act of Parliament "towards the
suspicious circumstance whose contours are administratively defined by
supple, malleable and particularist regulation. ,,135 If law is not
actually in decline, it is certainly undergoing a retreat.
132.
133.
134.
135.
ibid. p. 218.
ibid. p. 218.
ibid. p. 220.
ibid.
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(3) The "Irresistable Rise of the State Administration,,136 is
coupled with the dislodging of parties of power from their traditional
positions and a loosening of the "ties of representation" between them
and the power bloc, such that the functions of organizing the
political interests and ensuring the hegemony of the dominant classes
devolves upon the Executive and the State Administration:
"No longer is it a question of striking political
compromises in the political arena - that is, of publicly
elaborating the hegemonic interests in the form of a
National Interest •. The various economic interests are
now directl¥ present as such within the administration.
More precisely, the massive hegemony of Monopoly Capital
is everywhere realized under the aejis of the
administration and the Executive."l 7
With the breakdown of ties of Representation, political parties cease
to operate as centres engaged in the politicl elaboration and the
Working out of compromises and alliances around a more or less precise
prograrrme, and become increasingly mere "transmission belts for
executive decisions.,,138
(4) The need for "professional secrecy" within the administrative
apparatus triumphs over demands for public accountability, involving
a "considerable restriction of political liberties, understood as
forms of Public Control over State activity.,,139
(5) Accompanying the curtailment of democratic liberties, the
"sepration of powers" between the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary, always of a more or less fictitious character, is subject
136. see ibid. Part 4. Ch. 2.
137. ibid. p. 224.
138. ibid. p. 229.
139. ibid. p. 227.
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to final elimination.140
Crucially, the context of the decline of the "Normal" state and
bourgeois political freedoms and its replacement by authoritarian
control penetrating all levels of society, is given by developments in
the juridico-political instance and declining juridical ideology. At
the stage of State Monopoly Capitalism, where the dominant role is
played by the Political rather than the Economic (as is the case in
the pure CMP), the juridico-political region in the ideological "gives
way to economic ideology (of which Technocratism is only one aspect)
which tends to become the dominant region of the dominant
ideology.,,141
This approach too represents a significant advance over crude
economism and voluntarism, but again, the question arises whether a
sophisticated form of reductionism has not been substituted in their
place. The theoretical development of political concepts such as
POwer bloc, hegemony, dominant and dominated classes, is possible
because the specific separation of the political and the economic in
the CMP is considered to permit the constitution of the "Political"
as an autonomous and specific object of science. The investigation
of the relation between the various instances can then proceed within
the framework given in the Marxist Topography142 of base and
superstructure, Relative Autonomy, specific effectivity and
140. ibid.
141. (1968) p. 211.
142. For Althusser this conception remains essential to Materialism:
"The position of the Marxist Topography protects the dialectic against
the delirious idealist notion of producing its own material substance"
(1976) p. 140. The structuralist charge is denied; formalism,
theoretic ism, Spinozism are confessed, leaving the Marxist Topography
intact (see (1976) "Elements of self-criticism" 4. "On Spinoza".)
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determination in the last instance, pre-empting the question of why
social relations in bourgeois society should assume separate
economic and political forms. This conception of Totality is
vulnerable to the charge that it "only grasps the surface, that is the
manner in which 'economy' and 'politics' appear as separate entities
and not specifically related.,,143 'Theresult is a "Politicist"
tendency to ignore the effects of economic contradictions, such as the
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, arising from the process of
capital accumulation in concrete social formations.144
The recurrent problem of the relation of abstract Theory (Mode of
Production) to Concrete analysis (Social Formation), in this case not
accompanied by the "Logic/History" dilerrmabecause of the Althusserian
anathematization of History,145 is manifest in the tendency towards
"structuralist-abstractionism" and "abstract-formalism" (the
increasing predominance of form over content).146 The
temptation is to foreclose opportunities for more detailed
investigation at lower levels of analysis by appealing to the
principles of structural causality and determination "in the last
143. Wirth, M. (1977) p. 313 n.; see Mcdonnell & Robins (1980)
p.159. For epistemological reasons, Althusserianism can countenance
neither the category of Form nor the problematic of Essence and
Appearance (see Ch. 4. infra.)
144. see Holloway & picciotto (1978) p. 18.; also Jessop (1980) p.
358.
145. Because of Althusserian epistemology (real-concrete/concrete-in-
thought) "diachrony" is a category not of the concrete but of
knowinc;, located enti rely wi thin knowledge: "logic/history" is
therefore a "banal opposition" (see: Al thusser: (1970) pp.108-9).
This question and that of Althusser's reading of Marx's 1857
Introduction will be considered in Ch. 4. (infra). Here it can be
noted that the problem of concrete anal¥sis is not resolved by
Althusser's highly abstract/philosophical observations.
146. see Laclau's (1977) appraisal of Poulantzas and of the
"Poulantzas - Miliband" debate (in Blackburn. ed, 1972). Despite his
criticisms of Poulantzas, Laclau remains definitely an Althusserian
(see pp. 78-79) and therefore vulnerable to broader epistemological
objections to the general position.
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instance", or worse, to attempt to explain concrete phenomena by the
illegitemate extension of concepts engendered at too high a level of
abstraction. The attitude of Poulantzas, when faced with a complex
reality,
"is to react with taxonomic fury, and his taxonomy is set
at a level of abstraction so high that the symbolic
functions of the concepts necessary tend to predominate;
These symbols enter into relationship with each other and
create in turn symbols of these relations, and all
contact with the original meaning is 10st.,,147
This theoretical indeterminacy, and the general structuralist
position within which it is located, have effects on the concrete
analyses, which, where they succeed, do so "in spite rather than
because of his method.,,148 (1) There is a tendency, particularly
in the earlier work, to over-emphasize the inscription of political
class domination within the institutional structure of the Capitalist
State, at the expense of more concrete analyses of political
struggles, within the power bloc and between it and the masses.149
In the structuralist approach, class struggle is absent in the
consideration of the abstract Mode of Production, and exists only in
the concrete economic, political and ideological conditions of actual
Social Formations, hence the systematic tendency towards its
neglect.150
(2) The analysis of ideology asumes that social classes have
necessary or paradigmatic ideologies, and that ideologies are there-
147. Laclau (1977) p. 70.
148. ibid. p. 71.
149. see Jessop. (1980) p. 358.
150. see Althusser (1976): "The question of class struggle in ideology
did not appear. Through the gap created by this 'Theory' of ideology
slipped theoreticism: Science/Ideology". p. 141 (still denying
"structuralism") •
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fore composed of elements ('Nationalism', 'Militarism', 'Imperialism',
'abstract legal universalism') with definite class belongings.lSl
The importance of non-class interpellations and movements (gender,
ethnic, youth) in the struggle for hegemony and the constitution of
political parties is missed, despite the possibilities for such
analysis provided by the concepts of isolation efect and
individuation.lS2
(3) The treatment of "Authoritarian Statism", an inadequately
specified hybrid of "Normal" and "Exceptional" elements under the
dominance of the former, does not account for new forms of democratic
participation and representation that accompany the decline of
"representative democracy". The general depiction of Authoritarian
Statism in terms of the growing economic role of the State and the
permanent instability of ruling hegemony:
"is essentially descrietive in character and does not
elaborate either principle of explanation in any detail.
This reflects the need, in part, to abstract from
earticular conjunctures to eresent a senerai account of
Authoritarian Statism but it also lends itself to the
unfortunate technlque of subsuming a large number of
disparate contradictory and unevenly developed tendencies
under one loosely specified concept."lS3
Here the dangers of adopting a still highly abstract analysis in the
explanation of the British national conjuncture are particularly
clear.
(4) The reductionist/politicist tendency is exacerbated in the case
of Law by its conflation with the State in the concept of the
151. see Laclau (1977) p. 94.; Jessop (1980) p. 359.
152. these possibilities have been investigated by Laclau (1977) in
his analysis of class and popular-democratic interpellations; see also
Hall, (1978 b); (1980 d).
153. Jessop (op. cit.) p. 360. (emphasis supplied).
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"juridico-poltical superstructure", such that the question of the
specific effectivity of concrete legal institutions and practices is
never properly addressed154 but subordinated to that of the
juridico-political instance in general. The account of the decline in
the abstraction and generality of the "rule of law" and its subversion
by particularistic State intervention does not specify, other than in
very general terms, the conditions and characteristics of the
development of new lesal-administrative forms of regulation; The
decline in the bourseois "rule of law" does not necessarily imply
the complete demise of Law, but requires rather consideration of
other, still legal (not merely technocratic), forms of organization.
Similarly the corresponding decline in classical bourgeois juridical
ideology cannot be supposed unproblematically to be accompanied by the
irresistable rise of "economic ideology" which "tends to become the
dominant region of the dominant ideology"; this ignores the
specificity of new forms of legal ideology that cannot be reduced to
"economic" organization or mere technocratism. The question of the
limitations and possibilities of particular areas of Law as fields of
struggle is never adequately posed, and the resulting "concrete"
analysis is even more impoverished than that of the State Derivation
school.
On the other hand, the strengths of the Foulantzian analysis are co-
154. it is neutralized by the infamous footnote on p. 42. of (1973).
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extensive with its weaknesses, deriving from the same source.155
"Law in general" is successfully located within a Totality of forms of
bourgeois domination - economic, juridico-political and ideological
and the State is not reduced to the constitutional legality of the
Rechsstaat : "The activity, role and place of the State stretch a very
long way beyond law and judicial regulation, a fact which cannot be
grasped by a juridical-legalistic conception.,,156 '!heconcrete
functioning of the State does not invariably take the form of
law-rules since many of its practices escape juridical systematisation
and order.157 However, "the State often trans9resses law rules
of its own making by acting without reference to the law •••••• in
the higher interests of the State (raison d'Etat) ,,158,and further,
because the State, as the practitioner of legitimate violence and
physical repression, takes precedence over law, "the activity of the
State always overflows the banks of law, and it can, within certain
limits, modif¥" its own law.,,159 hJain, the institutional
materiality of bourgeois domination extends beyond the legal sphere
and incorporates techniques of knowledge and Power managed through the
"irresistable rise of the State Adrninistration".160 At a general
level, then, the account of the decline in the rule of law
accompanying the rise of Monopoly Capitalism and of its substitution
by juridico-political and administrative particularism may be
considered adequate.
155. It must be stressed that Poulantzas is not concerned with
specific aspects of Law, but with its general tendencies and
development in the broader context of the State. These criticisms
remain pertinent however insofar as a basis for theorising and
concretely analyzing Law is sought in his work.
156. Poulantzas (1978) p. 84.
157. ibid.
158. ibid. (emphasis supplied).
159. ibid. p. 85. (The "limits" may depend on the particular National
Constitution).
160. ibid. pp. 54, 217.
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The preceding criticisms may be resumed as : a tendency to reduce Law
to the State in the concept of the "juridico-political super-
structure"; and a "politicist" tendency to isolate this instance from
the conditions of its economic determination.
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III Other Approaches
Four further approaches to Law and/or the State will be considered
only briefly, because of their relatively limited focus.
(a) Edelman
Bernard Edelman demonstrates the juridical constitution and
transformation of the individual as a legal subject through the
ideological mechanism of Interpellation, on the basis of changes in
the conditions of capital accumulation and class struggle.161 The
interpellation :IIYou are a subject in Law" permits the individual
legal subject a concrete practice ': IISinceyou are a subject in law,
you are capable of acquiring and selling (yourself).11162 The
double-speculary structure of ideology assures the functioning of
juridical ideology:
liOn the one hand, the subject in law exists
in the name of the law, that is, the law
gives him his power. Better, law gives right
the power to give itself a power. On the
other hand, the power law has given right
returns to Law. The power of right is none
other than the power of subjects in law.
The subject recognizes itself in the subjects.
The power, ownership, recognizes itself in the power,
the State •••••The constitution of a State
subject in Law assures the functioning of juridical
161. The general framework and concept of Totality are implicitly
Althusserian. Insights from Pashukanis are however also incorporated:
Edelman, B. "OWnership of the ImageII• (1979).
162. ibid. p. 32.
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ideology. ,,163
By assuring and fixing the sphere of circulation in the CMP as a
"natural given", the law makes production possible:
"Circulation abolishes differences. Every
subject in Law is the equal of every other
subject in Law. If one contracts, it is
because the other has wished to contract too.
The ultimate cause of the contract is the very
will to contract. The subject in law
possesses himself as object in law. He
therefore realizes tne most developed form of
the subject, namely self-ownership. He
realizes his freedom in the very power to sell
himself that is accorded him.,,164
In the sphere of Circulation the law stamps Property, Freedom and
Equality on the face of exchange-value, but in the secret realm of
Production these marks are read as exploitation, slavery, inequality
and sacred egoism: "The 'other place' (Production) is abolished by
the very form of the subject.,,165
Edelman's technique is to then take highly concrete examples of how
the organization of juridical categories and legal reasoning are
"caught out" by class struggle and changing conditions of
accumulation, and to observe the process of resolution of ensuing
contradictions and inconsistencies at the level of juridical
163. ibid pp. 32-33.; see Althusser "Idelogy and I.S.A's" in (1971)
pp 121-173.
164. Edelman (op. cit.) p. 107; see pp. 93-108.
165. ibid. p. 108.
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ideology.166 Thus the Law is only gradually extended to Photography
and the Cinema as a result of struggle, leaving the status and
existence of author's right in the product of the new technology
initially ambiguous.167 Similarly, the State is observed in the
process of re-drawing the juridical distinction between ~litical
rights and erivate ("social") rights when a number of Algerians -
who according to the Evian agreements had the same rights as French
Nationals "with the exception of polit icaf rights" - stood as
candidates in elections to 'work committees. Ultimately, the Law
defined these elections to institutions of staff representation as
"occupational" in nature, not constituting the exercize of "p_)litical"
rights and not therefore violating the terms of the agreement.168
Whilst undeniably producing valuable empirical studies of particular
conjunctural aspects of bourgeois law, and rendering operational in
this field some of Althusser's abstract and programmatic formulations,
Edelman adds little in his discussion of "Elements for a Marxist
Theory of Law" to what already exists in Pashukanis and his recent
interpreters. The very specificity of the concrete analysis at the
level of juridical ideology excludes the broader question of the
relation between the development of the legal-totality and changes
in the economic and p_)litical conditions of advanced Capitalism.
Moreover, the criteria for the selection of those particular aspects
of law which are considered are not made explicit. From the Marxist
POint of view the analysis is still more fragmentary than it is in
Althusser ; larger questions, concerning the limits, form and function
166. hence the original Title: "Le Droit saisi par la photographie".
167. this example is not directly relevant to Britain because of the
different principles governing the law of Copyright.; see Hirst's
Introduction to Edelman (1979).
168. Edelman (op. cit.) Appendix I: pp. 115-141.
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of law are ignored, and in respect of them the "last instance", as
with Foulantzas, never comes.
(b) Hirst
Paul Hirst and his collaborators have broken decisively with Marxism
by denying : (1) the subject-object "problem of knowledge" and
"epistemological discourse"; (2) the "rationalist" conception of
objects as ("expressive") Totalities (3) processes of real
contradiction and determination such as can be grasped in theory ; and
(4) the Marxist-Leninist conception of the relation between Theory
and Practice. Instead, the "real" can only ever be "known" in the
form of its discursive constitution.169 Aspects of social relations
in concrete social formations ("Mode of Production" having been
abolished) are given to study by pre-eminent criteria of "Political
Calculation", and analyzed in terms of their "conditions of
existence".
The consequence for Law is that it cannot be said to represent
anything outside itself. The "means of representation" have complete
autonomy in defining the nature and extent of Law (the "represented"
do not determine the "means of representation"). The subject
interpellated in legal ideology has no point of origin outside
juridical practices themselves : the legal subject cannot be explained
169. This position is considered by some commentators the logical
Consequence of Althusser's neo-Kantian distinction between "real
concrete" and "concrete in thought". McDonnell & Robins (1980) thus
indict Althusser for Hindess and Hirsts' deformation of Marxism: the
problem is his epistemology, and related conception of Totality. (pp.
157-213) •
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prior to and independently of the process of legal definition.170
Hirst's critique of Marxist approaches to Law deriving from
Pashukanis171 centres on their failure to problematize non-human
forms of the legal subject : Law is a realm of equivalent human
subjects in contest, Law is the relation between those subjects. But
whilst they may be equal, contends Hirst, subjects in Law are not
identical or homogeneous, neither are the relations of dispute between
them: obligations and responsibilities vary considerably with
different types of subject - Public bodies, Corporations, Companies,
Partnerships, Trusts, and "Private" Individuals. Moreover the
effectivity of institutions and practices of the Law is denied in the
conception of Law as a relation between subjects ; legislation, the
courts, judges and legal interpretation are secondary and derived
effects of that relation. Law becomes resolved into the economic
(human) subject. The legal form/legal subject is the expression of
the commodity-form/commodity subject, the outgrowth of the prior
relationship of possesion between the economic subject and things
(a determination conceived in an expressive totality). Thus: Law
is the sphere in which sUbjects enter into contest over rishts (which
thel:pc;>ssess).The "possession form" is independent and
determinative of the legal form (its expression) ; Right "recognizes"
Possession, Possession is the foundation of Right. This treatment of
Law presupposes the ontological privileging of the prior-possessory
subject with certain attributes, and must therefore be inadequate
insofar as forms of subject and legal right embodied in Public law are
different in kind from Private law forms and cannot be reduced to them
170. Hirst: (1979); (1980); Hirst and Kingdom (1979)
171. ibid: Critique of Pashukanis and Blanke et. al. in (1979) of
Edelman in Introduction to "OWnership of the Image" (1979).
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by analogy.
Instead, according to Hirst, "rights" must be conceived as s~cific
ca~cities sanctioned bX laws:
"Legal rights reflect no inherent ontological attributes;
rather, they serve certain socially determined policy
objectives and interests. The rights sanctioned in law
need not correspond to the forms of consistency demanded
by ontological doctrines of the subject ; they have no
inherent unity or single point of reference.,,172
Moreover, Legislation need not create "rights" in the legal sense at
all:
liltmay secure interests by assigning tasks to personnel
or agencies ; it would be idle to think of this
assignment as the creation of 'rights': the
determination of the legality of an abortion is not a
doctor's right, but a task he is deemed competent to
perform by reason of status. Social policy objectives
can be served without endowing subjects with legal
'rights' and also without grounding in ontological
doctrines. ,,173
Furthermore, the position and capacities/rights of non-human legal
Subjects cannot result from their interpellation in the circular form
of speculary recognition which is claimed to operate in the case of
human individuals. Ideological Interpellation, in the absence of
other forms of subject-grounding produced by specific legislation,
cannot generate all the subjects of possession necessary to Capitalist
relations of production : "Interpellating individual humans as
subjects of the commodity-form cannot serve to produce all the agents
necessary for Capitalist production. Legal subjects and rights of
property corresponding to certain crucial forms of possession
172. ibid.: (1980) p. 104.
173. ibid: p. 100.
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(Corporations) are excluded.,,174
This approach provides a valuable reminder of the dangers of reducing
Law to its Private form, and of conceiving of legal sUbjectivity
solely in terms of speculary Interpellation, however, these criticisms
of reductionist tendencies may be made without abandoning Historical
Materialism: Science/Ideology, Subject/object of knowledge, Theory/
Practice, Totality and determination by the economic. On this basis
Hirst et. al. openly proclaim the redundancy of Marxism. The
consequence is theoretical and epistemological relativism, political
pragmatism, and the reduction of Socialism to an ethical postulate.
Hirst emphasizes the importance of Abortion, Company and Corporation
Law in current struggles on the Left, and this possibility must indeed
be recognized. However, such objects are here given to analysis, not
through a concept of Totality governed by determination and
contradiction, but according to unspecified criteria of "political
calculation". Within this approach there can be no coherent
theoretical basis for abstracting these aspects of bourgeois legal
relations from the existence of others. The selection is arbitrary
and the consequence a tendency to Voluntarist and reformist political
practice.
Despite the epistemological and theoretical gulf that separates them,
Hirst and Edelman are on similar ground in having produced concrete
analyses of the legal conditions of existence of various aspects of
the economic whilst failing to consider adequately the economic
conditions of existence of the legal order. As Jessop has concluded,
174. ibid. (1979) p. 14; see Hirst's critique of Althusser's theory
of Ideology, which centres on its failure at a general level to
resolve the problem of the subject in Marxism (in Hirst: 1980).
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"there is certainly insufficient attention paid to the effectivity of
legal discourse in other traditions (but) Edelman and Hirst themselves
are guilty of neglecting the extra-legal conditions that shape the
developnent and operation of an autonomous legal order.,,175
(c) Ball et. al.
Stuart Hall and his collaborators have developed a "sui generis
Gramscian approach,,176whicn locates Law as one of a plurality of
social forces and ideologies involved in the articulation of bourgeois
hegemony and the exercize of State Power in a definite conjunc-
ture.l77
The economic background to the hegenomic crisis emerging in the
'seventies is the "synchronization of Capitalist recession on a global
scale, and the crisis of Capital accumulation specific to
Britain",178 but the emphasis is on the crisis as a political and
and ideological field of struggle, constituted the terrain of the
"conjunctural" by the organization of social forces in
175. OPe cit. p. 363.
176. Jessop (ibid). This approach is also however indebted to
Althusser via Poulantzas (in whom there is a strong Gramscian
element); whilst the analyses are highly concrete, the Althusserian
framework is evident in the use of concepts of "articulation",
"levels", "instances", "overdetermination", "Relative Autonomy",
"Interpellation", "condensation", etc.
177. Hall et. al. (1978 a); Hall: (1979), (1980 c), (1980 d).
178. ibid. (1979) p. 15.
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oPposition.179 Hall's recent work recognizes the value of
Poulantzas's formulation of "Authoritarian Statism" but stresses
"the steady and unremitting set of operations designed to
build or construct a popular consent into these new
forms of Statist Authoritarianism. It is this element
(which introduces into the equation the pivotal issue of
'popular' versus 'populist' democracy) which would lead
us to rename the present process as a movement towards
"Authoritarian Populism".180
The theoretical basis of the analysis of the New Right in its struggle
for hegemony is Laclau's extension of Althusser's theory of
ideological interpellation, with its critique of the Poulantzian
ascription of ideological elements to necessary class origins 181;
what is crucial instead is the particular manner in which these
elements are organized together within the logic of different
discourses, and the articulation of these discourses to and by
different class practices.182 The conception of ideological
discourses operating by recruiting concrete social individuals through
their interpellation as "disursive subjects" is employed in the
analysis of Thatcherism, which is able to re-work themes of Law and
Order elaborated from the beginning of the 1970's with elements of the
"Social-Democratic solution" of 1974-1979, and neutralize the people/
power bloc contradiction183 effec~ively in the direction of an
179. see Gramsci (1971) p. 178. Hall's (1980 d) draws extensively on
the Prison Notebooks.
180. Hall (1980 d) p. 161. (emphasis supplied).
181. see Laclau (1977) discussed supra.
182. Hall (1980 d) p. 174.
183. In Laclau, The "class contradiction" is dominant at the abstract
level of the Mode of Production, whilst the "people/power bloc"
contradiction is dominant at the level of the Social Formation.
Non-class interpel lations are overdetermined by the class struggle.
(see (1977) On "Fascism and Ideology" pp. 108-111) Laclau's
Althusserianism is apparent in the language of "dominance" and
"overdetermination"; also in "condensation", "fusion", 'rupture",
"rupt.ural unity" (see pp. 92-94); c f , Althusser's flirtation with
psychoanalytic concepts in (1971); cf. also Hall's formulations
(infra)
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Authoritarian Populism:
"The monopoly by Social Democracy of the bureaucratic State
has enabled the discourses of Thatcherism to condense at
the negative pole Statism/Bureaucracy/social democracy/
"creeping collectivism". Against this representation of
the power bloc are counterposed various condensations of
possessive individualism/personal initiative/Thatcherism/
Freedom, on the positive pole. It is possible, then, to
represent Labour as part of the 'big battallions', ranged
against the 'little man' (and his family) oppressed by an
inefficient state bureaucracy. Thus, Social Democracy is
alligned with the power bloc, and Mrs. Thatcher is out
there 'with the people' •••••••neutralizing the people/
power bloc contradiction.,,184
Thus in the arena of Law and Order, Thatcherism has established a
moral-social leadership long neglected by social democracy, making
strategically effective interventions in a broad field of popular
conceptions concerning "the people", "the Nation", "our culture and
way of life", the "instincts of the ordinary British people",
etc. 185 : Under the right conditions, 'the people' in their
traditionalist representation can be condensed as a set of inter-
pellations in discourses which systematically displace political
issues into Universal Moral absolutes.,,186 In this context Crime
is articulated within a broader conception of moral degeneration and
the crisis of authority and social values, and "there is no mystery as
to why ordinary people should be actively recruited into crusades for
the restoration of 'Normal times' - if necessary through a more-than-
normal imposition of moral-legal force".187 Similarly in the field
of education, Thatcherism has established itself positively as a
guardian of the 'return to standards' against the indiscipline,
permissiveness and frustration of individual potential to 'get on and
competei which accompanies the policies of Social Democratic Statism.
184. Hall (1980 d) p. 177.
185. ibid. p. 179.
186. ibid.
187. ibid.
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Again, the Welfare State is presented as spendthrift and wasteful,
undermining the personal initiative of the less fortunate to "help
themselves". And on the theme of race, the interpellations of
'Nation', of 'National cultures/alien cultures', of 'our people', are
merely litherespectable signifiers of a more overt racism".188
This approach is valuable in rendering concrete within the British
national conjuncture some of,the abstract-formal insights developed by
Poulantzas through the use of concepts of 'National' and 'Exceptional'
State, 'Authoritarian Statism', etc., concerning the nature of the
hegemonic crisis and the incohesiveness of the power bloc. As with
Poulantzas, however, Law remains only vaguely specified and located
within a complex of strategies adopted by the State in its efforts to
contain the crisis. The underlying assumption is that "legal
discourses and practices are indeterminate and that their actual
implementation is overdetermined by other political and ideological
discourses and practices".189 '!hetendency is for Law to be
dissolved into Culture in a general consideration of the 'super-
structure'. This breadth of focus suggests that whilst the approach
may provide the indispensable context for conjunctural legal
analysis, it cannot engage with the seecificit¥ of concrete
material developments within the institutions and practices of Law.
Furthermore, the emphasis on the global constitution of hegemony
(Ideology) tends to neglect, in other areas as well, the material
changes that accompany the articulation of Authoritarian Populist
discourse, and the extent to which the principal ideological figure
of the "ec?ssessive individual" is established, not only
188. ibid. p. 182.
189. Jessop (op. cit.) p. 364.
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discursively, but concretely through the offloading of State
functions onto the private sector in the fields of Industry, Education
and Welfare.190
(d) E.P. 'Iho~n
A final approach, the tradition of Marxist Historiography prominently
represented by E.P. Thomson, must also be mentioned. Historical
analyses of the 18th Century, when customary rights of common are
increasingly threatened by the Whig private property consensus, and
the product of labour is becoming something distinct and separated
from the control of the worker who has only his labour-power to sell,
are of value in highlighting the conflicts over different conceptions
of property right accompanying the radical transformation of class
Society. In this context the Black Act of 1723 was just one of a
number of 18th Century statutes making Capitally punishable relatively
minor property offences, plainly in the service of dominant whig
property interests.191 Even during this period, however, Thompson
POints to the inhibitions on ruling class despotism imposed by the
rule of law, and to situations where the law provided a genuine forum
within which certain kinds of class conflict were fought out. One of
the greatest cultural achievements of the 17th Century Agrarian and
Mercantile bourgeoisie was to have passed down to the 18th the
framework of a juridical system quite different from the arbitrary and
extra-legal exercize of class power. Furthermore:
190. It is the very concreteness of "possessive individualism",
i.e. the (now increasing) materlal reality of private property in the
"property owning democracy", that constitutes one of the principal
questions for consideration in this thesis.
191. Thompson (1977); Hay et. al. (1975) consider conflicts over
customary rights of Wreckage, Poaching & Smuggling.
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"The notion of the regulation and reconciliation of
conflicts through the rule of law - and the elaboration
of rules and procedures which, on occasion, made some
approximate approach towards the ideal - seems to me a
cultural achievement of universal significance •••••
The rule of law itself, the imposing of effective
inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen
from powers' all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an
unqualified human good. ,,192
The assumption is that contemporary legal relations may be adequately
understood on the basis of an examination of their empirical genealogy
and development, and further· that such analysis enables the derivation
of universal conclusions as to the nature of the "rule of law". The
methodological foundation of this position is clarified in Thompson's
polemic against Althusserian structuralism : the problems of a
particular theoretical tradition are considered to impugn the status
of Marxist Theory as such, and what is offered in its place is
libertarian-socialist Historiography. This approach is unable to
inform theoretically, other than in vague and general terms, the
analysis of concrete legal institutions and practices in the
conjuncture, with the result that the limits and possibilities of Law
as a terrain of progressive and defensive struggles are not
considered. Neither are the coercive aspects of the Law, or of the
State in traversing the boundaries of "legality", taken into
account.193 The eternization of Law also pre-empts important
theoretical questions concerning the role of law in the transition to
192. Thompson (1977) pp. 265-266 (emphasis supplied)
193. see Poulantzas (1978), discussed supra.
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socialism and in future Communist Society.194 Here Society cannot be
conceived scientifically as governed by objective relations of
contradiction and determination, because present in Thompson's
conception of Totality is a historist/humanist Class subject "making
history" in accordance with the determining category of its
experience. This has definite effects in the field
of politics : "No-one can fail to see that when, in the midst of the
class struggle, the litanies of Humanism hold the theoretical and
Ideological stage, it is eco~omism which is quietly winning.,,195
194. this question remains important for Marxists, despite Thompson,
and Hirst's dismissal of it as "essentialist". It has only been
addressed, however, in very general terms (e.g. Arther (1978);
Picciotto (1979). The concrete analysis of Trespass provides specific
insights in this respect (infra: Ch. 8.)
195. Althusser (1976) p. 85. Althusser's anti-humanist thesis is one
of his lasting contributions to Marxism.
105
IV Conclusions; Prospects for the historical-materialist anal~is
of Tre~
From this brief survey it is evident that the Althusserian and State
Derivation approaches are most adequate in posing the general and
fundamental problems of historical-materialism, concerning the
conception of Society as Totality and the theorization of
determination within it. Because these problems are thought at the
highly abstract level of the Mode of Production, however, the
concrete analysis of Law and State - in their historical development
and their precise location and role in the current conjuncture - takes
second place, and is subject to distortions arising from the
insufficiency of mediating determinations. This inadequacy is
manifested in different forms in the various theories : in Blanke et.
al., in the inability to engage with historical reality, which is
separated from "form analysis" ; in Holloway and Picciot.to, in the
failure to concretize, other than at a still very general level,
the analysis of the limits of the form and function of Law and State
in the British National conjuncture ; and in Foulantzas, in an
extreme abstract-formalism which leads to the predominance of purely
symbolic elements within the analysis and results in an insensitivity
to specific aspects of the conjuncture. Behind these problems lie
reductionist tendencies which must have deleterious effects on such
empirical analyses as are produced.
The prospects for the analysis of particular historical and concrete
aspects of Law are therefore not promising within the dominant
theoretical positions. On the other hand, where specific attention is
accorded legal institutions and practices, as in Thompson, Edelman
W6
and Hirst, this tends to be at the expense of precisely those broader
considerations that define Marxism and distinguish it from other
approaches: Thompson's humanism excludes the scientific conception
of an objective Totality and its real conditions of determination
Edelman represents an outpost of Althusserianism which is so far
removed from its mainstream that the question of determination in the
last instance is still further postponed; and Hirst has explicitly
broken with Marxism by abandoning Epistemology, Science, Theory,
Totality and determination. Thus otherwise interesting analyses of
law relating to Abortion, Companies and Corporations, Photography
and the Cinema, are of limited value as Marxist analyses because they
have not been undertaken on the basis of a specified conception of the
legal-totality and its conditions of determination which would enable
the location of these aspects of law within a broader framework of
legal institutions and practices. The concern to avoid reduction to
the commodity-form and the private human legal subject leads Hirst,
for example, to consider the specificity of public bodies, Trusts,
Corporations, Companies and partnerships, and the effectivity of
legislation, the courts, judges and legal interpretation, however,
their operation within a society which produces and is reproduced on
the basis of commodity forms of calculation within and between
productive enterprizes and units of consumption, and the legal
conditions of existence (Private, Public, Administrative) of such a
form of economic organization, are ignored.
Hence the focus of attention must be returned to the principal
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theoretical debate.196 Here all contributors are agreed that there
is "much work to be done"197 and that "the Marxist Theory of Law is
still in its early stages".198 The assumption is that persistent
theoretical work within one or other position will ultimately enable
adequate historical and empirical research. Thus Jessop recognizes
the problem of the theoretical indeterminacy of the State Derivation
Approach at complex and concrete levels of analysis, and the dangers
of treating these levels as mere instances of the abstract or lapsing
into surface description of 'empirical phenomena, but the criticism of
this aspect is to be suspended "in the absence of methodol09ical
solutions or actual mediatin9 concepts".199 A similarly optimistic
but more general statement regarding the theorisation of Law is made
by Jessop in the Conclusion to his review of the field:
"Analyses at this level of abstraction ••••will inevitably
be relativel~ indeterminate in their implications for
specific conJunctures. This relative indeterminacy, or
under-determination, can be ro ressivel eliminated
through the concretizatIon and lor comp eXlflcatlon of
the theoretical object and its conditions of existence
and effectivity. This means a progressive shift from the
primacy of form to an emphasis on the content of law
and the legal order.200
But the problem remains of precisely how this shift from abstract to
concrete levels of analysis is to be accomplished without distortion
or lapsing into empiricism. There is no sign that the "relative
indeterminacy "of either dominant theoretical position is being
196. Hall's Gramscian approach is inadequate as a framework for legal
research because of its generality (supra)
197. see Jessop. (op. cit.) p. 366.
198. Edelman (op. cit.) p. 23.
199. Jessop. (op. cit.) p. 349. (emphasis supplied)
200. ibid. p. 366. See also Laclau's formulation: "'!hepossibility
of thinking the specificity of modes of production depends on
carrying to its logical conclusion the task which Balibar and
Poulantzas set themselves, but have only partially carried out: to
eliminate descriptive categories and replace them by truly theoretical
categories". i see also p. 10.
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IIprogressivelyeliminatedll. The record suggests, on the contrary,
that mediating concepts and theoretical solutions are not forth-
coming, and that the principal approaches have in fact encountered
problems of an order that cannot be resolved within their respective
problematics. Indicative of this failure are the decline in the
fortunes of Althusserianism and the virtual stagnation of the State
Derivation debate, and the rise of approaches of more limited scope
that avoid the broader issues of historical materialism.
These problems are further emphasized when the question ~f the
prospects for the historical-materialist analysis of Trespass is
specifically posed, for to be adequate here a Theory would have to
take account of the historical and conjunctural aspects of the
development of the law, and simultaneously explain its Civil/Private
and Criminal/Public dimensions without reduction. But this is
precisely the kind of highly specific and concrete research that
current Theory is most ill-equipped to undertake. Confronted with
this situation, the available alternatives would then appear to be:
(1) to adopt one or other of the principal approaches and attempt to
provide mediating theoretical determinations in the concrete analysis,
avoiding making this an instance of the abstract or reverting to
empirical description. Given the sheer technicality and juridical
complexity of the heteromorphous law of Trespass, however, the twin
temptations of Rationalism and Ernpirismwould be difficult to evade.
(2) to forsake the concrete object and concentrate instead on the
General Theory of Law and the State. This would be unacceptable for
two immediate reasons, firstly because the theoretical development of
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existing approaches has been limited, despite the concentration of
recent Marxist research in general theoretical areas, suggesting that
their potential is not great, and the development of an alternative
and more adequate "General '!beory"does not seem likely i and secondly
because the principal task of Marxist Theory is or should be the
concrete analysis of the current situation, and Trespass is given as
an object of study in the concrete conditions of struggle around the
transformation of the Law by the "Criminal Tresp:ss " Act 1977.
(3) to restrict the focus of analysis and avoid the broader questions
of historical~aterialism by examining the specific nature, content,
and form of particulr juridical discourses. This alternative too is
unacceptable, since it is precisely the consideration of the broader
questions of Totality and determination in respect of material legal
institutions that would constitute an adequate Marxist analysis of
Trespass.
(4) to locate the law in the context of a plurality of social forces
struggling to maintain hegemony in the conjuncture, and examine its
role in the overall articulation of bourgeois domination. As with the
focus on general theory, however, here the specificity of Trespass and
its institutional materiality would be lost.20l
The better solution is to avoid completely the terrain of the
principal theoretical debate (whilst nevertheless maintaining the
fundamental principles of historical~aterialism) by questioning
the very status of general theory and its relation to the concrete.
Here the defficiencies in the "General '!beoryof Law" and the paucity
of concrete research are seen as due, not to the "early stages of
201. This applies also to the Historiographic approach (supra)
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developnent" of this Theory, or to the neglect of an area in which
there is "still much work to be done", but to the rationalism
and theoreticism implicit in the vert'concept of a "<Jeneraltheort'
of one or other as~ct of the su~rstructures202. In proposing
instead Marxism as a method, which cannot be given in advance of its
particular concrete object of study, but whose general principles are
nevertheless specifiable upon a re-reading of Marx's later works, we
would be opposing the tenden~y to theoreticism and reductionism that
has beset the attempt to secure Marxism on a scientific basis from
della Volpe to Althusser. If this position can be established, and
if a highly concrete research programme for the analysis of legal
institutions and practices can be produced, with successful results,
then a more adequate foundation may at least have been laid for the
better understanding of the complex nature and function of law in
modern society.
202. The suggestion is that the opposition of "abstract theory" to
"concrete/empirical reality" is a rationalist conception.
(AIternative conceptions of "abstraction", "Theory", "Theoretical
determination" etc. are developed below.) The tendency is for general
theoretical elements at the abstract level of "Mode of Production" to
be elaborated in essentialist paradigms, which are them brought to
bear on the "concrete" at the level of the Social Formation. The
assumption that concrete research programmes can be realized through
the "progressive elimination" of "relative indeterminacy" (see Jessop,
Laclauj'supra) depends upon a particular (rationalist) conception of
the abstract/concrete relation. This is most apparent in Balibar's
(op.cit) "structuralist combinatory", but evident also in the
"Capital-logic" approaches. The problem of rationalism has been
"resolved" by Hirst (by abolishing the concept "Mode of Production")
but only at the expence of abandoning Marxism. This thesis attempts
to re-establish Marxism as an "empi rical" Sc ience - beginning and
ending with the concrete - avoiding empiricism and theoreticism (but
being no less "theoretical" for this). The first stages of this
argument are developed (infra) in Ch. 4.
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Ch. 4. Marx's Method
The specific question of the implications of Marx's method for the
concrete analysis of Lawl is subordinated, in the order of
exposition of this chapter, to the general consideration of that
method. Such a vast topic cannot be exhaustively examined here,
therefore it will be structured by the identification of several
crucial issues, all of which involve the interpretation of The 1857
Introduction2, concerning:
(1) The question of continuity in Marx's methodological and
theoretical development. How adequate a statement of Marx's method of
Inquiry is the 1857 Introduction? Is Capital the result of this logic
of investigation, or of some other, unspecified because the promised
"materialist dialectic" was never written?
(2) The corresponding question of the starting-point and the
relation of Capital, Wage-labour and Landed property. Marx resolves
the problem of the point of departure at the end of the Grundrissei
What does the replacement of Value by the Commodity imply for the
development of the logic of Investigation? How does this affect the
status of the Introduction?
(3) The corresponding question of the nature of Marx's method
of abstraction. Is the conception of scientific abstraction employed
in Capital equivalent to that specified in 1857? If it has changed,
is this in a manner consistent with the earlier text, or does it
1. see Part V, infra.
2. Marx: Introduction to the Grundrisse ("Foundations of the Critique
of Political Economy") [Rough Draft] Pelican (1973)
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indicate a break?
(4) The corresponding question of the epistemological founda-
tions of Marx's work. What does the change in starting point, method
of abstraction and conception of science between 1857 and Capital
imply (if anything) for the development of Marx's materialist dial-
ectic? Does Marx resolve the problem of his relation to Hegel by a
break or a re-appropriation? What is the status of Lenin's cryptic
assertion that it is impossible to understand Capital without having
thoroughly studied Hegel's Logic?
The "problem of method" sternsfrom Marx's failure to consider system-
atically the question of his method of Inquiry. Marx indicated to
Engels in 18583 his intention.to produce an account of the material-
ist dialectic, and again in a letter to Dietzgen in 1876 stated: "when
I have shaken off the burden of my economic labours, I shall write a
dialectic".4 Whilst this wish was never fulfilled, the recent re-
discovery of the 1857 General Introduction has been assumed by the
majority of commentators to provide an adequate substitute.5 The
acceptance of part or all of the methodological observations contained
in this text is the foundation of the theoretical positions of both
Althusser and Pashukanis, and hence of the principal approaches to the
3. Letter to Engels 14th January 1858 (Selected Correspondence).
4. quoted in Echeverria (1978 b) p. 333
5. The manuscript of the "Seven Notebooks" was lost in circumstances
unknown. A limited edition appeared in Moscow in 1939, but the first
effective publication was in the original German in 1953. French and
Italian editions appeared in the 'sixties. Fragments were published
in English in 1904, 1964 and 1972, Nicolaus's complete translation
becoming available in 1973. The impact of the Grundrisse on European
Marxism is thus relatively recent. [see Tribe, K. (1974) p. 180;
Nicolaus (Foreward to 1973 translation) p. 7.]
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analysis of Law and the State.6 Echeverria7 considers that
Lukacs, Colletti, Mandel, Vygodski, Della Volpe, Kosik, Zeleny,
Ilienkov, Rosdolsky, Luporini, Rovatti, Carver and Cutler et. al. also
treat the 1857 Introduction uncritically as Marx's position on his
logic of investigation.8 Against this tendency must be set more
recent interpretations of Marx's Method sharing in common a revived
interest in Capita19, which might broadly be said to follow Lenin's
reasoning that "If Marx did not leave behind him a 'Logic' (with a
capital letter), he did leave the loSic of Capital, and this ought
to be utilized to the full in this question.,,10 The most systematic
and extensive contributions in this field, those of Echeverria and
Sayer,ll distinguish the method of investigation from the logic of
exposition of Capital and consider the former, and its relation to the
latter, through a methodological reading of Marx's later works.
Because of the centrality of the 1857 Introduction to the debate on
Method, a brief resume of this text will be provided in part I, as a
necessary means of contextualizing the subsequent discussion. Section
II describes developments in the structure and content of the original
plan after 1857, universally acknowledged by all commentators. The
third section examines the assumption of continuity in three inter-
pretations representative of this position, whilst Part IV develops
6. This contention is supported (infra.) in Section V.
7. Echeverria, R. (1978 a)
8. ibid. Ch. 6 pp. 197-214; (1978 b) N. 4. p. 365. Zeleny, Colletti
and Althusser are considered below in part III. Ilienkov, Kosik,
Rovatti, della Volpe and Luporini are not available in English. (see
Echeverria's bibliography OPe cit.)
9. Echeverria (1978 a,b); Sayer (1979 a, b); Cleaver (1979); Clarke &
Fine (1978); Mepham (1977) (1979); Fine & Harris (1979).
10. quoted in Echeverria (1978 b).
11. considered in Part IV. (infra).
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the case against continuity12 by considering inconsistencies in the
Introduction and between 1857 and Capital, and proposing an alterna-
tive conception of Marx's logic of Inquiry. The final section relates
conclusions as to the nature of Marx's method to the theoretical
problems discussed in chapter 3., and considers again the prospects
for the concrete analysis of Trespass Law.
I The 1857 Introduction.13
(1) Production;
Marx distinguishes his initial object, material production, from the
presupposed independent and isolated individual of the "eighteenth
Century Robinsonades" and contemporary Economists such as Bastiat and
Carey.14 Production by an "isolated individual" outside Society -
as posited by Smith and Ricardo - "is as much of an absurdity as is
the development of language without individuals living tosether and
12. This terminology is adopted because whilst there is a systematic
"case" against continuity, the contary position tends to be merely
assumed rather than rigoroulsy argued.
13. The full ti tLe of the Introduction (Notebook M) is "Production,
Consumption, Distribuion, Exchange (Circulation)." The first two
sections analyze this totality, whilst the third, generally agreed by
commentators to be the most significant, examines in the light of
these observations "The Method of Political economy". This section is
also the most controversial, commonly considered as authority for the
abstract> concrete conception of Marx's method of Inquiry. Sections
(1) & (2), by contrast, have attracted little attention. The purpose
of resuming them at some length is to convey the overall structure of
Marx's argument in the introduction; they form the indispensable basis
of any materialist Marxist position, which must establish the primacy
of Production, and are included also for this reason.
14. (1973) p. 83.
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talking to each other." 15 Rather Production is always "production
at a definate stage of social development - production by social
individuals.,,16 Here it is clear that Production must either be
specified according to the particular historical epoch (e.g. modern
bourgeois production), or the entire process of historic development
pursued through its different phases. Nevertheless, all epochs
share certain common characteristics: "Production in general is an
abstraction, but a rational abstraction insofar as it really brings
out and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition.,,17
Thus no production is possible without instruments of production or
some form of stored past labour. The error of Carey, however, having
correctly conceived of Capital as an instrument of production and
objectified labour, is then.to make Capital a general and eternal
relation of nature, leaving out just that specific quality which makes
"instrument of production" and "stored labour" into Capital.l8
The inadequacy of the general concept of Production is evident,
according to Marx, in its use by contemporary economic and political
theorists such as J.S. Mill. Here the effect of the generalization of
production is "the crude tearing-apart of production and distribution
and of their real relationship",19 the former being presented as
distinct from the latter,
"as encased in eternal natural laws independent of
history, at which opportunity bourseois relations are
then quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws
15. ibid.
16. ibid. p. 85.
17. ibid.
18. ibid. p. 86.
19. ibid. p. 87.
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on which society in the abstract is founded.,,20
Whilst it is true that all production is appropriation of nature on
the part of individuals within and through a specific form of society,
to say that Property is therefore a precondition of Production is
merely tautologous. To then conclude that Property is inevitably
£rivate property, requiring its protection by the courts, police
etc. is to "bring things which are organically related into an
accidental relation, into a merely reflective connection."21 '!he
fact that every specific form of production creates its own legal
relations and form of government (the real organic connection) is
obscured by an a-historical method which eternalizes bourgeois
relations. Marx's conclusion as to the usefulness of the conception
of "Production in general" is therefore cautious and reserved:
"There are general characteristics which all stages of
production have in common and which are established as
general ones by the mind; but the so-called seneral
preconditions of all production are nothing more than
these abstract moments with which no real historical
stage of production can be grasped."n---
(2) The general relation of Production to Distribution, Exchange,
CollSlIIIfI:ion.
According to Marx, the economists have established some coherence in
their analysis of the relations between Production, Distribution,
Exchange and Consumption: in Production, members of society appropri-
ate nature in accordance with human needs; Distribution determines the
proportion in which individuals share in the product; Exchange enables
particular desires to be satisfied by converting the portion of the
product already assigned by Distribution in accordance with individual
20. ibid.
21. ibid. p. 88.
22. ibid.
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will; and finally in Consumption, the product becomes the object of
individual gratification. Production is the generality, Distribution
and Exchange the particularity, and Consumption the singularity in
which the whole is joined together.23 But whilst this is admittedly
a coherence, it remains a shallow one, the result of "barbarically
tearing apart things which belong together.,,24 The totality of
these different moments is more adequately grasped in the following
manner:
(a) Cons';!'Ption and Production:
Firstly, there is an immediate identit¥ between Production and
Consumption. Production is not only production, but also immediately
Consumption. In the process of production, the individual consumes,
expends and develops his abilities and capacities. Similarly the
means of production are consumed in their deployment, machinery and
tools are worn out and raw materials lose their natural form and
composition by being used up; hence the economists' shorthand,
"Productive Consumption. ,,25 Similary, Consumption is not only
consumption, but also immediately Production: the consumption of sun-
light and chemical substances produces the plant, the consumption of
food produces the human being; hence "Consumptive production.,,26
Secondly, however, a mediating movement takes place between Product-
ion and Consumption, establishing within the relation of externality a
!!!_utualdependence: "Production creates the material, as external
object, for Consumption; Consumption creates the used, as material
23. ibid. p. 89.
24. ibid. p. 89.
25. ibid. p. 90
26. ibid. p. 91
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object, as aim, for Production. Without Production no Consumption;
without Consumption no Production. ,,27 And thirdly, in addition to
this immediate and mediate identity, a relation of internal connect-
~ exists such that each of Production and Consumption "creates the
other in completing itself, and creates itself as the other.,,28
Consumption is the final form of Production, it completes the
product by dissolving it, by consuming its independently material
form. The product becomes fully a product, and the producer fully a
producer, only in the concluding act of consumption. A railway on
which no trains run is a railway only potentially and a garment
becomes a real garment only in the act of being worn.29 Similarly
Production produces Consumption "by creating the specific manner of
consumption; and, further, by creating the stimulus of consumption,
the ability to consume, as a need. ,,30 In this manner Production
also gives Consumption its specific "finish".
The "socialist belletrists" and "prosaic economists" (e.g. Say) there-
fore commit a fatal error in positing Production and Consumption as
simply identical. To say of a nation that "its production is its
consumption" is to miss the fact that "a people does not consume its
entire product, but also creates means of production, fixed Capital
27. ibid. p. 93
28. ibid.
29. ibid. p. 91
30. ibid. p. 93.
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etc.,,31 The cricial point to emphasize is that:
"Production is the real point of departure and hence also
the predominant moment. Consumption as urgency, as need,
is itself an intrinsic moment of productive activity.
But the latter is the point of departure for realization
and hence also its predominant moment; It is the act
through which the whole process again runs its course.
The individual produces an object and, by consuming it,
returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-
producing individual. Consumption thus appears as a
moment of Production. ,,32
In Society, however, the producer's relation to the product is
external "and its return to,the subject depends on his relation to
other individuals; he does not come into possession of it
directly.,,33 Distribution mediates Production and Consumption,
determining the producer's share in the total social product. In what
relation does this sphere stand to Production?
Cb) Distribution and Production:
As might be expected, in the standard works of Economics Distribution
appears outside Production as an autonomous sphere. Everything is
here "posited doubly": ground-rent, wages, interest and profit figure
under Distribution, whilst land, labour and Capital figure under
Production, without the comprehension of their proper relation. In
fact, Interest and Profit as forms of distribution eresuppose
31. ibid. p. 94
32. ibid.
33. ibid.
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capital as agent of Production34; the wage as a form of distribution
Eresu~ses wage-labour; and ground rent, by means of which landed
property is accorded a share in the product, eresu~ses large-scale
landed property. The relations and modes of Distribution are the
obverse of the agents of Production, not something existing separ-
ately from them:
"The structure (Gliederung) of distribution is completely
determined by the structure of production. Distribution
is itself a product of production, not only in that only
the results of,production can be distributed, but also •••
in that the specific kind of participation in production
determines the specific forms of distribution, i.e. the
pattern of participation in distribution. It is al-
together an illusion to posit land in production, ground
rent in distribution, etc.,,35
In what sense may Distribution therefore be said to structure Product-
ion? Marx emphasizes that "to examine Production whilst disregarding
the internal distribution within it is obviously an empty abstract-
ion.,,36 Distribution is : (1) the distribution of the instruments
and means of production, (2) ("a further specification of the same
relation") the distribution of members of society among the different
branches of Production in determinate relations37, and (3) the
distribution of products: "Production does indeed have its determin-
ants and preconditions, which form its moments.,,38 However, it is
always the mode of Production at a given stage in historical develop-
ment that determines the distribution that already exists, or which
arises as a result, for example, of conquest or revolution. Whatever
the new regime of distribution that is imposed in such circumstances,
"it is itself a product of Production, not only of historical product-
34. ibid. p. 95.
35. ibid.
36. ibid. p. %
37. ibid.
38. ibid. p. 97
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ion generally, but of the specific historic mode of production.1I39
Even pillage as a form of distribution must be determined by the mode
of production: IIA stock-jobbing nation cannot be pillaged in the same
manner as a nation of cowherds.1I40 Similarly the influence of Law
as an instrument of distribution, for example in relation to the
conditions of perpetuation of landed property in certain families, is
structured and limited by the prevailing mode of production.
(c) Exc~e and Circulation;
Circulation may be considered as Exchange regarded in its
totality.41 Again, this sphere is either already directly comprised
in Production, or else is de~ermined by it: (1) The exchanges of
activities and abilities that takes place in Production is essentially
constitutive of that process, and cannot be separated from it; (2)
The exchange of products in the making of the final commodity is
similarly comprised within Production; (3) The exchange between
dealers is itself a part of production and entirely determined by
it42; and (4) Exchange achieves its greatest independence in the
final phase where the product is exchanged directly for consumption.
But even here private exchange presupposes the division of labour and
private production, and its intensity, extent and manner is determined
39. ibid. p. 98
40. ibid.
41. ibid.
42. ibid. p. 99
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by the development and structure of Production.43
Marx's conclusion to this section is therefore "not that Production,
Distribution, Exchange and Consumption are identical, but that they
all form the members of a totality, distributions within a unity.,,44
Within this whole, Production may indeed be determined by the other
moments: expansion in the sphere of Exchange causes growth in the
quantity of Production and a deepening of divisions between its diff-
erent branches, similarly changes in Distribution, e.g. in the con-
centration of Capital or in the population between town and country,
also effect changes in Production: "Mutual interaction takes place
between the different moments, (as is) the case with every organic
whole.,,45 However, the final conclusion is that:
"Production predominates not only over itself, in the
antithetical definition of production, but over the
other moments aswell. The process always returns to
production to begin anew •••••••A definite production
thus determines a definite consumption, distribution and
exchange, aswell as definite relations between these
different moments".46
(3) 'Ihe Method of Political Economy
According to Marx, there are two basic methodological trajectories in
the politico-economic analysis of a given country: (1) The
economists of the 17th Century always begin with the "living whole",
43. ibid.
44. ibid.
45. ibid. p. 100
46. ibid. p 99
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the "real and concrete,,47, e.g. Nation, State, several States, or
the precondition of the entire social act of Production, Population.
From here the movement is towards "evermore simple concepts (Begriff),
from the imagined concrete towards ever Thinner abstractions until
(arrival) at the simplest determinations." Thus increasingly abstract
determinations and relations are revealed, such as division of labour,
money, value etc. But here the starting-point is a "chaotic
conception (Vorstellung) of the whole"; population is itself
(ironically) an "abstraction", since its simple and abstract relations
(classes, wage-labour, capital, exchange, division of labour, prices)
are left out of account, and there is no guarantee that this
methodological trajectory will reveal adequately the increasingly
simple determinations neceSSqry to the explanation of the concrete
object.48 (2) Only by moving analytically in the opposite
direction, Marx contends, can the concrete whole adequately be
(
grasped, "not as a caotic conception, but as a rich totality of many
determinations and relations." It is "obviously the Scientifically
correct Method,,49 to ascend from abstract and simple relations, such
as labour, division of labour, need and exchange-value to the concrete
and complex level of the State, Population, exchange between nations
and the world market. Rather than the "full conception" being
evaporated to yield an abstract determination, then, the "abstract
determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete of way of
47. ibid. p. 100
48. ibid.
49. ibid. p. 101
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thought" •50 This concrete:
"is concrete because it is the concentration of many
determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears
in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of
concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure,
even though it is the point of departure in reality and
hence also the point of departure for observation
(Anschaung) and conception".51
The method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is the way in
which thought must necessarily appropriate the concrete, reproducing
it as the "concrete in the ~ind". But this does not mean (contra
Hegel) that the real is "the eroduct of thought concentrating
itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by
itself.,,52 The simplest economic category, e.g. exchange-value,
always exists only as an abstract and one-sided relation within a
concrete, living whole. The movement of the conceptual categories
is not to be confused with the real process of production.
Having determined the respective positions of abstract and concrete
categories in the order of analysis, Marx then consider the extent to
which this path, rising from the simple to the more combined, corres-
ponds to the real historical process. Money and the exchange which
determines it are amongst the simplest of categories, but this does
not mean that their existence is presupposed in all complex forms of
social organization: In Peru there existed the highest forms of econ-
ornicco-operation and a developed division of labour, but without any
kind of money; the foundation of the Roman Empire remained taxes and
payment in kind, monetary relations developing fully only in the army.
Exchange/Money cannot therefore be considered a historically original
50. ibid.
51. ibid.
52. ibid.
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and constituent element of Society: "This very simple category makes
a historic appearance in its full intensity only in the most developed
conditions of Society".53 Similarly, Labour is a simple abstract-
ion, but neither does this category wade its way progressively through
all social development; it too "achieves practical truth as an
abstraction only as a category of the most modern society". Only
under bourgeois conditions does Labour cease to be thinkable in its
E._articularform. The abstraction of "labour", as it appears in the
head, "corresponds to a historic form of society in which individuals
can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the
specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indiffer-
ence".54
Since the analytical ascent must be from the simple to the complex,
and since simple categories achieve their fullest form only within
the most developed historic relations, then the present social organ-
ization of production (rather than any prior historical epoch) must be
the primary focus of attention: "Human anatomy contains a key to the
anatomy of the ape •••••The bourgeois economy this supplies the key to
the ancient. etc.,,55 '!hecategories which express bourgeois
relations allow insights into the structure and relations of product-
ion of previous social formations. The example of Money and exchange
have already shown, however, that the latest term cannot regard the
previous ones merely as steps leading up to itself. The "truth" which
the categories of bourgeois economics possess for previous societies
53. ibid. p. 103
54. ibid. p. 104
55. ibid. p. 105; This is the fundamental point emphasized (supra.)
in the Introduction to Chapter I.
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is to be taken always "only with a grain of salt".56
The problem remains of the order and sequence of categories within the
analytical method so far specified, concerning which of the abstract
and simple categories expressing bourgeois social relations is to be
the particular point of departure. Having established in section (2)
the predominance of Production over the other moments within the
whole, Marx observes that it now seems natural litobegin with ground
rent, with landed property, 'since this is bound up with the earth, the
source of all production and of all being, and with the first form of
Production in more or less all societies - agriculture".57 'This
however would be erroneous, because in all forms of society there is
one specific kind of Production which predominates over the rest,
"whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the
others. It is a general illumination which bathes all
the colours and modifies their particularity. It is a
particular ether which determines the specific gravity of
every being which has materialized within it".5
Thus in the feudal order, industry and even capital itself assume a
landed-proprietary character, whilst in bourgeois Society it is the
opposite, Agriculture increasingly becoming merely a branch of
industry entirely dominated by Capital. In conclusion,
"It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the
economic categories follow oneanother in the same
sequence as that in which they were historically
decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by
their relation to oneanother in modern bourseois
society, which is precisely the opposite of that which
seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to
historical development. The point is not the historic
position of the economic relations in the succession of
different forms of society. Even less is it their
sequence lin the ideal (proudhon) •••••Rather, their
56. ibid. p. 106.
57. ibid.
58. ibid. p. 107.
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order within modern bourgeois society".59
The correct order, then, is: (1) The general and abstract deter-
minants of all forms of society "but in the above explained
sense".6121(2) The fundamental categories of bourgeois society:
Capital, Wage-labour, landed-property; Town and Country; the three
social classes; Exchange; Circulation; credit system. (3) The State;
taxes; the population; colonies. (4) The international relation of
production and division of labour; international exchange. (5) The
world market and crises.6l
II Develo~ts in structure and content of the Plan after 1857
Marx completed the Introduction in mid-September 1857, but delayed be-
ginning the Work which it was intended to introduce and instead spent
the next year on the Grundrisse, a roughly drafted collection of manu-
scripts never meant for publication. In the process of the working-
out of the seven notebooks, a number of important developments in the
structure of the Plan take place, concerning principally the point of
departure for the systematic exposition and the logical relation bet-
ween capital, landed-property and wage-labour.62
As regards the former, the Second Notebook, written in November 1857,
demonstrates the superiority of Value as a starting point over Labour,
59. ibid. p. 11218.This line of argument is further developed in Ch's
4 & 5 (infra.) to justify the point of departure for the analysis of
Trespass.
6121.ibid. (referring to section (1) on "Production in general")
61. ibid. There follows a brief fourth section consisting of
"Notabene in regard to points to be mentioned here and not to be
forgotten"
62. It is useful to distinguish structure from theoretical content;
selective examples of changes in the latter are given below. (see
Nicolaus OPe cit.; Echeverria (1978 b). )
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at this stage the only other serious contender: "To develop the
concept of Capital it is necessary to begin not with labour but with
Value, and precisely, with exchange-value in an already developed
movement of Circulation".63 This involves beginning the analysis at
the level of Circulation rather than Production (as must be the case
with labour), without however denying that Production is the deter-
minant moment of Circulation, Exchange and Distribution.64 At the
same time, the crucial importance of the Commodity for the analysis of
the concept of Value is also increasingly recognized:
"It is commodities which form the presupposition of
circulation; they are the realization of a definite
labour-time and, as such, values; their presupposition,
therefore, is both the production of commodities by
labour and their production as exchange-values".65
But it is not until June 1858, in the Seventh Notebook, that the
commodity itself becomes the point of departure for the exposition:
"The first category in which bourgeois wealth presents
itself is in that of the cornmodit¥. The commodity
appears as the unity of two aspects. It is use-value,
i.e. object of the satisfaction of any system whatever of
human needs •••••Now how does use-value become transformed
into commodity? Vehicle of exchanse-value. Although
directly united in the commodity, use-value and exchange-
value just as directly split apart".66
It is the Commodity, then, which becomes the starting point of the
1859 "Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", the work for
which the 1857 Introduction had originally been intended; it remains
the point of departure for Capital, with minor modifications in the
first edition of Volume I (Part I) of 1867, and in the second German
63. Grundrisse p. 259
64. as demonstrated in the first two sections of the Introduction.
65. Grundrisse p. 255.
66. ibid p. 881
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edition of 1872.67
As to the question of the order and succession of the categories of
Capital, wage-labour and landed property, the Second Notebook departs
from the seqence envisaged in the Introduction by locating landed
property in second place and wage-labour in the third.68 By
February 1858, the first and most abstract section proposed in the
Introductory plan is to be incorporated within the general concept of
Capital, the whole work being divided into six books: (1) Capital
("contains some introductory chapters"); (2) Landed Property; (3)
Wage-Labour; (4) The State; (5) International Trade; (6) World
Market".69 In a letter to Kugelman of October 1866,70 however,
Marx repudiates the independent treatment of the three fundamental
categories, and subsumes them within the global analysis of Capital.
Wage-labour is now recognized as an integral part of fully developed
Capital, and Capital itself is considered to determine the specific
nature of landed property in bourgeois society. Hence the final Plan,
which is that realized in Capital, is: Book I, the Production process
of Capital; Book II, Circulation process of Capital; and Book III, the
process of Capitalist production as a whole. The structural change
between the first and final outlines consists, therefore, in the
embodiment of the original Book on Landed property in volume III of
Capital; the embodiment of the Book on Wage-labour in Volume I; and
the embodiment of sections (b) - (d) of the Book on Capital in Volume
67.
68.
69.
see Echeverria (1978 b) P 353
Grundrisse p 264
letter to Lassalle, 22 Feb 1858 MESC p. 96
70. 13th Oct. 1866 MEW Vol. 31 (referred to in Echeverria (op.
cit.) ).
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III, and of section (a) in Volumes I and 11.71
In accordance with this development of a final logic of presentation,
several transformations in the substantive content of Marx's theoret-
ical analysis also take place.72
(1) Volumes I and II of Capital share with the Rough Draft an
emphasis on the abstract study of the phenomenon of the formation of
Capital, conducted at the level of "Capital in general". Wheras, how-
ever, the Rough Draft remains at this level, considering Profit for
example as "profit in general" or "profit of the capitalist class,"
Volume III of Capital proceeds to the level of "many capitals in
competition", progressively approximating to the form in which
capitals appear on the surface of society, and enabling analysis of
the transformation of values into prices of production and the
division of surplus-value into business profit, interest, etc:
"At this point the limits of "capital in general" - as the
concept had been elaborated by Marx in the Rough Draft -
are far exceeded. Problems can now be dealt with, which
could only be hinted at in the earlier stages of the
inquiry".73
(2) In the course of the period between the writing of the Grundrisse
and Capital, the conceptual couple "fixed and circulating capital" is
replaced by "constant and variable capital". The former distinction
pertains to the sphere of circulation, fixed capital having a slower
rate of depreciation than its counterpart, whilst the latter refers to
71. see Rosdolsky (1977) for the most comprehensive account.
Rosdolsky's useful diagramme (p. 53) is reproduced in Appendix A. (see
Appendices).
72. only three such changes will be indicated here to illustrate
Marx's development in this respect; (see Rosdolsky OPe cit).
73. ibid. p. 51 Rosdolsky instances the development of the concept
of "socially necessary labour II (fn. p 51)
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Production, denoting the respective parts of capital accorded means of
production and living labour. In the movement from Circulation to
Production, Marx is breaking with the classical temP9ral conception
of capital, and the first couple is ultimately abandoned
completely.74
(3) In the later pages of the Rough Draft, the concept "labour
capacity" or "labour power" begins to be substituted for the classical
politico-economic concept of "labour". This development is Marx's
solution to a dilemma that had beset classical economics, concerning
the question of the "value of labour": To argue that the value of
labour was expressed by the worker's wages tended to suggest that the
source of Value lay jointly in the "factors of production", land,
labour and capital, and thus destroy the basis of a labour theory of
value; and to argue, on the other hand, that the value of labour was
expressed in the value of the product implied that the worker was not
paid the "value of his labour", and was cheated of a part of it,
contradicting the principle of equivalent exchange. Marx shows that
the question is badly posed; the commodity exchanged for the wage is
not a thing (labour) but rather a right of disposition over labour-
E?wer. The principle of equal exchange in the labour theory of value
is upheld, but at the same time an explanation is provided for the
accumulation and expansion of capital in the theory of surplus-value.
The value of labour-power is then, like any other commodity, deter-
mined by the labour time socially necessary for its production and
74. see Roldolsky (op, cit) pp. 351-365; Tribe, K. (1974) pp.
191-194.
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reproduction.75
Given that these developments in structure of presentation and theor-
etical content are plainly evident in Marx's work, the problem
concerns the extent to which the "method of Inquiry" laid down in 1857
can be said to have sustained these changes whilst retaining its
integrity. The argument for a continuity between 1857 and Capital
must defend the Introduction as Marx's logic of Investigation, despite
other developments that may have taken place. The argument against,
on the other hand, must demonstrate the inconsistencies in this text
and between it and Capital, and provide an alternative account of
Marx's Method.
III The ass~tion of Continui~
There is no particular unity amongst those writers who argue expli-
citly, or assume implicitly, a relation of continuity between 1857 and
Capital, other than that constituted precisely by the adoption of this
position. The principal concerns of commentators may be variously
epistemological, methodological or theoretical, and involve a greater
or lesser degree of attention to the intricacies of Marx's argument in
the Introduction.76 In "The Making of Marx's Capital", Rosdolsky's
purpose is the detailed exegesis and comparison of passages from the
Notebooks and Capital, and the demonstration of their relation. The
question of method is not extensively considered, and the assumption
that "the Outline (as did Capital later) follows the path from
75. see Nicolaus (op. cit) pp. 44-46; Sayer (1979 a) pp. 43-74;
Echeverria (1978 a) pp 274-280
76. all without exception draw almost exclusively on a single passage
in section (3) pp. 100-101
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abstract definitions to the concrete,,77 is based on only a brief
discussion of the Introduction. The nature of the scientific method
of abstracton is not discussed, and the movement from "capital in
general" in Volumes I and II to "many capitals" in Volume III is
assumed to be a development from abstract to concrete levels.78
Having broadly described the scope of the change in the Outline, the
question is asked: "how can it be explained? •••what motives lay be-
hind it?" The answer is superficial:
"The change in the Outline can be explained by reasons al-
ready touched upon ••••••namely, that once Marx had
accomplished the most fundamental part of his task - the
analysis of industrial capital - the former structure of
his work, which had served as a means of self-
clarification, became superfluous". 79
Capital is thus considered.the logic of presentation of the method of
Inquiry contained in the Introduction, the status of this text being
treated as unproblematic.
Zeleny, Colletti and Althusser, on the other hand, refer more exten-
sively to the 1857 Introduction specifically in order to ground their
epistemological and theoretical positions. Here the various interpre-
tations of this text are fundamental and integral to the respective
conceptions of Marxism, and therefore merit more detailed consider-
ation.
77. Rosdolsky op cit. P 53.
78. see Mepham's critique of Rosdolsky (1979), in which the latter is
indicted on three counts for assuming (1) that the Grundrisse and
Capital are identical in method, (2) that Capital constitutes a
unified and homogeneous discourse, and (3) that two discourses, one
philosophical and the other economic, can be conceptually identical.
(pp. 145-171)
79. Rosdolsky op cit. p. 53. The failure to consider the question of
method is surprising given Rosdolsky's claim in Part 7: "The main aim
of this work has been of a methodological nature. We set out from the
question that previous research was excessively concerned with the
material content of Marx's economic work, and exhibited far too little
interest in his specific method of investigation". (p. 445)
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Ca) Zelen~
According to zeleny80, the purpose of Marx's Capital is to analyze
capital in its basic structure, presenting the inner organization of
the mode of production, and to lay bare the economic "laws of motion"
of modern society. This simultaneously "structural" and "genetic"
analysis involves no contradiction, and does not result in parallel or
sequential treatment: "Marx was concerned with presenting the capital-
ist mode of production as a self-developing, self-generating, self
destroying structure. Theoretical analysis which strives towards this
goal is a unified structural:genetic analysis".8l The problem of
the starting-point for such a systematic analysis is considered to
have been resolved by Marx in the 1857 Introduction. Firstly, the
point of departure depends on the level of development of the science
under consideration. The small number of abstract and general relat-
ions discovered by 17th century economics form the basis of the
developed economic systems which ascend from simple and abstract
relations, such as labour, need and exchange-value, to the concrete
level of the State, exchange between nations and world market.82
This latter trajectory, "obviously the scientifically correct
80. (1980) "The Logic of Marx". Part 1. examines Marx's Analysis in
Capital, Part II "the Marxian Critique of Hegel", and Part III,
"Being, Praxis and Reason".
81. ibid. p. 9.
82. ibid. p. 32. (see the Introduction pp 100-101)
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method",83 is only possible on the basis of the results achieved at
an earlier stage in the development of economic science.
Secondly, within the limits of the correct scientific method, differ-
ent approaches and theories are still possible. Thus Ricardo proceeds
from a simple determination understood as a fixed essence84,
phenomenal forms being explained in a scientific system which moves in
"a straight line, from appearance to essence and from essence to
appearance".85 Marx's meti19d,on the other hand,
"oscillates between appearance and essence, and has a
continuous circular pattern from appearance to essence
and from essence to appearance, advancing beyond a
genetic-structural level to the comprehensive conceptual
knowledge of the object".86
Where Ricardo attempted the explanation of phenomenal forms by their
simple sUbsumption within an essential definition, "Marx on the other
hand usually abstracts phenomenal forms through so-called 'mediat-
ion".87 This new mode of abstraction enables the investigation of
II aspects of the inner structure of the object in isolation from one
another and from complex (concrete) forms".88 'IhusMarx's analysis
in Chapter I of Capital begins with historical forms (Commodity,
Value) which constitute the essence of Capitalist relations; then
Value is investigated independently of its phenomenal form (exchange-
value), so that a new investisation of exchange-value as value-form
is necessary:
"One advances from the establishment of distinctions and
83. Introduction p. 101
84. Zeleny OPe cit. p. 32.
85. ibid. p. 103.
86. ibid. At this stage it may be noted that whatever the value of
the notion of "oscillation" as a characteristic of Marx's method (see
Echeverria infra) there is no basis for it in the Introduction.
87. ibid. p. 104
88. ibid. p. 105.
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the existence of antitheses to an analysis of their
polarities, to the relations of the object, to an under-
standing of the contradictions in its essence, and
finally to an understanding of particular external
objects (comrnodity-rnoney)as a necessary form for
expressing an internally contradictory essence".89
The oscillating pattern of this circular "spiral form,,90analysis in
the first Chapter is reproduced in the structure of Capital in its
entirety: Volume I represents the essence of capitalist society,
Volume III the phenomenal forms of the essence, and Volume II the
mediating element of this structure.
Zeleny then considers the question of the specific starting-point for
structural-genetic analysis. Obviously this depends on the level of
development of the reality·(aswell as the science) under investiga-
tion, which here determines the commodit¥ as the elementary seed-
like unity of opposites, the cell-form of the capitalist economy, and
therefore the correct point of departure:
"The cell, the elementary form in the capitalist economy,
is for Marx the commodity, the value-form of the product.
Through all the alterations of his plans he stuck to the
solution which he had worked out in the first years of
his economic studies, that the secret of the capitalist
production of commodities is hidden in the commodity as a
specific economic form".9l
Not only is the commodity recognized as the appropriate starting-
point, but its concreteness is also acknowledged:
"(Marx) proceeds with the reproduction in ideas of a
complex reality rich in determinations, not from the
analysis of abstract concepts, but from the analysis of
89. ibid. p. 103.
90. ibid. p , 104. Zeleny does not further specify this "circular
spiral" movement. As with "oscillation", there is no foundation for
it in the Introduction. The possibility suggests itself that what may
well prove to be accurate observations of the methodological
trajectory of Capital are being imputed to the earlier text (see
infra. Section IV).
91. ibid. p. 32
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some other simple reality, the elementarx concrete as
cell, whose determination is abstract comeared to the
determination of the complex wholeit•92
Here the acknowledged concreteness of the commodity would appear to
contradict the claim that the abstract > concrete trajectory is
"obviously the scientifically correct method". This logical problem
can be resolved only by assuming that, in relation to the complex
concrete whole, the commodity is itself "abstract". with this reduct-
ion of the concrete to the,abstract "the previous important recogni-
tion that the commodity is concrete is completely dissolved".93
Cb) Colletti
In Colletti's interpretation of the Introduction, "the essential argu-
ment of interest is contained in one page",94 where Marx refers to
Hegel's illusion of conceiving the real as a product of thought con-
centrating itself and probing its own depths. Marx recognizes that
the concrete can be understood only through thought (pensiero) and
that it is in this sense a eroduct of thinking and knowing. But,
and in contrast to Hegel, he upholds together with the irreplacable
logico-deductive process a process of reality: "The passage from the
abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates
reality, it is not to be confused with the way in which the concrete
92. ibid. p. 34
93. Echeverria (1978 a) p. 357 Zeleny's contradiction can properly be
resolved only by recognizing the problematic nature of the
Introduction as an exploratory text rather than a definitive statement
of method (infra. Section IV.)
94. Colletti (1973) "Marxism and Hegel". p. 121. The reference is to
p. 101 of the Introduction.
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itself originates".95 Marx provides an example
"The simplest economic category, e.g. exchange-value,
presupposes population, moreover a population producing
in specific relations; as well as a certain kind of
family, or commune, or State etc. It can never exist
other than as an abstract, one-sided relation within
an alread¥ 9iven, concrete, livin9 whole. As a
category, by contrast, exchange-value leads an antedil-
uvian existence".96
Thus whilst in realit¥ categories of thought presuppose "popula-
tion", in l09ic "population" presupposes a series of categories
without which it remains an "abstraction" having little meaning. 97
Colletti is then in a position to expound the interrelation between
the logico-deductive process and the inductive process (or "process of
reality") with reference to the structure of Capital. The inductive
process (method of inquiry corresponding to process of reality) begins
with a particular historically concrete whole, the Capitalist mode of
production. The commodity-form as the form of value is the final
link inthe inductive chain98 which has begun within the concrete
object; it is the most generic, secondar¥ and subordinate (hence
final) phenomenal form of bourgeois relations; it is "the last element
which has been related in the course of the inquiry or the analytic
dissection of the object".99 '!here is almost nothing in bourgeois
society which does not have the form of value and does not present it-
self as a commodity. It is from this point that the logico-
deductive process (method of presentation) proceeds. From the "form
of value" or commodity-form is derived the "form of money" and from
this the "form of capital", a movement from the universal (Value) to
95. ibid. p. 121
96. Introduction p. 101 (emphasis supplied)
97. Colletti Ope cit. p. 125
98. ibid. see pp. 126-127
99. ibid. p. 127
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the particular (Money) to the individual (Capital). Whilst it may
appear that the links in the deductive chain are suspended from a
logical "prius" in the form of a mere "a priori" construction, what
prevents any "a priorism" is the production of the initial category
(the simplest feature of a complex object) as a result of the process
of induction:
"All of which means that the work develops, together with
the deductive process descending from the commodity to
money and fro~ the latter to capital, as an inductive
process soin9 back from the seneric or secondary
features of the object in question to its s~cific or
primary ones, from subordinate elements to dominant ones
- in short, from the particular phenomenal forms of
commodity and money to carital itself, which is their
basis and which alternate y assumes those forms in the
course of its life cycle".100
Thus the logical process is related to the process of reality in an
"inverse order".10l This understanding is crucial, according to
Colletti, if a rigorous meaning is to be given Marx's concept of
historx.102 Whilst it remains true that the logical deduction of
capital from money represents the essence of the historical movement
which preceded the birth of modern capital, it is no less important
to grasp the differentiation of the two processes together with this
unity, and "in short, to hold fast more than ever to the idea that
deduction is not induction, nor the logical process the process of
reality it.seLf".103 Once the foundations of the Capitalist mode of
production are established,
"The cause of the entirety is to be sought in the real
eremiss itself, i.e. in the present datum that is and
exists, and not in the historical premisses which by
now no longer exist and have disappeared. The cause,
the foundation in realitx, is, in short, caeital, and
100. ibid.
HU. ibid.
102. ibid. p. 130
103. ibid. p. 129.
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not the commodity or money, which appear rather at its
pre-requisites from a logical point of view".104
The "historical premisses" of Capital imply that it does not yet
exist, but that it will; as capital becomes established as a reality,
however, the historical pre-requisites appear, "not as a condition
of its coming into being, but as the result of its existence".105
Thus the commodity and money form the starting-point, not because they
preceeded Capital historically and were the "first in time", but
because they constitute the most general and abstract expression of
the capitalist mode of production. The order and sequence of cate-
gories must be determined by the relations and meaning they have
within modern bourgeois society, rather than according to the
sucession of the various forms of society.106 Marx observes in the
Grundrisse that:
"It is not necessary, in order to analyze the laws of
bourgeois economy, to write the actual history of
production relationships •••••The deduction of them as
historically developed relationships ••••leads us to draw
comparisons (Gleichungen) based on the past history of
this system; it is precisely these allusions or compari-
sons which, together with a correct grasp of the present
day, also offer a key to the understanding of the
past".107
Colletti's principal concern in examining that "one page" in the 1857
Introduction is therefore the critique of Hegelian idealism, and more
generally the question of the relation between Kant, Hegel and
104. ibid.
105. ibid. p. 130 (emphasis supplied)
106. see ibid p. 132. The relevant passage in the Introduction (not
explicitly acknowledged by Colletti) is on p. 107
107. in Mclellan (1970) pp. 109-110; quoted by Colletti p. 133.
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Marx108 ; the methodolosical problem of the starting-point is not
a central issue. Zeleny's primary focus, by contrast, is precisely
the "logic of Marx" in Capital, and only in Part II of his work does
he consider "The Marxian Critique of Hegel".109 Given this differ-
ence of emphasis, the interpretations of the Introduction are broadly
similar, for example in the treatment of the problem of logic and
historyl10, and most importantly in the assumption that the passage
from abstract to concrete is "obviously the scientifically correct
method"; in both cases the'structure of Capital is explained by refer-
ence to this logical trajectory.
However, whilst the problem with Zeleny's explanation of the starting-
point lay in the contradictory claim that the commodity constituted a
"concrete cell" at the same time as forming the first moment in the
"scientifically correct" ascent from abstract to concrete, Colletti
acknowledges no such "concreteness" in the commodity, which here is
considered the correct point of departure because it is the most
superficial, "general and abstract form of the capitalist mode of
production" .111
(c) Althusser
Like Colletti, Althusser is concerned less directly with the problem
of method than with epistemological and philosophical questions.
Drawing on the same passages in section (3) of the Introduction, he
arrives, however, at conclusions radically different from those of
108. see Colletti op. cit. Ch. 8. pp. 113-138.
109. see Zeleny op. cit. pp. 115-192.
110. see Zeleny op, cit. Ch. 5. "Theory and History" pp. 35-46 Again
p. 107 of the Introduction is crucial (ibid p. 38)
111. Colletti op. cit. p. 31; see also p. 126.
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either of the two writers previously considered.
The basis of Hegel's confusion, according to Althusser, is the
identification of the real object with the object of knowledge, the
real process with the knowledge process.112 In the case of Hegel,
realitx itself is produced and reproduced in the movement of the
Idea, but Feuerbach's empiricism is based on the same erroneous
epistemological conception, here expressed in the assumption that
there is an "irrrnediatereality" which must be the foundation of
knowledge. Historical Materialism, on the other hand, is grounded in
an epistemological break with the idealist/empiricist problematic of
identification, after which Science can no longer be conceived as a
process of extraction/abstraction of the "essential" from the
"inessential" real, and the "problem of knowledge" (the guaranteeing
of the correspondence of concepts to reality) is dissolved:
"Knowledge working on its ·object·•••••does not work on
the real object but on the peculiar raw material, which
constItutes, in the strict sense of the term, its
'ob~ect' (of knowledse), and which, even in the-IDOst
rudImentary forms of knowledge, is distinct from the
real object".1l3
Thus "abstract" and "concrete" moments are distinguished and developed
entirely within thought. Scientific knowledge is the concrete thought
-product (Generalities 3) resulting from the action of the concepts of
a scientific problematic (G2) on existing more or less ideological and
112. Althusser: Reading Capital (1970) p. 40
113. ibid. p. 43
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therefore "abstract" notions (G3).1l4 It is the functional
position of the concepts within the knowledge process that assigns
them their abstract or concrete character.115 Truth asserts itself
entirely within the theoretical system, rather than in the relation-
ship between thought and the supposedly external "real".116
It then follows that Marx's observations in the Introduction concern-
ing the "identity" or "non-identity" of the logical and historical
orders are framed within an ideological problematic; they merely
provide answers "without any explicit question: they therefore pose
for us the question of their questions, i.e. they impose on us the
task of formulating the unformulated question which these answers
answer" .117 The price of Iqnorinq the distinction between the real
object and the object of knowledge is the provision of "solutions" to
a "problem" (of the "relation" between the two orders) v.hich
scientifically does not exist:
"whether this relation is imagined as one which brings the
terms featured in the two orders of development into
direct one-to-one correspondence ; or whether the same
relatlon is imagined as one which brings the terms of the
two orders into inverse correspondence (the basis of the
thesis of Della Volpe and Pietranera) there remains the
hypothesis of a relation where no relation exists ••••••
and it is never possible to solve a problem that does not
exist."ll8
The contention that the "direct" or "inverted" correspondence between
the terms of the two orders has nothing to do with the real problem is
supported, according to Althusser, by Marx's conclusion to section (3)
114. Althusser (1977) "For Marx" ; see pp. 190-191 ("On the
Materialist Dialectic")
115. see Echeverria (1978 a) pp. 205-208.
116. Althusser (1970) p. 59.
117. ibid. p. 46.
118. ibid. p. 115 (emphasis in original).
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of the Introduction:
"It is not a matter of the connexion which is established
historically between economic relations in the succession
of different social forms ••••• but of their Gliederung
(articulated combination) within modern bourgeois
society. ,,119
It is precisely this Gliederung that has to be produced in knowledse
as an object of knowledse in order to reach an understanding of the
real articulated-totality which constitutes the existence of bourgeois
society. The "synchronic" 'isthen:
"nothing but the conception of the specific relations
that exist beteen the dIfferent elements and the
different structures of the structure of the whole, it is
the knowledge of the relations of dependence and
articulation that make it an organic whole, a
system. ,,120
Once synchrony has been correctly located, diachrony ("history") loses
its concrete sense and becomes a category of knowing:
"Diachrony is them merely the false name for the
process, or for what Marx called the development of
forms. But here too we are within knowledse, in the
process of knowledge, not in the development of the real-
concrete.,,12l
If, as suggested above, Colletti (but not Zeleny) tends to disregard
Marx's discovery in June 1858 of a concrete starting point,
Althusser appears st.illless moved by this development. The
Eroblem confronting Marx in 1857, of whether the point of departure
should be concrete (Population, Nation, State) or abstract (Value,
division of Labour etc) is dissolved, since all these concepts are
considered as having the same theoretically "abstract" status.
119. ibid. p. 48. Compare this, Althusser's rendering (via
Brewster's translation) with Nicolaus's translation pp. 107-8 (quoted
supra. )
120. Althusser (1970) p. 107
121. ibid. p. 108.
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Because the concept of Population is not Population itself,
Althusser denies its concrete character, "introducing a problematic
distance between the real and the concept which designates it, and
transforming Marx into a Kantian he never was.,,122 en the contrary,
Marx insists on the full capacity of thought to apprehend reality, and
on a relationship of correspondence between categories of thought and
real relations, ideologically mediated by phenomenal forms of
appearance; for him, "scie~ce reproduces the real concrete at the
level of thought, this being its first test of objectivity.,,123
In this section, the 1857 Introduction has been used as a focal point
for examining the assumption of continuity in Marx's methodological
development; three different Marxist positions have been considered
solely in terms of their interpretation of it. Whilst this brief
survey has therefore necessarily been extremely partial, it has sought
to demonstrate that the relation of continuity between 1857 and
Capital has been assumed (and used as the basis for epistemological
and philosophical considerations) rather than rigorously argued. Even
Zeleny, who most discusses specific methodological problems, does not
justify his interpretation of the "logic of Marx" in Capital with a
detailed examination of the developments in the structure and content
of the Plan after 1857, rather imputing Marx's later conclusions to
122. Echeverria (1978 a) p. 208
123. ibid. see also (1978 b) p. 359; Section IV (infra).
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the earlier text.124 The acknowledgement of the concreteness of the
commodity then results in inconsistency, avoided by the other
commentators who do not document Marx's discovery of June 1857, since
a forced reconciliation is effected between this point of departure
and that advocated in the Introduction.
The assumption that the 1857 Introduction holds the key to the under-
standing of Marx's mature method of Inquiry may now be critically
assessed by examining the case against continuity.
IV The case ?2ainst Continutir
The argument against methodological continuity between 1857 and
Capital might begin with the biographical observation that the Work
which the Introduction was intended to preface was postponed until
1859, whilst Marx determined the point of departure and the order and
sequence of categories in the course of the Rough Draft. The develop-
ment of the structure and theoretical content of the Outline during
this period is significant, according to this interpretation, for the
question of the method of Inquiry, and it is precisely changes in this
method that enable Marx to adequately develop his mature economic
theory in the "Contribution" and Capital. Moreover, Marx himself de-
cided in 1859 that the "Contribution" would be introduced, not by the
1857 text originally intended for it, but by a new Preface:
"A general introduction, which I had drafted, is omitted,
since on further consideration it seems to me confusing
to aniticipate results which still have to be substant-
iated, and the reader who really wishes to follow me will
have to decide to advance from the particular to the
124. see notes 86 & 90 above.
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general".125
The case against continuity further requires, however, that: (1) The
deficiencies and inconsistencies in the 1857 Introduction and in its
relation to the later works be demonstrated; (2) an alternative con-
ception of Marx's method of Inquiry be proposed; and (3) the theoret-
ical effects of the continuity - reading be considered.126
(1) Inconsistencies in the Introduction, and between 1857 and
Capital
The question of methodological inconsistency in the Introduction
primarily concerns Marx's contradictory usage of different conceptions
of the "concrete", the "abstract" and "abstraction", indicating an
uncertainty which Echeverria takes to be symptomatic of a transition
between two opposing conceptions of Science.127 In the first
section, Marx stresses that Production must always be defined by the
determinations of a definite stage of social development, but that,
nevertheless, the concept of "Production in general" does retain some
value:
"All epochs of production have certain common traits,
common characteristics. Production in general is an
abstraction, but a rational abstraction insofar as it
really brings out and fixes the common element and this
125. (1971) p. 19. ; on this point see Sayer (1979 a) p. 98,
Echeverria (1978 b) p.335. See also (supra.) Marx's later
observations on the need for a Materialist Dialectic.
126. The first two are addressed here in section IV, the last in
section V (infra) -,
127. On the one hand, Feverbachian empiricism, according to which
Theory should correspond to what is immediately observable
(abstraction being defined as a deficiency), and on the other hand,
the mature Marxist conception of Science, producing concepts without
immediate referents through Scientific abstraction. (infra)
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saves us repetition".128
Here the concept of "Production in general" is constructed according
to generalization from features common to all forms of production, and
"abstraction" is therefore understood within an empiricist framework.
Moreover, "despite Marx's acceptance of abstraction, he assigns it an
insi9nificant role in its capacity for explanation of distinct
historical stages" .129
In the third section, Marx criticizes the 17th Century economists who
began with concrete wholes, such as Population, Nation, State, and
argues that the opposite movement, from abstract and simple relations
to the concrete totality, is "obviously the scientifically correct
method" :
"The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for
example, the classes of which It is composed. These
classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar
with the elements on which they rest, e.g. wage-labour,
capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange,
division of labour, prices etc.,,130
The passage from which this quotation is taken has generally been
accepted uncritically as providing the key to Marx's method of
Inquiry131, yet two points should be noted in respect of it:
firstly, the ascension from abstract to concrete here merely endorses
the classical economy of Smith and Ricardo, by criticizing only the
128. Introduction p. 85 (see Section I supra)
129. Echeverria (1978 b) P 358
130. Introduction p. 100 (emphasis supplied) [supra Section I]
131. as demonstrated above in Zeleny, Colletti and Althusser
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method of seventeenth century economists132; and secondly, the
argument contains two contradictory conceptions of abstraction, re-
ferring on the one hand to Population as an "abstract" (because a
concrete "chaotic" conception of the whole), and on the other hand to
the necessary ascension from abstract and general definitions to the
concrete totality.133 Whilst abstraction here appears to be con-
sidered an indispensable recourse of scientific work, Marx's failure
to rigorously define its methodological status at this stage impedes
his theoretical development.
According to this interpretation, the resolution of the problem of
(for example) the point of departure in the course of the Rough Draft
reflects the development of a mature conception of scientific
abstraction. By the end of 1858 the cormnodity is recognized as the
proper starting-point, most importantly because of its concrete
character, and this has implications for the conception of the
"abstract" and "abstraction" in relation to it. In 1879, Marx was to
criticize Herr Wagner precisely for failing to see that use-value and
exchange-value were derived (through scientific abstraction) not from
the concept of Value, but "from a concretum (Konkretum), the commod-
132. see Echeverria (1978 b) p. 340. In fact, Marx can resolve
problems in the theory of value encountered by classical economy only
by transcending its limitations, through the use of a different
method, which eventually produces the concept of labour-power. (Infra
Part IV (2) ).133. ibid. But see Carver (1980), who argues that this contradiction
is only apparent (see n. 207 infra.)
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ity:,,134
"In the first place, I do not start out from 'concepts',
and do not have to 'divide' these in any way. What I
start out from is the simplest form in which the labour-
product is presented in contemporary society, and this is
the commodit¥. I analyze it, and right from the begin-
ning, in the form in which it appears.,,135
But this "concrete" is not the same as the concrete whole, the
"chaotic conception" (Population) referred to in the Introduction,
since the concrete totalit¥ is still understood as a "concentration
of many deteminations and 'relations", and unsuitable as a starting-
point for this reason; rather it is a simple concrete, whose choice
as starting-point is determined precisely by this elementar¥ con-
creteness. In contrast to Marx's position in the Introduction, the
concrete is no longer reduced to the concrete/complex whole, and the
abstract no longer exclusively identified with the simple and element-
ary determination; this allows for the possibility that a concrete
may also be simple and constitute the point of departure for this
reason.136 Hence the importance of Marx's observation in the 1859
Preface that "the reader who really wishes to follow me will have to
decide to advance from the particular to the seneral."137 '!he
path of Marx's mature method of presentation in Capital may therefore
be described as a movement from the concrete Particular to the
Concrete Totality.138
Once the concrete has been re-defined in this manner, "abstraction"
134. (1975) "Notes on Adolf Wagner". p, 189.
135. i.e. as a concrete; ibid p. 198
136. see Echeverria (1978 b) pp. 355-356
137. (1971) p. 19 (emphasis supplied)
138. Echeverria (op. cit); Sayer also acknowledges the concreteness
of the commodity and the novelty of its discovery (1979 a) pp1l2-ll3.
It will be argued (infra) that the method of Inquiry is expressed in
the logic of presentation, whilst nevertheless remaining distinct from
it.
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takes on a dimension entirely absent from the Introduction:
"While the concrete alludes to real objects constituted by
social practice, the abstract refers to objects which,
not being alien to that practice and in that sense being
real, are only recognized through scientific practice
••••••• Abstraction is defined as an adequate recourse of
the knowledge of the real, first in its capacity to be
derived from the objects constituted by social practice
and directly expressed in the consciousness generated by
such practice. Second, in its capacity to reproduce
the concrete in thought, to explain its actual move-
ments, which spontaneous consciousness cannot account for
••••• It is the problematic distance between the appear-
ance of the, movement of social practice and its essence
which justifies the necessity of scientific
practice. ,,139
Therefore the movement from concrete particular to concrete totality,
from the simple commodity to the complex surface dynamic of the
capitalist rrode of production, includes within its trajectory the
necessary recourse of abstraction. The correct scientific method
"starts from the concrete in order to deduce from it abstract concepts
with which to explicate the concrete in its totality".140 '!his re-
inforces the choice of the commodity as the point of departure, be-
cause of its peculiar capacity "to extend to basic abstract
categories through which the movement of capitalist production can be
theoretically reconstructed,,141; it is specifically this concrete,
practically constituted as the simplest and most elementary form of
bourgeois social relations, that contains within it the possibility of
the development of abstract concepts necessary to the explanation of
the determinate object of study. Hence the recognition in the final
pages of the Grundrisse of the two-fold nature of the commodity,
use-value and exchange-value; concrete labour and abstract labour; and
139. ibid. p 358 (emphasis supplied)
140. Echeverria (1980) "Reply to Terrell Carver" p. 213
141. Echeverria (1978 b) p. 360
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the secret of the fetishism of commodities.142 This fundamental
anti-empiricism also characterizes, according to Echeverria, Marx's
resolution of the problem of the order and sequence of the basic
categories in the 1860's:
"Wheras in 1857 the project adopted a more empirical, and
thus vulgar perspective, to the extent that it was
largely influenced by the expressions of immediate real-
ity, conferring upon its forms an independent nature, the
later project demonstrates a greater distance with
respect to phenomena, with the domination of an essential
dimension which results in the total ising nature of the
analysis of'capital".143
If this argument regarding the transformation in Marx's conceptions of
the "concrete", "abstract" and "scientific abstraction" is correct,
then the movement from abstract to concrete can be considered
"obviously the scientifically correct method" only in relation to the
logic of presentation, and then only in a restricted sense (from
"capital in general" in Volume 1. to "many capitals in competition"
in Volume 111.)144 Since the logic of exposition must differ from
the method of Inquiry145, the precise logic of investigation under-
lying capital remains problematic, requiring an excavatory method-
ological reading of this text146:
"The adequate logic of investigation of a determinate
object of study is only realized at a later stage of the
investigation and must express itself in the logic of
exposition. It follows that the logic of exposition is
the perfected and superior expression of the logic of the
142. This position is developed (infra) in sub-section (2)
143. Echeverria (1978 b) p. 362. "It should also be recognized that
this is consistent with the direction registered in the transformation
of Marx's concept of science, particularly after the re-appropriation
of Hegel in 1858" (ibid) On the latter point, see infra Section (2)
(a)
144. cf Sayer (1979 a) p. 102. This is the limited sense in which
Rcldolsky's account is adequate (supra. Section II).
145. see Marx's Postface to the 2nd German edition of Capital
(January 1873), reprinted in Capital I. (1976) p. 102
146. hence Lenin's remark (supra.) that Capital ought to be utilized
to the full in the question of method.
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whole investigation".147
The negative conclusion on the question of method to be drawn at this
stage, therefore, is that the 1857 Introduction does not "anticipate"
Capital, which cannot simplistically be considered its "reali-
zation".148 An alternative conception of Marx's logic of Inquiry
must now be presented.
(2) Marx's l<;>2icof Inqui!}':
(a) Echeverria.149
Echeverria begins his examination of method by defining the ultimate
object of Marx's scientific analysis as History, within which grand
design "Capital" provides the study of the capitalist mode of product-
ion.150 This requires an understanding of the relation between
147. Echeverria (1978 b) p. 364. Hence Marx's distinction between
method of exposition and method of investigation need not represent
"an obstacle to the deciphering of his logic of investigation on the
basis of the exposition of Capital, Le. the path proposed by Lenin"
(ibid) p. 365
148. cf. Mepham's (1979) critique of Rosdolsky's account of the
continui ty-relation between the Grundrisse and Capital: "Since on
Rosdolsky's assumption the Grundrisse is the origin of Capital, and
Capital is the truth or telos of the Grundrisse, this allows him to
dispel any obscurities in the earlier text by referring to the latter
one." p. 153. As has been demonstrated, the same teleological
conception is at work in the assumption of continuity between 1857 and
Capital, enabling Zeleny in particular to "read into" the Introduction
"Ci rcular", "Spiral" and "oscillating" movements which we shall argue
are characteristic only of the later work.
149. This account follows Echeverria's Ch. 5. (1978 a) [pp. 136-178]
in simplified form, substituting the new Pelican translations of
passages from Capital Vols. I & II where Echeverria has used the
Lawrence & Wishart edition.
150. This object (History) is considered by Marx both in the 1857
Introduction and the 1859 Preface. The critique (supra) of the
methodological inconsistencies in the Introduction does not of course
deny its many insights on this and other questions (for this reason it
was resumed in its entirety in section I). On the relation between it
and the Preface (1971) see Echeverria (1978 b) pp. 346-349. On Marx's
concept of History see Cohen (1978) "Marx's Theory of History: A
Defence", Shaw (1978), Arthur (1979 b), all of which extrapolate from
Marx's highly compressed remarks in the Preface.
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historically constituted social practice (objective movement) and
theoretically constituted scientific practice (theoretical move-
ment):15l
(1) The theoretical understanding of history does not coincide with
its actual movement. The determinant role of Production in society,
for example, is recosnized only under certain conditions of develop-
ment of the forces and r~lations of production, involving the exten-
sion and dominance of capitalism and the homogenisation of labour,
whose concrete qualitative features are erased with its abstraction
and mobiltiy in the production process. One of the objective con-
ditions of possibility for the explanation of the movement of history
is thus the development of economic science, enabled by the real
abstraction152 of labour and the autonomisation of production; a
second such condition is the manifestation of the contradictions of
Capitalism in economic crises and the struggle between wage-labour and
Capital.153 Therefore the theory of history must begin, not with
the first historical stages, but with that which renders them compre-
hensible, the capitalist mode of production.154
(2) Once the restricted object of study has thus been defined, the
theoretical movement does reproduce the objective movement:
"Theoretical connections are the adequate expressions within thought
151. Echeverria (1978 a) p. 138
152. "real abstraction" occurs in the real as a process of the
homogenisation of labour, and must be distinguished from scientific
abstraction taking place entirely within thought. (see Introduction p.
104).
153. Echeverria (op. cit) p. 141
154. This conclusion ("Human anatomy contains the key to the anatomy
of the ape" - see Introduction p. 105 and supra) is also shared by
Zeleny, Colletti and Althusser. Here the value of the Introduction is
apparent.
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of actual connections in objective reality".155
(3) There remains the problem of the relation between the logical
order of categories within the analysis of the restricted object and
their order of historical emergence. Here there can be no coincidence
between the theoretical and historical dimensions: whilst the category
of Rent historically precedes that of Capital, it cannot have priority
in the logical analysi~, since categories must be analyzed in
accordance with their function in the capitalist mode of production,
and Capital itself therefore here takes precedence.156
Having established the general methodological presuppositions of
Capital, Echeverria then problematizes its apparent organization as a
movement from Production (Vol.I) through Circulation (Vol.II) to the
consideration of capitalist production as a whole (Vol.III). Whilst
Production continues, as in the Introduction, to be the determining
moment of Exchange, Circulation and Distribution, the first two parts
of Volume I ("Corrmodities and Money" and "the transformation of Money
into Capital") pertain to the sphere of Circulation:
"it is at the level of Circulation that the capitalist
system presents its most characteristic appea~ance and
its most outstanding features, and the anal¥sIs must
develop from this. It is this level which poses the
problems which necessitate the transitio~ to the. sphere
of production in the search for explanatIons of ItS
155. Echeverria (op. cit) p. 142
156. ibid. p. 145; cf Introduction p. 107
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movements. ,,157
Marx had recognised by November 1857 that Value was a better point of
departure than Labour, and this necessitated beginning the analysis at
the level of Circulation, in the logical movement Circulation -
Production - Circulation.158 Similarly Volume II only partially
refers to the sphere of Circulation in isolation from Production.
Hence the titles of the three Volumes of Capital refer only to the
most general character of the logical trajectory, concealing its
complexity.
A crucial distinction is then made between the "apparent" and
"essential" movements within the restricted object of study.159
The levels of Appearance and Essence imply different forms of
conscious apprehension of objective reality, spontaneous consciousness
failing to grasp the essential movement, which can be understood only
through scientific theoretical activity questioning the immediate
apprehension of reality. To this appearance-essence relation
corresponds a concrete-abstract relation : the point of departure for
science is what is directly given in a determinate social practice,
providing a starting-point simultaneously concrete and located at
the level of a~arances. Because the essential movement is concealed
from the agents of this social practice, theoretical practice must
produce abstract concepts by a process of scientific abstraction,
revealing the essence of what would otherwise be grasped only as
appearance. This scientific abstraction is developed through a
specifically scientific practice in a problematic relationship to
157. ibid. p. 147 (emphasis supplied)
158. see Grundrisse pp. 225-259; also supra p. 11
159. Echeverria (op. cit) p. 148
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immediate ~eality, nevertheless, "science must always reach a point
where the level of abstraction should be abandoned, the level of the
concrete cofronted, and the scientific results prove their capacity to
account for all the phenomenal forms".160 The terminal point of
analysis must therefore be the concrete, no longer however the
concrete particular with which the investigation began, but now the
concrete totality, revealed as the unity of many determinations and
relations. Both concrete particular and concrete totality are
directly given within a specific and determinate social practice,
whilst the abstract revelation of essential relations occur.s as a
product of scientific practice.16l
The logical trajectory may therefore be represented as a movement
from (I) to (3) :
(I) (2) (3)
Appearances/Immediate
reality
CIRCULATION
{Vol.l Ch. 1-6
Concrete Particular
(social practice)
Essences/essential
reality
PRODUCTION
Appearances + Essences
PRODUCTION AS WHOLE
Abstraction Concrete Totalit¥
(scientific practice) (social practice)
The Commodit¥ Many capitals(competition)
This position is distinguished from that of 1857 by (l) the separation
of immediate from essential reality through the questioning of the
former, and (2) the acceptance of abstraction as a legitimate recourse
of knowledge. These developments mark a break, according to
Echeverria, with Marx's previously Feuerbachian Philosophy, which had
160. ibid.
161. ibid p. 153
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claimed (contra Hegel) that essence should be located at the level of
immediate reality and therefore defined abstraction as an inadequate
recourse of knowledge. Thus in 1845, in his critique of Hegelian
idealism and assertion of the active role of consciousness and
practice, Marx had tended to adopt an empiricist position on the
nature of knowledge, limiting the role of science to providing an
account of what was directly observable; since theoretical knowledge
was here affirmed as arising directly from observation and experience,
it was unnecessary to criticize the level of the immediate. Elements
of the resulting conception of abstraction, together with other and
contradictory ones, are evident in the 1857 Introduction.162
In 1858, however, Marx r~-read and was greatly impressed by Hegel's
"Science of Logic",163 and this, according to Echeverria, led to a
critical rectification of Hegelian philosophy and to the recognition
that Hegel had given a more satisfactory explanation of the process of
theoretical knowledge than that provided by the empiricists. In
January Marx wrote to Engels:
"The fact that by mere accident I again glanced through
Hegel's Logik••••has been of great service to me as re-
gards the method of dealing with the material •••••If
there should ever be time for such work again, I should
like to make accessible to ordinary human intelligence •••
what is rational in the method which Hegel discovered but
162. supra: section IV (1) ; also see Echeverria (1978 b) pp.
340-341: "The population is first considered to be concrete because it
is real in Feuerbachian terms; and then it is considered to be
abstract because it is still theoretically indetermined, in Hegelian
terms ••••the 1857 Introduction oscillates between a Feuerbachian and a
Hegelian position, without being able to conciliate both
epistemological perspectives". (ibid p. 341)
163. - one of a number of Bakunin's books sent to Marx by
Freiligrath. There is no doubt that the Introduction is also (in
1857) influenced by the "Science of Logic"; the question is, how
important was its re-reading? Echeverria's interpretation is disputed
by Carver (1980) pp. 197-198.
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at the same time enveloped in mysticism".164
The claim to have "inverted" Hegel's dialectic is made only from 1858
onwards, testifying to the importance of the discovery. Wheras in
Hegel, however, the questioning of immediate reality leads to the
conception of its theoretical expression as the essence of reality,
such that the real is transferred to the consciousness which "super-
cedes" the immediate, for Marx, the irreducibility of material reality
to the process that conceives it leads to a re-definition of the re-
lation between the immediate and the essential, the former exhibiting
the appearance of reality and constituting the spontaneous conscious-
ness of the agents of production, and the latter referring to the
theoretical constitution ,of concepts without immediate referents
through abstraction, and in a problematic relationship to the pheno-
mena.165 It now becomes the work of Science "to resolve the
visible, merely external movement into the true intrinsic move-
ment".166 Were it not for the problematic distance between the
immediate and the essential, there would be no need for science: "all
science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence
of things directly coincided".167 These conceptions of science,
abstraction, the abstract and the concrete, essence and appearance are
developed by Marx only after 1857.
The three basic moments of the logical trajectory, from Concrete
Particular through Abstraction to Concrete Totality, may now be more
rigorously defined:
164. MESC p. 93; quoted in Echeverria p. 85 (1978 a).
165. see Echeverria (1978 a) pp. 84-92, 243 - 250.
166. Capital III p. 213 (quoted in Echeverria OPe cit. p.92)
167. ibid. p. 817 (quoted ibid).
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(i) the Concrete Particular
The starting-point is the concrete conunodity, the most simple and
elementary cell-form of bourgeois relations, directly given and
practically constituted in immediate reality in the sphere of Circul-
ation and at the level of Appearances: "The commodity represents a
non-problematic concept, recognized and constituted by a determinate
social practice".168 The great theoretical advantage of the
commodity lies in its capacity to provide the basis for the develop-
ment of abstract concepts which will ultimately reveal the essence of
Capital:
"In this sense, the analysis of the commodity permits the
initial transition from apparent movement to essential
movement which, from the point of view of the concepts
required by analysis, simultaneously implies the transi-
tion from concrete to abstract concepts".169
Thus having recognized the dual nature of the commodity as use-value
and exchange-value, Marx demonstrates that the latter is the relative
expression of Value and that this, in its turn, is the expression of
social Labour. Both Value and Labour are here abstract concepts con-
noting essential relations, and are of a different theoretical status
to those, such as Price and concrete Labour, that refer directly to
immediate reality.170
The abstract concepts necessary for the scientific understanding of
the commodity are not, however, available to spontaneous conscious-
ness, which conceives its object only partially as it is given in
those appearances which conceal its essential character. As it
168. Echeverria (op. cit) p. 153.
169. ibid. p. 154
170. ibid.
161
appears in immediate reality, the commodity is a useful thing, estab-
lishing on the basis of its specific usefulness relations with other
useful things of similar nature. The disjunction between this
immediate appearance and the essence of the commodity is the basis of
commodity fetishism. The Inystical character of the commodity does not
arise from its use-value, but rather "consists in that the commodity
reflects the social characteristics of mens own labour as objective
characteristics of the er.oducts of labour themselves, as the socio-
natural properties of these things".171 In reality, the commodity
acquires value to the extent that it embodies homogeneous social
labour, Value then being expressed as exchange-value, but this cannot
be recognized in spontaneous consciousness, which reverses the order
of determination according to the fetishism of commodities:
"Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour
into relation with each other as values because they see
these objects merely as the material integuments of
homogeneous human labour. The reverse in true: byequat-
ing their different products to each other in exchange as
values, they equate their different kinds of labour as
human labour. They do this without being aware of it.
Value, therefore, does not have its description branded
on its forehead; it rather transforms every product of
labour into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, men try to
decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of
their own social product" .172
"If commodities could speak, they would say this: our
use-value may interest men, but it does not belons to
us as objects. What does belons to us as objects,
however, is our Value. Our own intercourse as
commodItIes proves It. We relate to each other merely
171. Capital I. p. 165 (not quoted in Echeverria, but included here
for clarification).172. ibid. p. 167. "Value does not stalk about wi th a label
describing what it is", according to the original translation p. 79.
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as exchange values".173
If the essential nature of the commodity was difficult to perceive
when socially abstract labour was simply expressed in Value, this
becomes still more the case when Value achieves an independent
incarnation in Money: "From this moment, the appearance of the
commodity erases any possible trace that could directly lead to its
essential dimension".174 With this development, heterogeneous
concrete labours pr~ducing different concrete use-values are repre-
sented in appearances merely as differences in the Price of commodit-
ies; in the process, a specific inversion occurs, further concealing
the real relation of commodities to Money:
"Although the movement of money is merely the expression
of the circulation of commodities, the situation appears
to be the reverse of this, namely the circulation of
commodities seems to be the result of the movement of
money".175
(ii) Abstraction
Marx's analysis thus demonstrates that abstract concepts, such as
Value and (later) Surplus-Value, are simultaneously realized and
perverted in the immediate and concrete sphere of Appearances, where
they assume the forms of Price, Money and Wages. Whilst priority is
accorded the abstract as a means of penetrating forms of appearance,
the concrete is never completely abandoned in this process but remains
constantly present within it. According to Echeverria, there are
three distinguishable forms of presence of the concrete within the
process of abstraction: (1) where the concrete assumes the role of
173. Capital I p. 177 (not quoted in Echeverria).
174. Echeverria (1978 a) p. 157
175. Capital I. p. 212
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historical presupp?sition but does not form an integral part of the
analysis, as for example in section 8. of Capital Volume I. on
"Primitive Accumulation", which is not strictly part of the
investigation of the capitalist mode of production176; (2) where the
concrete is that which theory is attempting to explain, in other words
the capitalist mode of production, and where it therefore "assumes the
form of an essential buttress for the course of the analysis".177
Here the theoretical movement rnust correspond to the real movement and
constantly refer to it, as is the case for example in Marx's analysis
of the passage from commodity to money and from money to Capital178;
and (3), where the concrete "is simply an auxiliary recourse for the
clarification and exemplification of the law of operation established
by the analysis",179 as in those chapters dealing with the working
day, modern industry and the general law of capitalist accumulation.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize the dominance of the
abstract over the concrete movement, and thus the restrictions on
the use of the concrete, particularly where it is understood in the
sense of an "essential buttress" for the abstract developnent; the
presence of the concrete is not continuous and unbroken, but implies
"the recognition of certain suspensions, postponements and restric-
tions within the analysis".180 Having examined the commodity,
further concrete objects are not then analyzed independently by the
same process of abstraction starting again from the concrete in
isolation, but depend on the abstract results already attained:
"Marx proceeds by developing further these initially
176. Echeverria (op cit.) p. 160
177. ibid. p. 161
178. ibid. (emphasis supplied)
179. ibid. P 162 (emphasis supplied)
180. ibid. p. 160
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abstract dimensions to explain the emergence and nature
of the new objects and processes under examination.
Their essential dimensions, disclosed by the analysis,
are not the result of an independent theoretical endeav-
our, different from what had already been disclosed as
essential in a previous moment. The process of theoret-
ical development is not only the increasing extension of
analysis to new elements, but also the simultaneous
development of the initially attained abstract dimension
and its application to new concrete situations. The
analysis of the objective movement therefore gives rise
to a theoretical movement which develops abstraction as
a distinct dimension from the apparent movement".181
An example of the dominance of the abstract over the concrete is con-
tained in Marx's assertion of a direct relation between the magnitude
of variable capital employed and the mass of surplus-value produced:
"'Ihis law clearly contradicts all experience based on
immediate appearances. Everyone knows that a cotton
spinner, who, if we consider the percentage over the
whole of hi's applied capi tal, employs much constant and
little variable capital, does not, on account of this,
pocket less profit or surplus-value than a baker, who
sets in motion relatively much variable capital and
little constant capital".182
Because appearances contradict this law, and question not only its
validity but also the theory of Value from which it was deduced, Marx
must favour either the abstract or the concrete dimension if the
analysis is to proceed. Rather than compelling the theory to submit
to appearances and account for them at this stage, however, Marx's
solution is to postpone this moment by provisionally privileging the
abstract. Only when the analysis of capital moves beyond Production
and incorporates Circulation can the apparent contradiction between
the immediate and the essential movements adequately be resolved, and
the validity of the abstract law, held in abeyance until this moment
181. ibid. pp. 162-163
182. Capital I p. 421 (Echeverria, unfortunately, has "banker"
instead of "baker")
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finally be confirmed.183
The insistence on a eroblematic distance between the apparent and
essential movements is therefore fundamental to Marx's logic of
investigation. The recognition of this dimension is absent from
empiricist accounts which consider abstraction as either a process of
partialization of the concrete (the "abstraction" of part from the
whole), or the mere theoretical apprehension of common features in the
concrete.184 The production of the concept of surplus-value, for
example, is the result of theoretical abstraction working in a prob-
lematic relation with the immediate expression and realization of this
concept in Profit; as an abstract category (the product of scientific
practice) it does not exist ready constituted in the concrete (as do
Price, Money, Profit, Commodity) and cannot therefore be the result of
generalization or partialization of this concrete.185
(iii) the Ooncrete Tbtality
In the final moment of analysis, those suspensions and postponements
of the concrete necessary for the development of theoretical abstract-
ion are abandoned and the concrete totality confronted in all its
complexity, this movement accounting for full spectrum of phenomena
present in the immediate appearances of the restricted object of
study. Volume III of Capital is thus the culmination of a process of
gradual, if constantly restricted and interrupted, approximation to-
183. Echeverria (op cit) p. 165. Echeverria also instances the
resolution of problems concerning the theorisation of the
labour-process in Ch. 7. Vol I (ibid pp. 163-164)
184. Echeverria considers Zeleny to tend to such a conception: ibid.
pp. 167-168.
185. ibid. Hence the charge of the empiricist use of abstraction in
the Introduction (supra).
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wards the concrete totality of capitals "in the form they assume on
the surface of society in the action of different capitals upon one-
another, in competition and in the ordinary consciousness of the
agents of production themselves" .186 'Ihisvolume represents "the
final transition of essential movement to apparent movement, the
descent from the already conquered realm of abstraction to the
globali ty of the realm of the concrete" .187
In this process, the reasons why appearances and hence spontaneous
consciousness should assume the forms they do are explained in the
theory of capital-fetishism. The categories of Profit and Wages
appear as distorted representations of the essential movement in the
sphere of Circulation, which compels the value of the product to be
realized in the market in accordance with the law of competition and
thus determines a price which does not correspond to the value
determined in the production process. This enables the Capitalist to
conceive Profit merely as the difference over the cost-price of the
product obtained through free competition, concealing its real exist-
ence as a form of surplus-value generated through the exploitation of
wage-labour; hence also the Wase appears as the price of labour
required by production, and not as the price of labour-power. The
real source of surplus-value is thus occluded, and Labour appears as
just another factor of production, subordinate to the driving-force of
Capital. The essential character of capital is still further obscured
with the distinction between Interest and Profit of enterprize. In
the simple category of Profit there had remained "a recollection of
its origin, which is not only extinguished in interest, but also
186. Capital Volume III Introduction, p. 25.
187. Echeverria (op. cit.) p. 172.
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placed in a form thoroughly antithetical to this origin".188 Inter-
est-bearing capital becomes the form of capital par excellence (just
as in commodity-fetishism Money succeeded exchange-value as the super-
ior expression of abstract labour) since it appears to be able to
create profit without the involvement of labour simply by offering
itself as loan and charging interest:
"It is in interest-bearing capital - in the division of
profit .into interest and (industrial) profit - that
capital finds its most objectified form, its pure fetish
form, and the nature of surplus-value is presented as
something which has altogether lost its identity".189
The complete explanation of the concrete totality of phenomena within
the determinate object of study is therefore, for Echeverria, the
basic test of truth to which the scientific theory must submit. But
this unity between theory and objective reality is not the ultimate
criterion of scientific verification:
"The final criterion is at the level of objective reality
itself, in the active unity of its transformation, in
social practice. The validity of a scientific theory
can only be proven in its effective capacity to
re roduce the concrete in obOective realit , and not
onl~ In thou9ht".
188. Capital III. p. 829189. Theories of Surplus Value p. 498; see Echeverria (op cit) pp.
168-178. Echeverria here considers parts of Theories of Surplus-Value
superior to similar sections in Capital III, and suggests that Engels
was at fault in not including them in Capital.
190. Echeverria (op cit) p. 169 (emphasis supplied) see Ch. 8. "'!he
problem of a revolutionary Science" pp. 265-297. In this discussion
of method we have emphasized the first criterion of validity; the
second is no less important for Echeverria's thesis.
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Cb) Sa~r19l
Sayer also considers that changes in Marx's Plan after 1857 are sign-
ificant for the question of the method of Inquiry. The decision to
begin with a historical particular, the commodity, rather than with
general and abstract determinants obtaining in all forms of society,
implies that the logical ascent from abstract to concrete can be
considered an adequate description of the method of Presentation only
(and then only in certain sense). The latter is also conceived by
Sayer as an ascent from essential relations to phenomenal forms,
organised on the basis of a hierarchy of "conditions of
possibility".192 These conditions must have been unearthed in their
entirety and their "inner connection" established before the logical
presentation could commence, thus the question of the method of
Inquiry remains open.193
Sayer argues that this method can be characterized specifically as a
Critique194 of categories expressing phenomenal forms of appear-
ance; assuming a relation of correspondence between categories of
thought and the phenomenal forms they apprehend, then "the conditions
of validity of the former will strictly co-incide with the conditions
191. see "Marx's Method: Ideology, Science & Critique in Capital"
(1979 a) ; "Science as Critique: Marx vs. Althusser" (1979 b) Sayer's
contribution is neither so broad nor ambitious in scope as
Echeverria's and will be discussed more briefly. An essential
congruence between the two positions will be suggested in the
Conclusion to this section.
192. this commodity before money, money before capital etc, according
to a deductive chain of reasoning (1979 a) p. 101; cf. Colletti supra.
193. Sayer (op cit) p. 102; see Marx's Postface to the 2nd German
edition of Capital, reproduced in (1976) p. 102.
194. so much, but no more, Sayer takes from Kant (op cit) pp.
105-110. It should be noted that Echeverria also conceives of Marx's
logic of Investigation as Critique (of the method of Political
Economy) - see (1978 a) Ch 6. pp. 179-214.
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of existence of the latter".195 Thus the starting-point lies not in
abstractions, but rather in "a concrete social form, the commodity,
as, moreover, it presents itself phenomenallx".196 Given this
point of departure in a particular phenomenal form, the structure of
Marx's analytic cannot be deductive, since there are no abstract or
"transhistorical" general laW'Sfrom which the essential relations of
phenomenal forms could be inferred, but neither can it be inductive,
since it is of the Qature of phenomenal forms that they are misleading
and general laws could not therefore validly be inferred from the
existence of broad empirical regularities. Instead, Marx's object is
the explanation of empirical and phenomenal correlations established
on the surface of society, through the discovery of the mechanisms
which bring them about, and behind these mechanisms the conditions
that are required for their operation:
"to this extent Marx held what modern philosophers of
science term a realist conception of explanation. This
means that the 'logic' of Marx's analytic is essentially
a logic of hypothesis formation, for what he basically
does is to p?sit mechanisms and conditions which
would, if they existed, respectively explain how and why
the phenomena we observe come to assume the forms they
do.197
The process of scientific reasoning may therefore be described as "a
195. Sayer (op cit) p. 110
196. ibid. p. 112 (emphasis supplied) cf Echeverria (supra) Sayer
quotes extensively (as does Echeverria) from Marx's Notes on Wagner,
where the concreteness of the commodity is emphasized. The
recognition of this concreteness would appear to be a pre-condition
for the adequate understanding of Marx's method. . ..
197. ibid. p. 114 ; this conception accords wIth the posItIons of
Bhaskar (1978) and Keat and Urry (1976).
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posteriori" and "retroductive,,198 in character, moving from phen-
omena I (surface) explananda to provisional (essential) explanans, and
incorporating exhaustiveness, independence and consistency as definite
criteria of adequacy.199
The inadequacy of Ricardo's explanation of the phenomenal forms of
Price and Profit, for example, derives from his failure to properly
account for the mechanisms of their production in his theory of
value. Because of the initial theoretical identification of value
with "Price of production and surplus-value with Profit, Ricardo is
led, when confronted with the manifest fact that this coincidence does
not occur in reality except for capitals of average composition, to
explain the empirical deviations as exceptions to the law of value,
and ultimately to postulate determinants of value other than labour-
time:200
"Ricardo commits all these blunders, because he attempts
to carry through the identification of the rate of
surplus-value with the rate of profit by means of forced
abstractions. The vulgar mob has therefore concluded
that theoretical truths are abstractions which are at
variance with reality, instead of seeing, on the
contrary, that Ricardo does not carry true abstract
thinking far enough and is therefore driven into false
abstraction".201
In other words, the mechanisms by means of which the alleged essences
are supposed to have caused the phenomena to assume the forms they do
have not been adequately specified. Scientific abstraction is com-
plete "only when the residuum resisting explanation has been thorough-
ly expunged; precisely when, in other words, the criterion of
198. here Sa~er draws on Hanson, discussed (ibid) pp. 113-135
199. ibid. e. 117
200. ibid. ee. 126-130
201. Theories of Surelus Value II. e.437 (emehasis supplied).
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exhaustiveness has been satisfied".202
Once the mechanisms explaining phenomena have been successfully re-
troduced, the conditions which explain why such mechanisms should
themselves exist may be identified as the real essential relations
underlying the forms of appearance. The explanation of how the
value-form, for example, can exist, is given in the mechanism which
renders commodities commensurable as repositories of abstract labour,
while the explanation of wh¥ this process should occur depends on
the demonstration of exploitative relations of surplus-value
extraction peculiar to developed commodity production.203 From the
critique of more or less adequate historical categories, then, has
resulted the reconceptualization of phenomenal forms "in terms of
their precise historical conditions of existence, as forms of
manifestation of historically specific essential relations."204
Having ascertained, in the process of this analytic procedure, the
boundaries within which economic categories can properly be applied,
Marx's dialectic then consists of the identification and criticism of
transsressions of these boundaries, resulting in the wholesale
reformulation of the categories of Political Economy :
"What is at stake •••• is not just conceptual precision as
an end in itself ; it is the provision of categories
capable of grasping the historicity of the phenomena they
describe. Marx systematically and consistently re-
formulates the categories of his predecessors as
unambiguously trans-historical or historical concepts,
the former on the basis of his analysis of production in
202. Sayer (op cit) p. 122 (emphasis supplied) c.f. Echeverria's
conception of the submission of the abstract to the concrete totality
(supra). For a discussion of the further criteria of "independence"
and "consistency", see Sayer (op cit) pp. 130-135.
203. Sayer (1979 b) p. 44.
204. ibid.
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general and the latter on the basis of the conclusions of
his analysis.,,205
Thus the apparently simple category of Labour, whose different
dimensions Ricardo failed to grasp in his Theory of Value, does not
exist in this form in Capital. From the end of the Grundrisse, the
concept of "useful labour" is used to refer to that "irrmeasurably
ancient relation valid in all forms of society", whilst "abstract
labour" is specificapy defined as obtaining as a category only of the
most modern relations; and the commodity exchanged in the wage-trans-
action ceases to be regarded as a thing (labour), and becomes instead
the right of disposition over labour-power. Another example of the
transgression of proper categorial boundaries is the Trinity formula
of vulgar economy, which links three elements of production in
general (land, labour and means of production) with three historically
determinate economic forms (rent, wages and interest); this subsurnp-
tion of historical under transhistorical categories also results in
the eternization of specifically bourgeois relations, through the
spurious generalization of particular historical characteristics.206
(3) Conclusions; Marx's Method
Were this thesis concerned specifically with the question of Marx's
method, it would be necessary, in order to do justice to the "contin-
uity" interpretation, to attempt a detailed reading of the 1857
Introduction and its comparison with the later works, with the pur-
pose of reconciling the apparent contradictions between different
periods in Marx's development and demonstrating through close textual
205. Sayer (1979 a) p. 146.
206. ibid. pp. 147-149
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analysis the validity of the conception of an abstract> concrete
logical trajectory; the basically ehilosoehical concerns of Zeleny,
Colletti, Althusser and others have dwarfed the particular question of
method and resulted in teleological interpretations of the 1857 text
which fail to even acknowledge its problematic character.207 It
would also be necessary, in making a proper case a9ainst continuity,
to define Marx's method of Inquiry in Capital and illustrate this
interpretation with a greater rigour and closer respect of the
complexity and detail of the argument than has so far been provided.
But since our particular object is Law (and moreover a specific aspect
of Law) rather than the capitalist economy, this undertaking is
considered, for present purposes, unnecessary (and possibly even
misleading) since the'implication of the argument above is that the
finer points of the materialist method must be developed in relation
to the e:rticular object and not "a prioristically" determined in
advance of it. Therefore the question of Marx's method of inquiry in
Capital must remain open, and only preliminary and tentative
observations here offered by way of conclusion.
As the debate currently stands, the conclusion that a definite break
separates the early parts of the Grundrisse from capital is inescap-
207. A "prima facie" case has been made out against continuity,
controvertible only through a similarly rigorous argument. Carver
(1980) has contested the conclusions of Echeverria's published extract
on the 1857 Introduction, arguing that the different concepts of
abstraction employed there are only apparently contradictory; that
there is no "break" in 1859 through a re-appropriation of Hegel; and
that Echeverria's account of method is "obscure and inaccurate". Here
it can only be noted that Carver's five sides hardly do justice to the
complexity of Echeverria's argument, as the latter makes clear in his
reply (1980) ; that (whatever its other defects) Echeverria's account
can hardly be called "obscure", particularly in the context of his
broader thesis; and that other currents in Marxist thought, besides
Echeverria, (eg Mepham, Sayer, Tribe Ope cit.) have arrived at similar
conclusions in similar studies (although by slightly different paths),
and the breadth of this movement should be considered in its critique.
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able; the latter cannot adequately be conceived as the realization,
the truth of, the former which "anticipates" it. Only in a super-
ficial sense does the Rough Draft provide the key to the anatomy of
the mature economic works. Neither can the method of investigation
informing Capital be considered the same as that laid down in the 1857
Introduction.
The framework for a ~re adequate conception of Marx's method of
Inquiry is provided in two alternative accounts, different but not
fundamentally contradictory. Echeverria emphasizes the inconsisten-
cies in the use and meaning of abstraction in the Introduction; the
break with Feuerbachian empiricism and the "critical re-appropriation"
of Hegel; the distinction between concrete social practice and
abstract scientific practice; and the characterization of Marx's
method as a trajectory from concrete particular through abstraction to
concrete totality. Sayer on the other hand stresses the element of
Critique in Marx's method; the analytic and dialectic moments of this
process; the distinction between violent and scientific abstraction;
the transgression of "categorial boundaries" and the subsequent
process of re-formulation; and most importantly the "retroductive" and
"a posteriori" basis of Marx's reasoning in a Realist epistemology,
postulating mechanisms and conditions underlying forms of appearance.
The principal defficiencies of each interpretation may be considered
in the light of the other: In Echeverria, the process of abstraction
that constitutes scientific practice is well described but its epist-
emological basis, the logical structure of reasoning that produces the
correct results, nowhere properly specified. Sayer's accounts on the
other hand, whilst adequate in this respect, fails to grasp the
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d¥namic character of Marx's method as a continuous movement from
concrete to abstract to concrete (but now a broader concrete), from
the particular to the general.
Nevertheless, the common ground of assumptions between these two
writers is considerable, concerning the role of Science as penetration
of Appearances and revelation of essential relations; the correspond-
ence of categories of thought to phenomenal forms expressing real
relations; the starting-point in a simple phenomenal concrete, the
commodity; and the empirical foundation of Marx's method (yet its
non-empiricist conception of scientific abstraction). It is possible
therefore to characterize the basic principles of Marx's method as a
synthesis of these two positions (with significant additional insights
from other sources), and to illustrate the resulting conception in
general terms by examining the basic structure of Capital.
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(1) The methodological trajectory may be represented by the figure of
an inverted cone208, its circular surface plane denoting the total-
ity of practically constituted social practice, and its conical form
reaching down to its "apex" expressing the process of scientific
abstraction. The former plane constitutes the realm of Appearances
and phenomenal Forms, whose objects are the concentration of many
determinations and relations, unity of the diverse; this is also the
sphere of Circulatio~ and Exchange, and the foundation of bourgeois
ideology accounting for the spontaneous consciousness of the agents of
production. The latter dimension on the other hand is distinguished
by its non-appearance at the level of social practice and by its
revelation of Essences and Real relations, the determinations that
constitute the concrete as unity of the diverse; this is also the
sphere of Production and of Marxist Science. This representation of
the basic elements of Marx's logic conceives scientific knowledge as
the result of a process of excavation, beginning with concrete
social forms and revealing what lies beneath them, rather than as the
result of a procedure "rising above" the concrete and then descending
to that level in order to account for it.209
(2) At the centre of the circular surface plane of this figure,210
and extending down to its "apex" in a straight line, is represented
the dimension of simplicity; the futher the analysis moves away from
this central axis, the less simple and more complex it is becoming.
Hence whilst the abstract may certainly be simple, the simple is not
reduced to the abstract, since after 1857 Marx recognizes that the
208. see Appendix B. fig 1.
209. see Sayer (1979 b) p. 31
210. see Appendix B. fig. 2.
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concrete may also be simple. Thus one plane of the logical trajectory
is the movement from concrete particular to concrete totality, from
the particular to the general, expanding in a "spiral" movement
across the surface of the figure and eventually encompassing its outer
boundaries; but the second and indispensable dimension that makes this
trajectory possible is the constant oscillation between the concrete
and the abstract. What must finally be explained is the Concrete
Totality and the place and function of the Concrete Paricular within
it, the reasons why they should assume the forms they do, and why
therefore the spontaneous consciousness of agents should be as it is.
Only the constant resort to abstract determinations through a scien-
tific process of abstraction can satisfy these requirements.211
(3) Marx's restricted object of study in Capital is the capitalist
mode of production212, represented by the circular surface of the
figure. Within the restricted object, the most elementary and simple
cell-form given in social practice is the concrete commodity,213
which therefore occupies a position at the centre of the surface
plane. Marx begins Capital with a critique of this form and its
corresponding categories which operates through abstraction, constant-
ly analyzing surface forms and breaking them down into their constitu-
ent elements, and returning the results in a process of synthesis to
211. Echeverria makes fragmentary reference to "spiral" and
"oscillating" movements, these notions originating most probably in
Zeleny (who incorrectly altributes their basis to Marx in the
Introduction) (supra). These metaphors grasp the dyvamic element in
Marx's method (underemphasized by Sayer); we have Interpreted them
here (not necessarily in the same way as other writers) as part of a
coherent broader visual metaphor. It must be remembered that this
figurative representation is merely a 9uide to thinking the problem
of method, which must not then assume an independent existence and
impose its structure on the complexity of the object.
212. see Appendix B. fig. 3.
213. see the opening paragraph to Capital 1 p. 125.
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the level of the concrete as explanation. Having analyzed the twofold
nature of the commodity, what has to be explained is exchange-value,
the form of appearance of Value. The question of how such a social
form is possible is answered by postulating the existence of a
mechanism which renders distinct commodities commensurable as
repositories of abstract labour. Exchange-value is then analyzed in
its Simple, Expanded, General and ultimately Money forms (section 3),
but always in relation to the results already produced by scientific
abstraction. The spiral movement outwards from the most elementary to
increasingly complex forms is subject to constant interruptions and
suspensions, as the oscillating movement between abstract and concrete
gives priority to the former, however, the analysis is fully submitted
to the concrete in s~ction 4, where commodity fetishism, and hence the
spontaneous consciousness of the agents of production, is explained
in the context of the results obtained in the previous three sections.
From here the spiral expands in consideration of Exchange (Ch.2),
Circulation (Ch.3), the transformation of Money into Capital and the
sale and purchase of labour-power (part 2), before leaving the sphere
of simple circulation completely and descending into the realm of the
production of Absolute and Relative surplus-value (parts 3-5),
examining the real relations of exploitation (the conditions of the
mechanisms) from which the phenomenal forms ultimately derive. The
process of approximation to the concrete totality is gradually
developed in the analytical progess of the three Volumes, the most
abstract categories of capital-in-general (surplus-value, labour-
power) giving way to those of the analysis of many capitals in
competition (Price, Profit, Wages). The exhaustive explanation of the
restricted object of study culminates in the account of the totality
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of its forms and of agents' corresponding consciousness through the
theory of capital-fetishism.214
214. This description is of course extremely schematic. An adequate
examination of Marx's logic in Capital would have to trace the
development of the analysis in detail, in constant reference to the
text.
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V pro~ts for the Marxist anal~is of Law
(1) Method and 'l1leo!}'
The assumption that the logical trajectory from abstract to concrete
characterizes Marx's method of Inquiry results in a definite
conception of the nature of Marxist "Theory" and of the "concrete" in
relation to it : once the simplest and most abstract theoretical
elements of the obj~ct under investigation have been isolated,
progress can begin towards the reproduction of the concrete whole as
a concentration of many determinations and relations by a smooth
process of "concretization". The concrete itself is reached only when
sufficient mediating determinations have been provided in the develop-
ment of the initially abstract theory.215 Whilst at a high level of
abstraction,
"analyses will inevitably be relatively indeterminate in
their implications for specific conjunctures. This
relative indeterminacy, or underdetermination, can be
progressively eliminated through the concretization and/
or complexification of the theoretical object and its
conditions of existence and effectivity. This means a
progressive shift from the primacy of form to an emphasis
on content •••"216
The dominant approaches thus acknowledge the existence of an
embarrassing disjunction between Theory and the concrete, but promise
that concrete and historical analyses will ultimately be forthcoming,
if at the end of a difficult period of theoretical development. But
whilst the method of presentation of Capital may arguably be
characterised as a movement of gradual approximation towards the
215. The tendency is to oppose the "abstract" Mode of Production to
the "concrete" Social Formation.
216. Jessop (op cit) p. 366 (referring to theories of Law and the
State).
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concrete object,217 there is no adequate basis for the assumption
that this trajectory constitutes Marx's logic of Investigation, and it
is precisely this problem of research that most concerns us here. It
has been argued that the method of inquiry informing Capital begins
with the concrete and ends with the concrete : the starting-point is
given in practically constituted social organization, not in abstract
and general a priori definitions; and that, moreover, the process of
inquiry is characterized by two distinct but inter-related movements,
the spiral expansio~ from simple to complex and the oscillating move-
ment between the concrete and the abstract, involving breaks,
suspensions, digressions and interruptions in the analysis, which
cannot therefore adequately be described as a gradual descent from the
abstract to the concrete and complex whole.
The conceptions of theory, the concrete, the abstract and abstraction
that define the dominant approaches have significant effects when
attention is turned from the exposition of Marx's logic in the
economic works to the theorization of other aspects of the totality.
Even assuming that Zeleny, Colletti, Althusser or Carver, as examples,
were correct in their interpretation of Marx's method, the question of
the specific nature of the superstructure218 and therefore of the
possibly different method that might be required to appropriate it
would still need to be posed, and the particular object of study
rigorously defined, before the assumption that the same method was
applicable in both cases could be justified. However, when theorists
of Law and the State have considered the problem of method, authority
has generally been sought in the 1857 Introduction, supposed to embody
217. (supra) Section IV
218. (here this term is used merely as descriptive shorthand, having
a metophorical rather than theoretical status).
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"obviously the scientifically correct method" for the analysis of any
aspect of the totality whatsoever. The consequences of this
allegience may be illustrated by reference to the methodological
foundations of the two principal approaches to Law and the State, as
represented by Pashukanis and Althusser.
Pashukanis2l9 refers extensively to that same section of the
Introduction consid~red by all commentators who assume continuity
between 1857 and Capital. The purpose of Theory is the reproduction
of the concrete as a rich totality of many determinations and
relations, avoiding chaotic and blurred conceptions that leave out of
account the constituent elements of the object.220 Marx's
observations are :
"directly p:rtinent to the general theory of law. The
concrete reality - society, the population, the State -
must in this case, too, be the conclusion and the end
result of our deliberations, but not their starting-
point. By moving from the most simple to the most
complex, from the process in its purest form to its more
concrete manifestations, one is following a course
which 1S methodologically more precise and clearer, and
thus more correct, than if one were to feel one's way
forward with nothing more in mind then a hazy and
unarticulated picture of the concrete whole.,,22l
Here a problematic assumption is made concerning the "direct
pertinence" of Marx's methodological remarks to the field of law, and
the "simple", as might be expected, is reduced to the "abstract", both
of which terms are logically opposed to the concrete totality.
Pasukanis concludes his brief discussion of method thus :
219. Pashukanis (op cit) is discussed here because of his obvious
influence on the State Derivation school; the close methodological
relation to Zeleny and Colletti should also be noted.
220. (op cit) "The Methods of constructing the concrete in the
abstract sciences", pp. 65-72.
221. ibid. p.66 (emphasis supplied)
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IIApplying these methodological considerations to the theory
of law, we must start with an analysis of the legal form
in its most abstract and pure shape and then work towards
the historicall¥ concrete b¥ making thIngs more
comelex.1I222
Chapter 4 then identifies the IIsubject IIas the purest, simplest and
most irreducible atom of legal form, and therefore the correct point
of departure for the theory of law. The legal State as a social
organization with the means of coercion at its disposal is lithe
concrete totality Wbich we must arrive at after first comprehending
the legal relation in its purest and simplest form.1I223
Here abstraction is conceived, consistently with Marx's basic position
in the Introduction, as a practice decomposing the real concrete into
its most basic constituents, lIabstracting fromll the existence of the
diverse and chaotic whole in order to find the starting-point, before
the restriction on the concrete is relaxed and the analysis gradually
approximates to the concrete totality.224 The theoretical effects
of this position, involving the reduction of the State to
constitutional legality and the essentialization of different forms of
right and sUbjectivity in the commodity-form, have been detailed in
Chapter 3.225 The purpose here is to demonstrate the possibility
that these theoretical defficiencies are rooted in a methodological
inadequac¥ - in a particular conception of the abstract/concrete
relation and of the nature and role of scientific abstraction. Thus
the IIcontradictionll supposedly undermining bourgeois domination,
postulated at an abstract theoretical level but purporting to explain
222. ibid. p. 71
223. ibid. p. 99.
224. see Echeverria (1978 a) p. 167.
225. see Conclusion to discussion of Blanke et. al., Hirsch, and
Holloway & picciotto, supra Ch. 3.
184
conjunctural developments in Law and the State, merely imposes
essentialist definitions on the complexity of concrete reality.226
This tendency to rationalism, implicit in the a priori development of
abstract theoretical constructs and the subsequent attempt to bring
them into relation with the concrete, also explains the almost
complete absence of concrete and historical analyses within this
tradition, which has remained at an abstract and general level despite
the recent efforts of the State derivation school.
The suggestion of rationalism in the Althusserian tradition is
compounded by the rigorous distinction of the real object from the
object of knowledge.227 Since the Essence/Appearance conception of
the structure of reality is abandoned, scientific knowledge cannot
result from the excavation and extraction of the "essential" from the
"phenomenal", but is produced rather by the action of the concepts of
a scientific problematic (G.2.) on existing more or less ideological
notions (G.l.). The adequacy of theoretical concepts is not then
judged according to the "idealist/empiricist problem of knowledge",
but by internal criteria governing the process of concept formation
within the theoretical system. By these means the problem of the
concrete and of the relation between the logical and historical orders
(which Althusser identifies in Della Volpe and Colletti but which
exists also in the tradition of Pashukanis) is dissolved into a
consideration of the "synchronic" and "diachronic" entirely within the
226. ••••and is responsible for the "apocalyptism" referred to
(supra) in Ch. 3.
227. for Marx this is a "prosaically commonsensical distinction made
in a specific context: against Hegel's speculative habit of making the
concept the demiurge of reality". (Sayer 1979 b p. 29). As has been
extensively demonstrated, Marx assumes a relation of correspondence
between categories and the real (supra)
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knowledge process.228 '!benature of IIGeneralities 211as means of
analysis absolved of the requirement of producing results in
llconformityllwith the real enables, in its extreme form, Balibar's
attempt to generate the concepts of all possible modes of production
by permutating five "formal invariantsll•229 Hence also Poulantzas's
concern with the "invariant elements of the economic in generalll,230
labourer, means of production and non-labour, combined in specific
relations of property and real appropriation. It has been shown,
however, that Marx accorded only a limited role to transhistorical
categories (e.g. Production in general), and that the 1857 plan
beginning with lithegeneral and abstract determinants obtaining in
more or less all forms of society" was abandoned in favour of a
concrete starting-point given specifically within the social practice
of the capitalist mode of production.
Even where lIapriorismlldoes not take this extreme form, there remains
a tendency, for example in Poulantzas, to avoid detailed analysis at
the most concrete levels either by invoking instead the principles of
structural causality, relative autonomy, over-determination and deter-
m inati.on"In the last instance", or by subsuming empirical phenomena
within general and abstract concepts; thus the concept of IIAuthorit-
arian Statismll, because it abstracts from the existence of particular
national conjunctures in order to present the general features of the
"exceptionalll form of the IInormalllState, lends itself to litheunfort-
unate technique of SUbsuming a large number of disparate, contradict-
228. see supra. Section III (c); of course the problem is not
thereby resolved; Poulantzas confronts it as unsuccessfully as does
Pashukanis.
229. see Althusser (1970) Part 3: IIBasic concepts of Historical
Materialismll•
230. (1968) p. 26.
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ory and unevenly developed tendencies under one loosely specified
concept" .231 In relation to Law, general conceptions of "decline"
subsititute for detailed and concrete anaylsis of specific conjunc-
tural changes in form and function. Law is reduced to the State and
the political instance in the abstract-formal concepts of the
"juridicopolitical" and "Authoritarian Statism", and where the
concrete (but still relatively abstract) analyses do succeed, this is
in spite rather than because of the method employed.232 The
problem of concrete research is thus no more adequately resolved by
this theoretical approach, Althusser's intervention having succeeded
merely in re-casting it in terms foreign to Marx's epistemology, which
moreover increase the possibility of the distortion of material
reality.
It is now clear that the reductionism of the dominant theoretical
approaches, detailed in the previous chapter,233 is a function of
their particular conception of the nature of theoretical practice and
its relation to the concrete, theory having its point of departure in
the abstract and counterposed in its initial development to the
concrete. Yet no sinsle abstractl¥ determined theor¥ can P9ssibl¥
srasp the complexit¥ of the concrete totalit¥ of a siven object with-
out distortion and reduction. The pervasiveness of the reductionist
tendency, and the failure of theorists of Law to produce an altern-
ative conception that does not suffer from this defect, is indicative
of the bankruptcy of the abstract > concrete methodological trajectory
informing the dominant theoretical approaches. Thus tendencies to
231. Jessop (op cit) p. 360
232. see Conclusions to Ch. 3, section II (supra) for further
examples.
233. (supra) Ch. 3. Section IV.
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rationalism, essentialism, theoreticism and reductionism are linked
indissolubly to particular conceptions of the abstract, concrete,
theory and scientific abstraction, these in turn depending on the
implicit or explicit assumption of an abstract point of departure and
the gradual approximation of theory to the concrete. Here the promise
of concrete analysis adequate to the complexity of the object is delu-
sory. Only a different understanding of method, which enables
theoretical determinations to be developed in close relation to the
specificity of Law,'can break the deadlock of the existing theoretical
debate and open up new directions in Marxist research.
The critique of "General 'Theory", therefore, emphasizes the inadequacy
of this conception in respect of its claims both to be grounded in
Marx's method of investigation and to provide the conditions for
concrete and detailed analysis of the object of study. The specifi-
city of Law is lost in general theories of Law and the State, which
fail inevitabl¥ to account exhaustively for its diversity: for its
private and public forms of right and subjectivity, its consensual and
coercive functions, and its broader relation to the repressive State
apparatus. This argument should not, however, be extended to the
complete denial of general theory and its achievements; insights into
the role and function of the juridico-political in general may be
provided only at a high level of abstraction, and could not possibly
be "retroduced" from the concrete: Poulantzas's conception of
"Authoritarian Statism" and Iblloway and picciotto' s notion of the
"restructuring of the capital relation" are examples. Nevertheless,
the fact remains that the limitations of the conception of general
theory, in its methodological basis and its capacity to account fully
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for the concrete, have not been properly recognized. The belief that
research projects can move eventually to lower levels of abstraction
through complexification and concretization of abstract determinations
provided within one or other of the dominant theoretical positions is
a complacent illusion that must be resisted.
(2) Pros~ts for the concreteanal~is of Tres~s Law
It follows that the failure of the dominant theoretical approaches to
provide the conditions for the adequate concrete analysis of Trespass
law, indicated in the Conclusion to Chapter 3,234 is a result of
methodological defficiencies in the conception of a "General 'Iheory"
of Law and the State. An abstract > concrete logical trajectory is
wrongly attributed to Marx's Capital, and then applied without just-
ification in the field of the juridico-political".235
The prospects for the concrete analysis of Trespass Law in accordance
with the methodological observations of this chapter may now be con-
sidered:
(1) There can be no question of the advance formulation of a general
dialectical method applicable to all social phenomena. Marx's method
provides, on the contrary, "a liberation from any such formalization
•••••established a priori to the scientific inquiry. Scientific
thought is defined as a free movement of thought only bound to the
234. ibid.
235. "jundico-J2C?litical", "su~rstructure" etc, are here used merely
descrietivel¥ (see note 218 suera) •
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objective movement beinS anal¥zed".236 The method of inquiry is
expressed and realized in the earticular concrete analysis237 (in
this case of Trespass law), therefore observations at this stage must
remain schematic.
(2) The implications of the difference between Trepass as an object
of study and Marx's object in Capital must be worked out in the course
of the analysis. Here it may be noted that it is of the very nature
of Law (particularly in its relation to the State) that it is ~
junctural, to adopt Gramsci's terminology, as opposed to orsanic;
occasional, immediate and ephemeral, "almost accidental", rather than
structurally long-term and relatively pennanent238; it is one
element within a totality of practices, ideological, religious,
philosophical, political and juridical, "that form the terrain of the
conjunctual (upon which) the forces of opposition organize".239 This
does not imply that Law is not in some fundamental respects "organic",
rather it suggests that law cannot be exhaustivel¥ defined other
than in conjunctural terms - precisely because in modern bourgeois
society it is constitutive if the conjuncture: Thus it is the
conditions of strussle around the eroE?sed chanses in Tres~ss law in
the mid-seventies that sive this object to Marxist anal¥sis. The
point of departure is in a definite historically and nationally
specific social formation, with whose complexity the concrete-abstract
-concrete methodological trajectory appears well-equipped to
236. Echeverria (1978 a) p. 254. (emphasis supplied); see ibid. ch.
7. "The Materialist Dialectic" pp. 214-264.
237. see Echeverria (1978 b) pp. 364-365; and (supra)
238. Gramsci: "Prison Notebooks" (1971) pp. 177-178.
239. ibid. p. 178.
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deal.240 (3) Certain distinguishing features of the analysis of
Trespass may be anticipated, deriving from the particular nature of
the object. Whilst the history of Trespass is subordinated to the
analysis of the present structure, role and function of the law ("the
anatomy of man provides the key to the anatomy of the ape"), the place
of history in the explanation of Trespass is not directly comparable
to its role (as identified by ECheverria24l) in Capital. Here it
will be used above all as a resource for comparison and contrast.
Similarly, "determination" assumes a dimension given entirely by the
specificity of the object and for which there is no precedent in
Capital. Again, the problems posed for analysis by the level of
Appearances of Law require explanations of a different order from
those provided by Marx in Capital, necessarily of a more dynamic
character because of the starting-point (which must be "explained") in
the conjuncture and the Social Formation; thus the explanatory
"mechanisms" and "conditions", and the criterion of "exhaustiveness",
may be given different meanings from those already attributed to
Marx's method of inquiry in Capital. Nevertheless, Marx's discoveries
can be expected to provide the foundation and presupposition of the
analysis of Trespass law.
(4) The proposects for the concrete analysis of Trespass law may now
240. The suggestion is that whilst Marx's Capital can be understood
as providing a "general theory" (distinguished from the General 'Iheory
criticized above by its concrete-abstract-concrete method) of the
tendential laws of motion of the capitalist economy, given at the
level of the mode of production and applicable across national
boundaries, there can be no such "general theory" of law, even in this
limited sense, because of its constitutive role in the conjuncture and
the social formation. Thus the same basic methodological trajectory
produces very different results depending on the nature of the object
of analysis. (Note that even in Capital this trajectory ensures that
"Mode of Production" is derived from the concrete and not
rationalistically opposed to the social formation as in abstract >
concrete conceptions).
241. Section IV (2) supra.
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be regarded as good. The starting-point is the concrete particular,
given in the determinate social practice of the restr.icted object at
the level of Appearances and in the sphere of Circulation, derived
from the critique of phenomenal forms as they are apprehended "with
social validity" in the categories of legal commentators, and
consisting of the simplest, most elemental and irreducible expression
of this aspect of legal practice : The risht to exclude the world
from interference with possession of land. This starting-point is
given literally in current social practice (in 1977 or 1981)
constitutive of the conjuncture, as the simplest element of the
restricted object, the basic atom of both its Private and Criminal
aspects. The obligation to the State not to infringe another
person's property right, embodied in the 1977 Act, depends for its
coherence on the pre-existing definition of exclusive property right.
"Private Law" (as it is defined in Appearances) is therefore the point
of departure, but it is not the essence of all other aspects of the
law which need not thereby become merely its expressions, since the
starting point has not been "logically deduced" within an abstract and
essentialist general theoretical system.
This concrete particular is then analyzed in its specificity, broken
down into its constituent elements through the scientific practice of
abstraction, before being returned to Appearances now r.evealed as the
synthesis of many determinations and relations. At this stage the
analysis will have provided a provisional explanation of whX the
form of appearance (the equal risht to exclude) assumes the form it
does, through the retroduction of both the mechanisms that might
explain it, and further the conditions and real relations essential to
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these mechanisms.242 Here the exposition is frequently interrupted
with digressions into the history of the law, serving as a resource
for contrast and comparison with its present form. The oscillation
between concrete (social practice) and abstract (scientific practice)
will also suggest, because of the essential relations uncovered
beneath the phenomenal appearance of the concrete particular, new
aspects of the concrete to be submitted to analysis, which does not
therefore begin comp'letely afresh with an entirely novel object. By
this process the object of study is broadened beyond what was
suggested in immediate appearances to include all law relatin9 to the
conditions of ~ssesion of and se~ration from Land both as a factor
of Production and a scarce resource in Consumption. The expanding
spiral trajectory from simple to complex social practice gradually
embraces Conspiracy, Forcible Entry, Landlord and Tenant and Property
Law, whose appearance as "Private" or "Public", "Civil" or "Criminal"
is now revealed as a result of the phenomenal organization of
categories in legal reasoning. Constantly the results of analysis
suggest the reformulation of legal categories and their articulation
in more scientifically adequate frameworks, which explain the real
role and function of this area of Law.
The first aspect of the concrete totality, whose appearances and
constituent forms must be exhaustively explained and accounted for, is
thus the concrete totality of law relating to the conditions of
possession of and separation from land. Complementing this
"synchronic" dimension, however, is a "diachronic" analysis of the
242. The explication of these conditions (real relations) has its
foundation in Capital, in the discoveries already made by Marx
principally in the "economic" region.
193
concrete totality of law in the context of its real histor¥, as
its elements are developed and re-articulated in the pervasive
struggles that form the terrain of the conjunctural.243 The final
stage of the analysis comprises the complete and exhaustive account
of the different forms of legal right and sUbjectivity through which
relations of possession are secured in the Capitalist formation,
including the historical and conjunctural analysis of the relation
of this aspect of the law to the activity of the State in its
mobilization in ever-more repressive forms. Law is not reduced to the
commodity-subject, failing to account for its links with the State
apparatus, but neither is it reduced to the State, ignoring its
specific quality as Law. The result is a total explanation, rich in
theoretical determinations developed through scientific abstraction,
yet firmly located in the concrete and the current situation.
Moreover, in the process of this investigation of Trespass, further
objects will have been suggested for analysis. It is above all in
respect of the promise of such concrete analysis that the approach
developed here is considered to transcend the sterility of existing
debates and to open up new possibilities for the Marxist understanding
of Law.
243. hence the redefinition of "concrete totality", given in the
nature of the object.
